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Abstract
This dissertation develops a semantic model of gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’, ‘good’, ‘big’,
‘heavy’, etc., within a formal semantic theory of locativeswe callLocative Structure Semantics
(LSS).
Our central hypothesis is that gradable adjectives are, semantically, a species of locative ex-
pression. The view of gradable adjectives as locatives is inspired by the vector-based semantic
models of Vector Space Semantics (VSS), as well as the notionf perspective or point of view,
as found in Leonard Talmy’s research on spatial expressions(Talmy [153]) and the tradition of
Situation Semantics (cf. Barwise and Perry [9, p. 39]). Following Barwise and Seligman [11],
we construe the contextual variability that characterisesgradable adjectives in terms of shifts
in cognitive perspective.
We argue that perspectives are a formal part of a semantic repres ntational structure that is
shared by expressions from several different domains, which we refer to as alocative structure
(L-structure). The notion of an L-structure is influenced byReichenbach’s notion of tense, and
can be thought of as a generalisation of the Reichenbachian notion of tense to the realm of
concepts. Reichenbach [134] proposed that each temporal expression is associated with three
time points: a speech point,S an event point,E, and reference point,R, whereE refers to the
time point corresponding to the event described by the tensed clause,S is (usually) taken to be
the speaker’s time of utterance, andR is a temporal reference point relevant to the utterance. In
LSS we extend this tripartite scheme to locative expressionin general, to which we assign a
ternary structure comprising a Perspective, a Figure, and aGround, represented symbolically
asP, F, andG, and which are generalisations of the ReichenbachianS, E, andR, respectively.
We show that a formal semantics based on L-structures enables us to capture important cross-
categorial similarities between gradable adjectives, tenses, and spatial prepositions.
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Chapter 1
Towards a Locative Theory of Gradable
Adjectives
1.1 Introduction
This dissertation develops a semantic model of gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’, ‘good’, ‘big’,
‘heavy’, etc., within a formal semantic theory of locativeswe callLocative Structure Semantics
(LSS).
Our central hypothesis is that gradable adjectives are, semantically, a species of locative
expression. The view of gradable adjectives as locatives isfound in the vector-based accounts of
Faller [46] and Winter [176], who employ a formal vector-based account within the framework
of Vector Space Semantics (Zwarts [180], Zwarts and Winter [182]).
At the heart of our proposed account of gradable adjectives is the notion ofperspectiveor
point of view. The concept of perspective is given particular importancei Leonard Talmy’s re-
search on spatial expressions (Talmy [153]), and is also a central principle of Situation Seman-
tics (e.g., Barwise and Perry [9, p. 39]). In particular, we follow Barwise and Seligman [11] in
regarding the contextual variability that characterises gradable adjectives as a matter of perspec-
tive, and present a formal account in which attributing thisvariability to a hidden perspectival
parameter in the semantic representation of the adjective.
Furthermore, we claim that there is an abstract level of semantic representation that is shared
by gradable adjectives, spatial and temporal prepositions, and tense, which we refer to as aloca-
tive structure(L-structure). The notion of a locative structure is influenc d by Reichenbach’s
notion of tense, and can be thought of as a generalisation of the Reichenbachian notion of tense
to the realm of concepts. Reichenbach [134] proposed that each t mporal expression is associ-
ated with three time points: aspeech point, S, anevent point, E, and areference point, R, where
1
E refers to the time point corresponding to the event described by the tensed clause,S is (usu-
ally) taken to be the speaker’s time of utterance, andR is a temporal reference point relevant to
the utterance. LSS extends this tripartite scheme to spatial expressions gradable adjectives; like
Reichenbachian tenses, locative structures have a ternarystructure, comprising aPerspective, a
Figure, and aGround(cf. Talmy [153]), represented symbolically asP, F, andG, respectively,
which are generalisations of the ReichenbachianS, E, andR points from the temporal to the
conceptual domain.
We begin this chapter with a discussion of the semantic properties of gradable adjectives,
followed by a survey of several different treatments they have been accorded in the formal
semantics literature (section 1.2). Of particular relevance to the present work is the theory of
Vector Space Semantics(VSS), as developed by Zwarts [180], Zwarts and Winter [182], which
we discuss in section 1.3. The VSS accounts of gradable adjectives (Faller [46], Winter [175,
176]) extend mechanisms originally developed to model the semantics of spatial prepositions,
effectively treating adjectives as locatives. In section 1.4 we present the principal claims that
comprise our thesis, and conclude with an overview of the following chapters, in section 1.5.
1.2 The Formal Semantics of Gradable Adjectives
1.2.1 Adjectives and Gradability
Certain properties have the characteristic that entities do not simply possess them, but possess
them to a certaindegree. Adjectives whose denotations are ordered according to such proper-
ties are accordingly called ‘gradable’ or ‘degree’ adjectives. For example, the adjectives ‘tall’
and ‘short’ have denotations that are ordered according to the same gradable property, viz.
HEIGHT. However, although both adjectives refer to the same underlying property, they do
so in contrasting ways; informally, ‘tall’ indicates a height greater than some threshold, while
‘short’ indicates a height that is lower.1 This threshold tends to vary according to the context,
and may be influenced by a broad range of factors, including the kind of entity the adjective is
being used to describe; for example, it might be appropriateto describe a five-year-old child as
‘tall’, yet a grown man of the same height might be considered‘short’.
Klein [95, p. 6] takes an adjectiveA to belong to the class of degree adjectives if and only if
1. A can occur in predicative position, in copular constructions with verbs such asbe, seem,
become, et cetera;
1It is not necessary to think of the threshold as apoint; it can be construed as aninterval instead, in which case
it would be possible for something to be neither ‘short’ nor ‘tall’.
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2. A can be preceded by degree modifiers such asvery, quite, extremely, et cetera.
Another traditional hallmark of degree adjectives is usagein comparative constructions, where
depending on properties of the associated ordering, the potential for comparison may be total
or partial:
(1) a. Bill is very rich.
b. Her watch was more expensive/cheaper than my car.
c. Bob is richer/poorer than Bill.
d. The bedroom was hotter/colder than the kitchen.
e. My car is faster/slower than your motorcycle.
The criteria for applying the standard and comparative forms of a given adjective do not always
coincide; it is often possible to describe a thing using the comparative form of an adjective even
where one would use an antonym or a negation of the standard form.
(2) a. Bob is not tall, but he is taller than Bill.
b. The film was not short, but it was shorter than the concert.
c. John is old, but he’s younger than Alice.
By the criteria given so far, the set of gradable adjectives includes items such asbig, small, tall,
short, old, young, high, low, etc., as well as ‘evaluative’ adjectives such assuperb, excellent,
skilful, beautiful, good, fair, poor, badandawful.
Another mark of gradability ismeasurability, though this is a sufficient rather than a neces-
sary criterion for gradability. Measurement can be viewed as a form of comparison in which an
interval or extent (a length, duration, or the degree to which an entity possesses a given prop-
erty) can be numerically expressed as a ratio of some known interval, known as ameasureor
unit of measurement. Some measures are fixed by formal social or scientific convention (e.g.,
centimetre, fathom, kilogramme, ampere), but everyday measur terms vary considerably in
their degree of exactness (e.g.,handful, day’s walk), and can sometimes be improvised in an ad
hoc manner.
In applying a measure, it is necessary to identify the boundsof the interval being measured.
In English, when the measure phrase modifies a comparative form, as in (3), what is measured
is thedifferencein degree between the things being compared:
(3) a. Bob is 60 kilogrammes heavier/lighter than Alice.
b. Her watch was 400 dollars more expensive/cheaper than my car.
c. Bob is 2 million dollars richer/poorer than Bill.
3
d. The bedroom was 30 degrees hotter/colder than the kitchen.
e. My car is 10 metres-per-second faster/slower than your motorcycle.
By contrast, when a measure phrase modifies the positive (non-comparative) form of a grad-
able adjective, as in (4), the measure term invariably qualifies thetotal or absoluteextent of
possession of the property in question; if we think of the prope ty as represented by a line, then
measurement is taken from the zero point or origin.
(4) a. Bob is 2 metres tall.
b. The hotel is 4 storeys high.
c. John is 30 years old.
d. The film was 2 hours long.
e. Her watch is 5 minutes slow.
While we may take the presence of a measure phrase modifier as asure indicator of gradability
in an adjective, the converse is not the case. First, there aradjectives for which measure terms
are simply not readily available (e.g., ‘beautiful’); morev r, there are also many gradable
adjectives which readily take a measure phrase modifier in their comparative form, yet seem
unable to do so in their absolute form, as we can see if we compare the sentences in (3) with
those in (5).
(5) a. * Bob is 60 kilogrammes heavy/light.
b. * My watch was 400 dollars expensive/cheap.
c. * Bob is 2 million dollars rich/poor.
d. * The bedroom was 30 degrees hot/cold.
e. * My car is 10 metres-per-second fast/slow.
Even in those cases where measure phrase modification is felic tous, however, the absolute form
is constrained in other ways. Given an antonymic pair of gradable adjectives in positive form,
as in the sentences in (6), we often find that measure phrase modification is acceptable with one
member of the pair, but not the other—by contrast, with the comparative form, measure phrase
modifiers are typically acceptable with both members of the pair, as in (3) above.
(6) a. Bob is 2 metres tall/*short.
b. The table is 1 metre wide/*narrow.
c. The hotel is 4 storeys high/*low.
d. John is 30 years old/*young.
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However, there are some pairs, such as those in (7), where this asymmetry is not present.
(7) a. My watch is 2 minutes fast/slow.
b. Bob was 2 hours late/early.
One feature of adjectival measure phrase modification is that the meaning of a gradable ad-
jective in the presence of a measure phrase appears to be different from what it means on its
own. The adjective appears to lose the ‘evaluative’ aspect of the its meaning in the presence
of a measure phrase modifier: objects ofany height can be described using the construction
‘x metres tall’, not just the ones judged to be ‘tall’simpliciter. For example, a child who is
described as ‘five years old’ would not be described as ‘old’ in absolute terms, nor would a
man who is ‘four-foot tall’ be described as ‘tall’.
Measure phrases do not only appear with gradable adjectives, of course, but also with spatial
and temporal locative expressions in general, as in (8) and (9) below.
(8) a. five metres in front of/behind/outside/*near/*on thehouse
b. five metres tall/*short/wide/*narrow/deep/*shallow
(9) a. two years before/after the storm
b. two years old/*young
The possibility of measure phrase modification with gradable adjectives has led to at-
tempts to develop a cross-categorial account of measure phrase modifiers, notably by Martina
Faller [46] and Yoad Winter [175, 176] in the framework of Vector Space Semantics (VSS).
1.2.2 Predicative and Attributive Adjectives
In English, adjectives occur in two canonical positions within the clause, in what are often
called ‘attributive’ and ‘predicative’ position. IfA is an adjective andN a common noun,
then we shall say thatA is in attributive positionwhen it occurs as a nominal modifier in a
construction of the formA+ N, as in the phrases ‘blue sky’, ‘big flea’ and ‘good plumber’,
and inpredicative positionwhen it appears without an accompanying noun in the VP, after
copularbeor a verb such asbecome, as in the corresponding phrases ‘The sky is blue’, ‘The
flea is big’, and ‘The plumber is good’.
It has become commonplace to employ the terms ‘attributive’and ‘predicative’ to describe
thesemanticproperties of adjectives. Those adjectives whose occurrences, whether in attribu-
tive and predicative position, can be given a standalone or inte sective interpretation are clas-
sified assemantic predicatives, and those which cannot are classed assemantic attributives.
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Much of the debate over the semantics of degree adjectives has centred around whether they
should be treated as predicatives or attributives.
The traditional logical analysis of adjectives treats themas predicates, which works well
for some cases; for example, if we know that some entityx is a three-legged dog, then we know
thatx is a dog, and also thatx is three-legged. Moreover, a three-legged dog doesn’t cease to be
three-legged when we consider the supertypes of dog: a three-legg d dog is also a three-legged
mammal, and a three-legged animal.
(10) x is a three-legged dog.
(11) a. ⇒ x is a dog
b. ⇒ x is three-legged
The meaning of ‘x is a three-legged dog’ can be given an analysis in terms of conjunction or
(extensionally) set intersection: ifA is an adjective andN a noun, with denotationsA′ andN′
respectively, thenJA+NK = A′∩N′. It is possible to think of ‘three-leggedness’ as a standalone
property, independent of whatever noun it modifies.
While many adjectives can occur in both attributive and predicative positions, some adjec-
tives cannot appear as standalone predicates, and are only fou d in attributive position; for ex-
ample, the attributive phrases ‘former president’, ‘alleged fraudster’, ‘pretend policeman’, etc.,
do not appear to have acceptable predicative versions, cf. *‘The president is former’, *‘The
fraudster is alleged’, *‘The policeman is pretend’. Accordingly, these are sometimes called
‘attributive’ or ‘relational’ adjectives; this group includes, for example, the adjectives ‘former’,
‘future’, ‘alleged’, ‘supposed’, ‘purported’, ‘pretend’, and ‘imitation’ , among others.
Parsons [123, p. 323] refers to these adjectives as ‘non-standard modifiers’;2 semantically,
they cannot be modelled using a straightforward intersectiv analysis. If we know that person
x is an ‘alleged’ fraudster, than we cannot conclude thatx is a fraudster, while it makes no
sense to say that ‘x is alleged’; moreover, ifx is a ‘pretend’ policeman, then we must conclude
that he or she is in factnot a policeman, while a ‘former’ policeman is someone who is nota
policeman at the time of utterance, but has been at some pointin the past.
(12) x is an alleged fraudster.
(13) a. ; x is a fraudster
b. ; ∗x is alleged
2The class of ‘non-standard modifiers’ also includes certainadverbs, such as ‘allegedly’ and ‘supposedly’; see
Parsons [123, p. 323] for discussion.
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In most of these cases, the adjective does not appear to denote a standalone property: adjectives
such as ‘former’ or ‘alleged’, for example, do not make sensei isolation, but can only be
interpreted in construction with a common nounN, as in ‘formerN’ or ‘alleged N’. In the
logical semantics, these adjectives are functors that mustfirst apply to the semantic value of
N, only then yielding a one-place predicate which can be combined with a subject. In other
words, if A is an adjective andN a noun, with interpretationsA′ andN′ respectively, then the
interpretation of the phraseA+N is given byJA+NK = A′(N′).
Some theorists have proposed that certain other types of adjective, notably degree and evalu-
ative adjectives, should be given the same semantic treatment as relational adjectives even when
occurring by themselves in predicative position without anaccompanying noun. As Geach [55,
p. 33] puts it:
‘Big’ and ‘Small’ are attributive; ‘x is a big flea’ does not split up into ‘x is a flea’
and ‘x is big’, nor ‘x is a small elephant’ into ‘x is an elephant’ and ‘x is small’;
for if these analyses were legitimate, a simple argument would show that a big flea
is a big animal and a small elephant a small animal.
Geach’s claim is that ‘big’ and ‘small’, as well as other gradable adjectives, aresemantic at-
tributives, a view that is also found in Montague’s proposed semantics for English in [117]. We
describe this position in the next section, and the resurgence of predicative analysis in the work
of Kamp and others in Section 1.2.4 below.
1.2.3 Degree Adjectives as Semantic Attributives
Montague’s [117] describes gradable and evaluative adjectives as ‘subsective’ (other terms are
‘affirmative’ in Kamp [84, p. 125]) and ‘restrictive’ in Keena and Faltz [91, p. 68]), which
means simply that the set denoted by the result of applying such an adjective to a noun is
always a subset of the denotation of the noun by itself. In other words, given adjectiveA and
nounN, with denotationsA′ andN′ respectively, we haveA′(N′) ⊆ N′, as in (1.2.3) below.
(14) big′( f lea′) ⊆ f lea′
(15) good′(hitman′) ⊆ hitman′
Clearly, the class of subsective adjectives includes the class of intersective adjectives, but not
vice versa: in Geach’s example, if we know that an entity is a big flea, for instance, we cannot
say that the entity is big, since a big flea can be considered a small animal, but at least we know
that the entity is a flea. Similarly, if we know that someone isa good hitman, then although we
cannot conclude that he or she is good simpliciter—indeed, one would usually consider a good
hitman to be a ratherbadperson—we do know that the person is a hitman.
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(16) x is a big flea.
(17) a. ⇒ x is a flea
b. ; x is big
(18) x is a good hitman.
(19) a. ⇒ x is a hitman
b. ; x is good
In the case of the relational or attributive approach, instead of saying simply that some entity
is ‘big’ or ‘tall’, one says that that entity is ‘a bigN’ or ‘a tall N’, where N specifies the
comparison class. In similar vein, instead of saying that some entity is ‘good’, one says that
it is ‘a good N’ where N indicates the relevant role or respectin terms of which goodness is
judged. In logical syntax, the adjective is applied first to this N, yielding a one-place predicate
which only then can be predicated of the subject like the one-place predicatethree− legged′.
On this view, ‘big’ is always interpreted relative to some comparison class, and it makes no
sense to call something big or small except relative to such aclass: a flea can be ‘big for a flea’,
while at the same time ‘small for an animal’. In the case of evaluatives like ‘good’ and ‘bad’,
interpretation is relative to some relevant criterion, such as thefunctionperformed by the entity
being evaluated: thus, a man can be at once ‘good as a husband’but ‘bad as a father’, without
contradiction.
However, Montague [117] rejects the idea of defining multiple classes of adjectives in the
grammar itself, opting instead for a uniform treatment in which all adjectives are relational
(two-place) predicates, denoting functions from intensiof properties to properties. More-
over, all adjectives, in common with other functors, operaton theintensionsof their arguments
(this is motivated by the fact that many adjectives, especially the relational ones, are indeed in-
tensional in character).
While Montague’s approach avoids generating invalid entailments, this is only because, in
its raw form, it does not give rise to any entailments at all; in order to model the properties
of intersective and subsective adjectives (e.g., the knowledge that a three-legged dog is both
three-legged and a dog), Montague resorts to meaning postulates such as those in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Meaning postulates (Montague [117]))
1. ⌈everyδζ is a ζ⌉
whereδ is an intersective or subsective adjective andζ is a common noun.
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2. ⌈everyδζ is δ⌉
whereδ is an intersective adjective andζ is a common noun.
For example, ‘three-legged’ is an intersective adjective and ‘big’ is a subsective adjective. The
first meaning postulate in Definition 1 then allows one to infer that a three-legged dog is a dog
and a big flea is a flea; similarly, the second postulate allowsus to infer that a three-legged dog
is three-legged, but not that a big flea is big. These rules allow Montague to assign all adjectives
the same syntactic category and logical translation, whilest l obtaining the right entailments.
Of course, while Montague manages to avoid introducing adjectival subclasses in the grammar
proper, ultimately he does have to make reference to such subclasses.
Parsons [123] and Wheeler [170] also advocate a non-predicative analysis of degree adjec-
tives. Parsons analyses attributives like ‘fake’ and ‘alleged’ as semantic operators, so examples
like ‘x is a fake gun’ becomeF(Gx) (Parsons [123, p. 326]). Wheeler [170] translates a grad-
able adjective like ‘tall’ as a two-place relation holding between an entity and a set of entities,
where the latter acts as a comparison class by which tallnessis to be judged; a phrase such as
‘John is a tall man’ receives a two-part translation, as shown in (20):
(20) John is a tall man.
tall( john,λx.man(x))∧ john∈ λx.man(x)
In the first part of the translation given in (20), the adjective ‘tall’ is translated as a two-place
predicate holding between an entity and a comparison class,and is properly read as “John is
tall relative to the class of men”; the second part states that John is a man, and supports the
inference from ‘John is a tall man’ to ‘John is a man’. In contras to the Montague-Parsons
translation of ‘tall man’, Wheeler’s translation supportsthis inference directly. The analysis of
the adjective as a two-place relation allows for the variability of ‘tall’ to be modelled in terms
of the variability of the comparison class: for example, ‘John is a tall jockey’ would receive the
interpretation in (21), which indicates that John’s heightis now to be considered relative to the
set of jockeys.
(21) John is a tall jockey.
tall( john,λx. jockey(x))∧ john∈ λx. jockey(x)
Thus, as the comparison class changes from men to jockeys to basket all players, or whatever,
the tallness of John may also vary significantly.
At first sight, the attributive approach appears to be a simple and adequate solution for
capturing the variability of gradable adjectives: any syntactically attributive constructionA+N,
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whereA is a degree adjective andN is a noun, will be translated withN representing the
relevant comparison class. However, several researchers,including McConnell-Ginet [113],
Siegel [144], [146], and Beesley [12, p. 200–202], have argued that a syntax-based attributive
analysis along the lines of (20) is inadequate, and that the relativity of degree adjectives can be
better handled by appealing to context.
One problem with this approach is that, while it is natural ins mple cases to construe
the modified noun as indicating the comparison class, it is not always easy or even possible to
derive the relevant comparison class straightforwardly from the syntax, in a mechanical fashion,
once the noun phrases get more complex. In the case of noun phrase constructions involving
multiple degree adjectives, like the ones in (22) below, we find that a syntax-based approach
such as Wheeler’s generates multiple candidate comparisonclasses, the number of which rises
quickly with the number of modifiers.
(22) a. Jones is a tall old man.
b. Jones is a tall old fat man.
c. Jones is a tall old fat ugly man.
d. Jones is a tall old fat ugly evil man.
According to Wheeler [170, p. 314], a sentence such as (22a) has two readings, one of which
describes Jones as tall relative to the class of old men, while t e other describes him as both
tall and old relative to the class of men in general; in turn, asentence like (22b) has a reading
where Jones’ tallness is relative to the class of old fat men,plus (at least) two other readings,
and sentences (22c) and (22d) have more still. Thus, Wheeler’s syntax-based approach leads
to considerable semantic ambiguity in these cases: rather than a single comparison class, we
have a set of candidate comparison classes, from which the hear r will still need to select the
correct or intended one, at least partly on the basis of contextual information. Moreover, it also
appears that the comparison class does not have to correspond to a continuous subconstituent
of the noun phrase. Siegel, who has discussed the problems ofinterpretation of multiple degree
adjectives at some length in [144] and [146], observes that (23) has a reading where tallness
is understood relative to the class of little basketball players, leaving out red-headedness al-
together, which she takes as an indication that context rathe than syntax has the final say in
determining the comparison class.
(23) Billy is a tall little red-headed basketball player.
Indeed, Kenneth Beesley [12, p. 202] has argued that the comparison class, even in the simplest
A+N constructions, may not even be the class denoted by the noun at all. He asks us to consider
the conversation in (24):
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(24) Q: Which of the men over there is Quang?
A: Quang is the short Vietnamese.
As Beesley points out, there is a perfectly natural reading of ‘short Vietnamese’ wheremen′
rather thanVietnamese′ serves as the comparison class for ‘tall’; that is, ‘short Vietnamese’
can be paraphrased as “short compared to men in general, and Viet amese”, and it is moreover
perfectly consistent to claim that Quang is a short Vietnamese but that he is nevertheless not
shortfor a Vietnamese. But if a syntactically attributiveA+N construction may in fact involve
a comparison class distinct fromN, then this undermines any attempt to develop a syntax-based
attributive account of gradable adjectives.
Another central problem for any syntactic attributive theory is how to account for gradable
adjectives appearing in predicate position. If a sentence su h as ‘Bob is tall’ is to be analysed
as an attributive, then the noun denoting the comparison class must be present at some point
in the underlying syntactic representation. As Beesley [12] notes, this can be done in basically
two ways: the first is to derive a predicative sentence such as‘Bob is tall’, for example, from
the sentence ‘Bob is a tall jockey’ by a syntactic mechanism of noun phrase reduction, but
which leaves the predicate corresponding to the noun, in this casejockey′, in the semantic
representation; the second is to take ‘tall’ as applying to aphonologically empty dummy noun,
which is then assigned a nominal predicate in the semantics.On the first approach, we end
up with an indefinite number of syntactic representations for the same surface string (one for
each noun that could be modified by the adjective), while on the second the indeterminacy is
transferred to the semantic representation. Either way, this approach leads to what appears to
some as an unacceptable indeterminacy at the heart of the grammar itself, where we cannot
even say exactly how many syntactic (semantic) representatio s a simple sentence might have,
nor determine which syntactic or semantic structure is the corre t one without appealing to
context.
An alternative approach is to derive the comparison class for predicative constructions from
lexically coded semantic features. One proposal, due to Katz [86], is that concepts are ordered
in a semantic hierarchy, and the choice of comparison class for an entity is the ‘lowest’ cate-
gory that includes it (see Katz [86, p. 186]). Thus we have, for example, skyscraper∈ buildings,
man∈ humans, flea∈ insects, United States∈ countries, etc. However, Katz restricts the num-
ber of possible interpretations by maintaining that the comparison class canonlybe the imme-
diately subsuming category—going so far as to claim that we cannot interpret ‘The skyscraper
is big’ asThe skyscraper is big for a physical object, or ‘The flea is big’, asThe flea is big for
an animal.
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One obvious problem with Katz’s proposal is that the restriction he imposes is far too strin-
gent: even if it might be plausibly argued that thed fault comparison class is given by the
immediately subsuming category, there are contexts where it is quite reasonable to select a dif-
ferent category as the basis for comparison. For example, inthe context of a science fiction
novel featuring giant mutated fleas,The flea is big for an animalmight be a reasonable, or even
preferred, interpretation of the sentence ‘The flea is big’ (cf. Beesley [12, p. 203]), and there
are buildings large enough to warrant interpreting a sentence such as ‘The skyscraper is big’
asThe skyscraper is big for a physical object. Moreover, the lexical entry for certain words,
such as proper names, may provide little or no indication of which category they should be
subsumed under (see Bartsch [7, p. 165] and Sampson [140, p. 257]) Further analysis of the
inadequacy of trying to assign comparison classes mechanically on the basis of lexical codings
can be found in the work of McConnell-Ginet [113, p. 89], Siegel [144, p. 129], [146, p. 243],
and Bierwisch [13, p. 165 ff.]. What emerges from this literau e is that, while the lexicon may
provide useful clues for the interpretation process, context is the dominant factor in determining
the appropriate comparison class.
1.2.4 Degree Adjectives as Semantic Predicatives
A number of researchers in the general tradition of formal semantics and Montague Grammar,
including Dowty [39], Kamp [84], Bartsch [8], and Klein [95,96, 97], have disagreed with the
Montague-Parsons analysis of all adjectives as attributive. Kamp [84] defends the traditional
translation of degree adjectives as one-place predicates,though he expresses doubts over ex-
tending one-place predicate status to relational adjectivs like ‘alleged’. Siegel [145], [146]
distinguishes between degree adjectives and evaluatives,analysing the former as one-place
predicates (together with intersective adjectives), and treating the latter as semantic attribu-
tives. Beesley [12], however, has argued that even evaluatives should be analysed as one-place
predicates.
A number of arguments have been advanced to show that degree adjectives behave syntac-
tically like predicative adjectives, which lends support ta common translation. For example,
unlike most relational adjectives, degree adjectives are typically able to appear grammatically
in predicate position.
(25) a. Alice is alive/two-legged/pregnant. (predicative)
b. Alice is tall/rich/slim. (degree)
c. * Alice is supposed/alleged/former. (relational)
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Siegel [145] notes that only one-place predicates can functio as non-restrictive modifiers of
noun phrases, and observes that in this regard degree adjectives pattern with predicatives rather
than attributives:
(26) a. I saw pregnant/divorced Alice. (predicative)
b. We spoke with big/rich Bertha. (degree)
c. * Mere/alleged Bob came to see us. (relational)
There also appears to be some correlation between predicative status and having a meaning-
ful nominalisation or nominal form; the key seems to be that we can conceive ofredness,
three-leggedness, or tallnessas independent qualities, but not of*merenessor *allegedness.
Siegel also argues that in the case of verbs and verb constructions with ‘makingA’ or ‘be-
comingA’ interpretations, the adjectiveA typically corresponds to a predicative rather than a
relational adjective: we can make something red (‘redden’), or make something big (‘enlarge’),
or make someone pregnant (‘impregnate’), but there are no verbal constructions correspond-
ing to *‘make former’ or *‘make alleged’ (the verb ‘allege’,though related in meaning, is not
interpretable as*to make alleged).3
Of course, the main problem in treating degree adjectives asone-place predicates is the
apparent failure of an intersective analysis, which is whatprompted their classification as se-
mantic attributives in the first place. But advocates of a predicative analysis argue that this
problem can be resolved through a proper understanding of the role of context. Proponents of
an attributive analysis generally assume that the comparison class for a sentence of the form ‘x
is aA N’ must necessarily be the class denoted byN, so that for ‘Dumbo is a small elephant’,
for example, the comparison class must necessarily be the seof el phants. But as Beesley and
others have argued, this assumption is simply false: even for simple attributive constructions
like ‘short Vietnamese’ and ‘big flea’, context may introduce omparison classes altogether
distinct fromN. Though there may often be strong pragmatic reasons to evaluate shortness
relative to Vietnamese in a construction like ‘short Vietnamese’, we should not allow ourselves
to be misled into thinking that the usual or default readingsfor such constructions are theonly
readings available. Rather, it is context that ultimately determines the comparison class by
which any sentence of the form ‘x is anA N’ or ‘ x is A’ will be evaluated.
One criterion commonly proposed for distinguishing between gradable and non-gradable
adjectives is that the former allow modification by degree modifiers such as ‘very’, ‘extremely’,
3Here the argument is less convincing, however, given apparent counterexamples such as ‘fire’, ‘dismiss’,
‘impeach’, etc. (Ewan Klein, personal communication); onecould still argue that these are rare or exceptional,
but this would require a more detailed empirical investigation.
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‘remarkably’, ‘quite’, and the like (e.g., see Klein [95, p.6]). Many intersective adjectives
that are not usually classified as gradable also allow modification by modifiers such as ‘very’,
though they usually cannot do so without taking on a secondary (and sometimes figurative)
meaning (see Vendler [166, p. 109], Bolinger [15, p. 15], andKeenan and Faltz [91, p. 164]).
For example, a woman is either pregnant or not pregnant, but ‘very pregnant’ might refer to a
range of properties associated with being pregnant, such asa woman’s size, emotional state,
etc.; similarly, being alive is an all-or-nothing affair, but ‘very alive’ might be used to describe
qualities that typically indicate life: high levels of activi y, healthy appearance, a quick mind,
and so on. By contrast, relational adjectives usually cannot take degree modifiers at all, which
lends further supports treating degree adjectives as predicative rather than relational.
(27) a. A very pregnant woman walked into the room.
b. We saw a remarkably tall man in the park.
c. * The plumber was a quite former academic.
d. * The extremely alleged murderer was arrested.
Given that an appeal to context appears to be both necessary and natural in selecting a com-
parison class, we can capture this in the semantics in at least two ways: the first is to translate
the adjective as a logical relation, which takes a comparison class as an explicit argument; the
second is to translate the adjective as a one-place predicat, but one whose semantic value is
contextually variable. In the former case, the interpretation of the adjective is kept constant,
and it is the value of the additional parameter that varies; in the latter, the interpretation of the
adjective itself is made context-dependent.
One way to make the interpretation of the adjective variableis by employing contextual
variables, sometimes called ‘delineations’ (e.g., McConnell-Ginet [113, p. 115]), to fix the ex-
tension of degree adjectives. The context picks out a relevant delineation, relative to which
predicates are assigned an interpretation. Some version ofthis idea can be found in the work
of McConnell-Ginet [113], Klein [95], Bartsch [7], and Keena and Faltz [91], among others.
These theories all translate degree adjectives as one-placredicates, while relativising their in-
terpretation to contextually specified comparison classes. We shall refer to these as ‘delineation
theories’.
Semantically, the difference between gradable and non-gradable predicatives lies in the
way an adjective divides up the universe of a model: a predicate like ‘dead’ sharply divides all
entities into the dead and the not-dead, with no remainder. The boundaries of tall, on the other
hand, may be somewhat unclear, and between the group of tall en ities and the group of short
entities there may be a group of entities which are neither sho t nor tall.
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While contextual variability is taken care of by relativising interpretation to contexts, vague-
ness is commonly handled in terms of semantic partiality. According to Klein [95], who ex-
tends the theory of adjectives put forward in Kamp [84], gradable and non-gradable adjectives
are distinguished by the fact that the latter always denotec mpletefunctions from individuals
to truth values, while the former may denotepartial functions from individuals to truth val-
ues. Thus, for a logical languageL, the interpretation functionF is subject to the following
constraint (see Klein [95, p. 10]):
Wheneverζ ∈ Ad j andc∈C, Fζ(c) ∈ {0,1}(U).
Here,Ad j denotes the subset of one-place predicates that correspondto adjectives in English,C
is the set of contexts, and{0,1}(U) is the set ofpartial functions from the universe of discourse,
U , into the set of truth values. The constraint ensures that the interpretation function,F, assigns
denotations to non-logical constants relative to contextsof use.
Givenα an arbitrary expression ofL, andU a partial context dependent interpretation, the
extension ofα is relative toU, a contextc and assignmenta, and writtenJαKU,c,a (cf. Klein [95,
p. 11]). The adjective ‘tall’ in a sentence like ‘Sean is tall’ is translated as a one-place predicate,
which is then assigned the interpretation in (28b) below.
(28) a. Sean is tall.
b. Jtall(Sean)KU,c,a
Klein associates each predicateζ with a pair of functions, pos and neg, from contexts to sets
of entities, namely, the set of entitiesx for which A(x) is definitely true (what Klein calls the
‘positive extension’, following Kamp [84]), and the set forwhich A(x) is definitely false (the
‘negative extension’).
For any contextc∈C:
1. posζ(c) = {u∈U : Fζ(c)(u) = 1}
2. negζ(c) = {u∈U : Fζ(c)(u) = 0}
A comparison class is the subset of the domain of a gradable adjective that is relevant in
a given context of use. Since different subsets of the domainay be relevant in different
contexts, when we evaluate a sentence of the form ‘x is ζ’ in a contextc, we first apply the in-
terpretation function corresponding toζ to thec-relevant subset ofDζ, and then check whether
the denotation ofx is contained in the positive extension.
Since the semantics is partial, some entities may not be assigned to either set; those entities
in the domain which are not assigned to either the positive ornegative extension ofζ are said
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to belong to the ‘extension gap’ ofζ (see Klein [95, p. 11]). The existence of borderline cases
is the hallmark of vagueness: in any given context of use, there will be people we consider to
be definitely tall, others who are definitely not tall, and yetothers who are borderline (that is,
neither definitely tall nor definitely not tall). Although a vgue predicate can be used without
having to draw a clear boundary between the positive and negativ extensions, this boundary
can often be made more precise when the circumstances require; however, while the boundary
may vary from context to context, the assignment of entitiesto partitions is typically con-
strained by the underlying ordering of the domain, which is as umed to remain constant across
contexts; Klein [96, p. 126] stipulates that the ordering ona comparison class must preserve
the initial ordering on the domain of the adjective.
Suppose that Sean is on the borderline between tall and not tall in a contextc; then (28a) will
be neither definitely true nor definitely false. However, thestatement might be “sort of true”
or “true-ish”. One of Kamp’s aims in [84] is to capture the degree of truth of a vague sentence
in terms of the set of complete (classical) valuations of ‘tall’ which close up the extension gap
in a consistent manner (see also Lewis [111]). One way to do this is to introduce a two-place
function S, which assigns to anyc ∈ C andζ ∈ Ad j a set of new contextsS(c,ζ). S(c,ζ) is
intended to represent the set of contexts in whichζ has been made fully precise. Relative to
any c+ ∈ S(c,ζ), F then assigns toζ a classical extension; i.e.F(c+,ζ) is a total function.
Then, we can capture the degree of truth of a sentenceα by examining the proportion of full
specifications in whichα is true.
The analysis of gradable adjectives in terms of full specifications can also be used to model
the semantics of comparatives. Both Lewis [111] and Kamp [84] attempt to explain the con-
nection between a positive form, such as ‘tall’, and its associated comparative, ‘taller than’, by
taking into consideration the total set of full specifications, and propose that a comparative such
as ‘a is taller thanb’ is true iff the set of specifications on which ‘b is tall’ is true is a proper
subset of those on which ‘a is tall’ is true (see Kamp [84, pp. 138–140] and Lewis[111, p.65]).
However, both Lewis [111] and Kamp [84] have difficulty with cases where the compared ele-
ments both definitely have some property; for example, if Boband Bill both count as definitely
tall (say 1.98 and 2.1 metres respectively), then ‘Bob is tall’ and ‘Bill is tall’ will be true in
exactly the same set of admissible specifications (that is, all of them), and it follows that the set
of specifications in which ‘Bob is tall’ is true will not be a proper subset of those in which ‘Bill
is tall’ is true. Another example, due to Klein [95, p. 12], isgiven below in (29).
(29) a. ‘an’ is a longer word than ‘a’.
b. ‘an’ is a long word.
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c. ‘a’ is a long word.
As Klein points out, on Kamps approach, (29a) will only be true in a contextc if there is
some contextc′ in which the standards for what counts as a long word have beenshifted in
such a manner that (29b) comes out true inc′ but (29c) comes out false. But the mechanisms
Kamp employs for making vague predicates more precise, being monotonic in character, cannot
produce such a contextc′.
Klein [95] proposes a solution to this problem using comparison classes. As Klein [95, p.
126] observes, what is required within Kamp’s overall framework is a context in which ‘an’
can be considered an orthographically long word; such a context would be one in which we
could find a way to exclude certain elements from consideration, for example, all words longer
than two letters. By employing comparison classes, we can produce such a context: namely,
the context in which the comparison class for long is a set of word forms consisting of at most
two letters, such asX = {‘an’, ‘we’, ‘on’, ‘to’, . . . , ‘I’, ‘a’ }. Once we are able to restrict the
interpretation of the adjective to a subset of the domain (excluding the larger set of all words
from consideration), we can apply the predicate ‘long’ to the remaining, smaller subset.
1.2.5 Scalar Theories
All the theories we have discussed so far treat gradable and no -gradable adjectives as be-
longing to the same semantic type. There are approaches, however, which analyse gradable
predicates in terms of abstract entities such as dimensions, scales, degrees, intervals, or vec-
tors. We shall refer to theories which employ such abstract measures as ‘scalar’ theories, and
to those which do not as ‘non-scalar’ theories.
The basic notion underlying scale-based analyses of gradable adjectives is that an individual
can possess or exhibit a property to a certaindegreeor extent, where a degree is interpreted as
a position along, or section of, a (totally or partially) orde ed scale associated with a particular
property (e.g.,HEIGHT in the case of ‘tall’ and ‘short’), and are often measurable in terms of
some unit associated with that dimension, such as metres or feet for height, kilos and pounds
for weight, and so on. Gradable adjectives are analysed as relations between individuals and
abstract representations of measurement, such as degrees or intervals. Comparisons between
individuals relative to a dimension are then evaluated in terms of the relative ordering of their
associated degrees on a scale associated with that dimension, while absolutes can be analysed
ascovertcomparisons between the degree associated with an individual and some contextually
determined standard.
Most (if not all) non-scalar theories assign the same semantic type to both gradable and
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non-gradable adjectives; on a predicative analysis, they are usually interpreted extensionally as
sets of entities (or characteristic functions thereof), and share the same logical type,(e→ t).4
The principal difference between gradable and other predicative expressions is that gradable
adjectives have domains that are ordered (totally or partially) with respect to some property or
set of properties that permits gradation, such as such asHEIGHT, WEIGHT, AGE, and so on.
Scalar theories, on the other hand, typically introduce some abstract representations of mea-
surement into the semantic ontology, and analyse the semantics of gradable adjectives in terms
of relations between entities and those representations; examples include Cresswell [29], Hel-
lan [67], Hoeksema [73], von Stechow [169], Bierwisch [14],Moltmann [115], Kennedy [92],
as well as the vector-based analyses of Faller [46] and Winter [175], [176].
From a methodological standpoint, there is a bias in favour of a non-scalar approach: in
accordance with the principle of ontological parsimony, orOccam’s Razor, when given the
choice between two explanatorily adequate theories, we should prefer the one which makes the
fewest ontological assumptions. In other words, we should on y allow additional types into the
ontology as a last resort;all else being equal, parsimony dictates that a non-scalar approach
is preferable on methodological grounds. Of course, proponents of scalar theories argue that
such entitiesare in fact necessary to capture the full range of behaviour thatgradable adjectives
exhibit, and justify the introduction of scales and degreeson the grounds that this enables them
to explain certain phenomena that are problematic for non-scalar approaches.
One such phenomenon isincommensurability, which has been discussed by Klein [97] and
Kennedy [92, ch. 1], among others. In (30) below, we see that comparisons are not possi-
ble between adjectives associated with different dimensions; while it is simple and intuitive
to account for this by stipulating that semantically well-formed comparatives must have the
same dimensional parameter, it is hard to see how this could be explained without introducing
dimensions into the semantic ontology (cf. Kennedy [92, p. 17]).
(30) a. Bob’s boat is wider than Bill’s car is long.
b. * The film was heavier than Bob’s caravan.
c. * Bob is shorter than Bill is intelligent.
d. * The speech was longer than the
Another phenomenon, which Kennedy [92, p. 19] refers to ascro s-polar anomalyconcerns
comparisons between adjectives of opposite polarity: comparatives that involve positive-positive
4It would be possible for a non-scalar, delineation-based thory to interpret gradable adjectives as relationships
between individuals and delineations (Ewan Klein, p.c.); however, to the best of our knowledge, none of the non-
scalar theories do so—for good reasons, as we shall see.
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or negative-negative pairs of adjectives, as in (31a) and (31b) below, are generally accept-
able, but those constructed out of positive-negative pairs, such as (31c) and (31d), are typically
anomalous. In [92, ch. 3], Kennedy shows that it is possible to provide an account for this in
terms of the scale structure associated with the adjectives.
(31) a. The desk is longer than the table is wide.
b. The Christmas tree is shorter than the ceiling is low, so it’ll fit in the room.
c. * Bob is poorer than Bill is rich.
d. * Bob is fatter than Bill is slim.
A third phenomenon which scalar approaches are arguably better equipped to deal with is
the distribution of measure phrases, and specifically the distribution of measure phrases with
antonymic pairs of adjectives. In order to accommodate measur phrases, some theorists em-
ploy the notion of adifference degree, which, as the name suggests, is the difference on a
given scale between one degree and another (see Hellan [67],von Stechow [169], and Bier-
wisch [14]). Bierwisch [14], for example, proposes that difference degrees have adirectionas
well as a magnitude, and that comparison takes place on a directed scale(D,0) with a zero
point, and the degreesdi corresponding to the entities being compared are sections of D begin-
ning at 0. The differenceδ between two degreesd1 andd2 is then a section ofD that starts
at one degree and ends at the other, and depending on its starting point may have the same
direction as the scale(D,0) , or the opposite one (see Bierwisch [14, pp. 111–114]). Bierwisch
exploits this contrast in directionality in order to provide an account of the contrary nature of
antonymic pairs of adjectives such ast ll/short, heavy/light, etc., and associated entailments
such asBob is taller than Alice⇔ Alice is shorter than Bob.
It is possible to construct the notion of a degree within a non-scalar approach. For example,
Klein [95, p. 3] endorses Cresswell [29, p. 281] formal definitio of the notion of ‘degree’ in
terms of equivalence classes of objects: ifd is the degree to which Bill is tall, thend is the
equivalence class consisting of all things which are neither less tall nor more tall than Bill. For
any given adjective, such as ‘tall’, it is possible to define aequivalence relation,≈ tall, as in
Definition 2 below:
Definition 2 u≈ tallu′ iff for all v:
1. u is taller than v iff u′ is taller than v,
2. v is taller than u iff v is taller than u′.
Bills degree of tallness is thus{u: u≈ tallBill }.
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Klein [95, pp. 27–30] goes on to discuss constructions involving adjectives and measure
phrases, including examples such as (32).
(32) Mona is six foot tall.
On a reading where ‘x foot tall’ is interpreted as ‘exactlyx foot tall’ (cf. Klein [95, pp. 28–
29]), the predicate ‘six foot tall’ is true ofu iff u bears the relation≈ tall to some object which
measures six feet, i.e. some object in the set of objects thatare six foot tall, written 6̄f . As
Klein [95, p. 30] observes, if we regard 6f̄ as adegreeof tallness, then his treatment of degrees
turns out to be very similar to that proposed by Cresswell [29, p. 281]—the main difference
being that, unlike Cresswell, Klein’s degrees are derived rather than primitive elements in the
semantic ontology.
However, as pointed out by Kennedy [92, p. 40], this analysisfail to make a distinction
between positive and negative adjectives, and thus does notprovide an explanation of the fact
that negative adjectives such as ‘short’ do not allow measure ph ases:
(33) * Mona is six foot short.
The problem is that, since ‘tall’ and ‘short’ are extensionally equivalent, the relation≈ short is
equally well-defined according to Definition 2, and (33) should be acceptable.
1.2.6 From Degrees to Vectors
The notion of a directed difference degree put forward by Bierwisch [14] is very similar to
the intuitive (or “naive”) notion of a vector; in both cases,we are dealing with an abstract
object with amagnitudeand adirection. Vector-based accounts of gradable adjectives have
been proposed by Faller [46] and Winter [175, 176], who both attempt to extend the semantic
analysis of locative PPs originally developed in Zwarts [180] and Zwarts and Winter [182] to
the case of gradable adjectives.
Purely in terms of the study of gradable adjectives, little is gained merely by employing vec-
torsper se, instead of difference degreesà la Bierwisch [14], or the intervals of Kennedy [92].
The principal benefit of adopting a specificallyvector-based account of gradable adjectives,
rather than one based on degrees or intervals, is that it provides a format in which to analyse
cross-categorial aspects of semantic phenomena, one example of which being measure phrase
modification. As noted earlier, measure phrase modifiers occur not only with adjectives, but
also with expressions of other categories, such as the spatial and temporal PPs in (34) below.
(34) a. The tree is 60 metres in front of the palace.
b. The bird is 20 feet above the house.
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c. Your suitcase is 40 kilogrammes above the limit.
d. The gala dinner took place 30 minutes after the ceremony.
e. The fireworks will begin 20 minutes before the presentation.
In (34), the measurement in each case applies to the relations expressed by the locative PPs;
specifically, what is measured is therelative position(in space or time) of two objects or events.
This bears some resemblance to the way measurement functions w th comparative adjectives,
where what is measured is therelative degreeof some property, and suggests the possibility of
a unified theory that accounts for the range of cross-categorial modification phenomena. In the
next section, we discuss the attempts by Faller [46] and Winter [175, 176] to extend the VSS
account of measure phrase modification to adjectival degreeconstructions.
1.3 Vector Space Semantics
Vector Space Semantics (VSS) is a framework for model-theoretic semantics that includes
vectors in its basic ontology, and was originally developedby Zwarts [180] and Zwarts and
Winter [182] in order to account for the semantics of spatialexpressions such as locative and
directional prepositions.
A locative preposition combines syntactically with an NP that refers to a spatially located
object, such as ‘the house’, ‘the cloud’, etc., in (35) below. Locative prepositions are usually
relational in nature, and describe the position of an objectr lative to that of another; for ex-
ample, in sentence (35a), the bird is assigned a location relativ to the house, while in (35b) it
is assigned a position relative to the cloud. VSS refers to the object whose location is being
determined to as thelocated object(LO), and the object functioning as a reference point as the
reference object(RO).
(35) a. The bird is above the house.
b. The bird is below the cloud.
c. The bird is above the house and below the cloud.
VSS interprets locative prepositions as maps from the reference object (denoted by the prepo-
sition’s NP complement) to a region in space which is relatedto the reference object, where the
exact nature of the relation depends on the preposition involved.5 These regions are formally
modelled as sets of vectors emanating from the reference object, so a preposition is a function
from individuals to sets of vectors, and a locative PP is simply a set of vectors. For example,
5See Jackedoff [77] and Landau and Jackendoff [104] for an earlier p oposal of this idea.
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in the case the sentences in (35) above, the PP ‘above the hous’ denotes a set of vectors ema-
nating from the house in an upwards direction, and ‘below thecloud’ denotes the set of vectors
emanating from the cloud in a downwards direction. The proposition expressed by a sentence
such as (35a), ‘The bird is above the house’, for example, is then rue iff there exists a vectorv
in the set of vectors emanating upwards from the house which has the location of the bird as its
endpoint.
The located object can be described in relation to more than one reference point, as in
example (35c). Intuitively, the sentence (35c) will be trueiff there exists a vector emanating
upward from the house as well as another vector emanating downward from the cloud, both
of which end at the location of the bird. Surprisingly, however, it turns out that the formal
modelling of coordinate structures is highly problematic for VSS; we shall go into the reasons
for this in Section 1.3.5.2 below, after we have examined thetheory in greater detail.
VSS employs a standard definition of vector spaces, as in Definition 3 below.
Definition 3 (Vector space) LetF be a number field. Then avector spaceoverF is a structure
〈V,~0,+, ·〉 comprising the following elements:
• a setV;
• a distinguished zero element~0∈ V;
• a vector addition operation,(+) : V×V → V;
• a scalar multiplication operation,(·) : F×V → V.
for which the following properties hold:
1. ∀~u,~v∈ V : ~u+~v =~v+~u;
2. ∀~u,~v,~w∈ V : (~u+~v)+~w =~u+(~v+~w);
3. ∀~v∈ V : ~v+~0 =~v;
4. ∀~v∈ V : ∃(−~v) ∈ V : ~v+(−~v) =~0;
5. ∀k∈ F : ∀~u,~v∈ V : k · (~u+~v) = k ·~u+k ·~v;
6. ∀k,m∈ F : ∀~v∈ V : (k+m) ·~v= k ·~v+m·~v;
7. ∀k,m∈ F : ∀~v∈ V : (km) ·~v= k · (m·~v);
8. ∀~v∈ V : 1 ·~v =~v.
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This definition is more general than required, as it is definedover arbitrary fields. VSS limits
itself to finite n-dimensional vector spaces over the real numbersR. VSS also assumes the
existence of anorm function|·| : V 7→ R+, satisfying the following conditions:
Definition 4 (Norm) A norm on a real vector spaceV is a map|·| : V 7→ R+ such that the
following hold for all vectors~u,~v∈ V and scalars k∈ F:
1. |~v| ≥ 0, and|~v| = 0⇔~v =~0;
2. |k ·~v| = |k||~v|;
3. |~u+~v| ≤ |~u|+ |~v|
VSS distinguishes between a set of normal, or ‘basic’, vectors V, and a domain oflocated
vectors(essentially directed line segments), where a located vector consists in an ordered pair
of basic vectors,w = 〈p,v〉 ∈V ×V. Although both the first and second members of each pair
〈p,v〉 are vectors inV, they are interpreted differently: the first component indicates alocation,
while the second component indicates adisplacement. Each pointp defines alocated vector
space, Vp, centred atp.
Thestarting point(spo) andend point(epo) of a located vector are locations in the vector
space, defined as follows (we use the symbol ‘,’ for definitional equations).
Definition 5
1. spo〈p,~v〉 , p,
2. epo〈p,~v〉 , p+~v.
According to Zwarts and Winter [182], all locative prepositions denote functions from sets of
(simple) vectors to sets of located vectors. The location ofa reference object is represented
as a setA ⊆ V, the locative expression denotes a function loc:℘(V) 7→℘(V×V) from sets
of vectors to sets of located vectors. For example, the preposition ‘behind’ denotes a function
from the set of vectorsα whose endpoints indicate the position of the reference object (d noted
by the prepositional complement) to the set of vectorsJbehind NPK that start on the reference
object and end at a point behind it; the phrasebehind the table, therefore, denotes the set of
located vectors that start on the table and end at a point behind t e table.6
6Properly speaking, in VSS the setJPloc NPK comprises those located vectors that areint rnally or externally
closestto JNPK; informally, a located vectorv is internally (externally) closest to a setA whenv starts at a boundary
point of A, has its endpoint inside (outside)A, and there is no shorter connection between the boundary ofA and
the endpoint ofv; for a formal definition of the notion, see Zwarts and Winter [182].
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In terms, sentence (35c) is analysed as making an existence claim regarding two located
vectors, call them〈w1,v1〉,〈w2,v2〉, where the pair of vectorsw1,v1 ∈ V in the first located
vector〈w1,v1〉 correspond to the location of the house and the location of the bird in relation
to the house, and the vectorsw2,v2 in the second located vector〈w2,v2〉 describe the location
of the cloud and location of the bird relative to the cloud.
(36) a. Jabove the houseK =
λv.v points up∧v starts at (the location of) the house
b. Jbelow the cloudK =
λv.v points down∧v starts at (the location of) the cloud
(37) a. Jthe bird is above the houseK =
∃v.v points up∧v starts at the house∧v ends at the bird
b. Jthe bird is below the cloudK =
∃v.v points down∧v starts at the cloud∧v ends at the bird
However, the interpretation of spatial PPs as properties ofvectors introduces certain complica-
tions into the semantic interpretation process: in order toapply the vector predicate in (36a) to
the non-vector individual denoted bythe bird to obtain (37a), we need to perform some sort of
type conversion operation to overcome the type mismatch between subject and predicate. The
mechanism introduced by Zwarts and Winter [182] makes use ofa pair of complementary ‘lo-
cation’ and ‘anti-location’ functions, written loc and loc−, which map non-vector entities into
vector entities and (sets of) vector entities into (sets of)n n-vector entities, respectively. The
type mismatch between the subject and the predicate triggers th application of loc−, which
transforms the predicate from a property of vectors into a prope ty non-vector individuals,
namely, those objects that are located at the endpoint ofsomevector in the original set—see
Zwarts and Winter [182] for further details.
Jthe bird is above the houseK =
= loc−(Jabove the houseK)(Jthe birdK)
= (λx.∃v.v points up∧v starts at the house∧v ends atx)(Jthe birdK)
= ∃v.v points up∧v starts at the house∧v ends at the bird
1.3.1 Measure Phrases in VSS
Measure phrases may occur in spatial and temporal PPs with the structure shown in Figure 1.1.
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PP
MP
at least two metres
P′
P
above
NP
the house
Figure 1.1: PP with MP modifier
In VSS, measure phrases denote properties of vectors; e.g.,an MP such astwo metreshas as its
extension the set of vectors that is 2 metres in length:
J2 metresK = {w : |w| = |2 metres|} (1.1)
Since locative phrases are also interpreted as sets of vectors, VSS provides a straightforward
compositional analysis of measure phrase modification in terms of set intersection. Thus, the
meaning of the phrase ‘2 metres above the house’ is given by:
J2 metres above the houseK
= J2 metresK∩ Jabove the houseK
= {w : |w| = |2 metres|}∩{u : u points up∧u starts at the house}
= {u : u points up∧u starts at the house∧|u| = |2 metres|}
We find exactly the same modifier construction in the case of temporal expressions:
J2 hours after the concertK
= J2 hoursK∩ Jafter the concertK
= {w : |w| = |2 hours|}∩{u : u points to the future∧u starts at the concert}
= {u : u points to the future∧u starts at the concert∧|u| = |2 hours|}
1.3.2 Gradable Adjectives in VSS
The motivation for Martina Faller’s [46] extension of the VSS framework to degree adjec-
tives and comparatives is the possibility of modelling the cross-categorial semantics of mea-
sure phrase modifiers. Faller [46] develops an interpretation process for adjectives modelled
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on the one for locative expressions: first, a given denotation of type e (corresponding to
the reference object) is mapped to a vector that indicates its position on some dimensional
scale (e.g.,HEIGHT); then, semantic operations involving the adjectival exprssion yield as
result a set of located vectors, which is mapped back into a set of entities of typee for type-
commensurability with the subject of the predication. In order to carry out the necessary type
shifts, Faller [46] introduces a pair of ‘dimension’ and ‘anti-dimension’ functions dimS: e→
℘(V) and dim−S: ℘(v× v)→℘(e), which are explicitly modelled on the equivalent functions
for locative expressions, namely, the “location” function, loc: e→ v, which maps entities to a
position in space, and the “anti-location” function, loc− : ℘(v× v) →℘(e), which maps sets
of vectors to sets of entities, viz., those located at the endpoints of those vectors (cf. Zwarts and
Winter [182]).
Faller [46] takes dimensional adjectives to be sets of located vectors in some dimension
d, where antonymic pairs of adjectives correspond to vector sets with opposed polarities; she
follows Kennedy [92] in deriving both comparative and absolute forms from a common adjec-
tive root; for example, the adjective rootstall- andshort-are interpreted as sets of dimensional
vectors:
1. tall Z⇒ λu.HEIGHT(u)∧pos(u)
2. shortZ⇒ λu.HEIGHT(u)∧neg(u)
HereS is a position vector which corresponds to some contextually-given standard for tallness
or shortness (for present purposes, we make the simplifyingassumption that the standards for
‘tall’ and ‘short’ are the same, even though in reality they might not be).
Following Kennedy [92], Faller adopts an analysis in which the adjectival roots combine
with a comparative marker, such as the suffix-er and the adverbsmoreandless, or a phoneti-
cally null absolute marker,/0ABS (Definition 6).
Definition 6 (comparative and absolute markers)
1. more / -erZ⇒ λW.λV.λv.W(v)∧ (∃w.V(w)∧w = spo(v))
2. lessZ⇒ λW.λV.λv.W(ṽ)∧ (∃w.V(w)∧w = spo(v))
3. /0ABS Z⇒ λW.λv.∃w.W(w)∧v= epo(w)∧S= spo(w)∧|w| > 0
whereṽ is defined as follows: ifv = 〈s,u〉, thenṽ = 〈s,−u〉. Thus the effect oflessis to reverse
the basic polarity of the vector associated with the adjectiv (cf. Faller [46, p. 158]).
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Let us consider first the comparative formtaller.7 By Definition 6, we obtain the interpre-
tation in (1.4) below:
[
Deg′ taller
]
Z⇒ (λW.λV.λv.W(v)∧ (∃w.V(w)∧w = spo(v)))(λu.HEIGHT(u)∧pos(u))
= λV.λv.(λu.HEIGHT(u)∧pos(u))(v)∧ (∃w.V(w)∧w = spo(v))
= λV.λv.HEIGHT(v)∧pos(v)∧ (∃w.V(w)∧w = spo(v))
(1.2)
Both comparative markers license ath n-phrase, where the complement ofthanmay be nomi-
nal, as intaller than John, or clausal, as intaller than John is wide; we shall follow Faller [46]
and Winter [175, 176] in limiting our discussion to the case where the complement is a nominal
expression. For this case, Faller identifiesthanwith the function dim, so the phrasethan John,
for example, returns the set of dimensional vectors corresponding to the denotation of John.
Definition 7 (than)
than Z⇒ λy.λu.u∈ dim(y)
For example, given that ‘John’Z⇒ j, we have
[PPthan John] Z⇒ (λy.λu.u∈ dim(y))( j)
= λu.u∈ dim( j)
(1.3)
Then we can combine the interpretation of the comparative adj ctive in (1.4) with that of the
than-phrase to obtain the following translation oftaller than John.
[
DegP
[
Deg′ taller
]
[PPthan John]
]
Z⇒ (λV.λv.HEIGHT(v)∧pos(v)∧ (∃w.V(w)∧w = spo(v)))(λu.u∈ dim( j))
= λv.HEIGHT(v)∧pos(v)∧ (∃w.(λu.u∈ dim( j))(w)∧w = spo(v))
= λv.HEIGHT(v)∧pos(v)∧ (∃w.w∈ dim( j)∧w = spo(v))
Since in Faller’s theory there is at mostonedimensional vector in dim( j) from each dimension,
it follows that there can be at most one vectorw∈ dim( j) such thatHEIGHT(w) andw= spo(v),
namely, the vector corresponding to John’s height, which Faller [46, p. 158] writes asdim〈H〉j .
We can simplify the above expression as (1.4):
[
DegP
[
Deg′ taller
]
[PPthan John]
]
Z⇒ λv.HEIGHT(v)∧pos(v)∧dim〈H,j〉 = spo(v) (1.4)
However, since the semantic interpretation of the predicate ‘is taller than John’ in (1.4) is a
property of (located) vectors rather than individuals, we cannot combine this directly with an
7We follow Faller and Kennedy in assuming thatmoreis semantically equivalent to-er.
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individual-denoting subject, say ‘Bob’. In order to assignan interpretation to a sentence such
as ‘Bob is taller than John’, we require some way to overcome the type mismatch between the
subject and the predicate. For this, Faller [46] introducesa pair of functions dim and dim−,
explicitly modelled on the loc and loc− functions in Zwarts and Winter [182]; like loc−, the
dim− function transforms the predicate from (the characteristic function of) a set of vectors into
(the characteristic function) of a set of non-vector indiviuals (cf. Faller [46, pp. 158–159]):
namely, the set of all things that are located at the endpointof some vector in the original
set; note also that dim− also implicitly performs existential closure at the clausal level (cf.
Definition 8 below).
Definition 8 (dim−)
dim− , λW.λx.∃v.∃u.W(v)∧u∈ dim(x)∧u = epo(v)∧|v| > 0
As in the case of loc−, dim− is not associated with a particular lexical item; rather, itis an
operation that is triggered by the type mismatch between subject and predicate. Applying
dim− to the interpretation of ‘tall’, we obtain an expression of type(e→ t), which is then able
to combine semantically with an expression of typee:
dim−([ taller than John])
Z⇒ (λW.λx.∃v.∃u.W(v)∧u∈ dim(x)∧epo(v) = u∧|v| > 0)
(λw.HEIGHT(w)∧pos(w)∧dim〈H,j〉 = spo(w))
= λx.∃v.∃u.(λw.HEIGHT(w)∧pos(w)∧dim〈H,j〉 = spo(w))(v)∧u∈ dim(x)
∧u = epo(v)∧|v| > 0
= λx.∃v.∃u.HEIGHT(v)∧pos(v)∧dim〈H,j〉 = spo(v)∧u∈ dim(x)
∧u = epo(v)∧|v| > 0
Taking ‘Bob’ Z⇒ b, b of typee, we obtain the following translation for ‘Bob is taller thanJohn’:
[ Bob [ is [ taller than John]]]
Z⇒ (λx.∃v.∃u.HEIGHT(v)∧pos(v)∧dim〈H,j〉 = spo(v)∧u∈ dim(x)
∧u = epo(v)∧|v| > 0)(b)
= ∃v.∃u.HEIGHT(v)∧pos(v)∧dim〈H,j〉 = spo(v)∧u∈ dim(b)
∧u = epo(v)∧|v| > 0
(1.5)
The translation states that there is a positive height vector v which has its starting point at the
vectordim〈H,j〉, corresponding to John’s height, and its end point at another vectoru belonging
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to the set of vectors associated with Bob, dim(b), which must therefore be the (unique) height
vector corresponding to Bob’s height. If we represent John’s eight asjH and Bob’s height
asbH, and allow for addition of vectors, then we can simplify the translation in (1.5) to the
following (cf. Faller [46, p. 159]):
[ Bob [ is [ taller than John]]] Z⇒∃v.bH = jH +v∧pos(v)∧∧|v| > 0 (1.6)
The interpretation of a standard (non-comparative) form ofthe adjective proceeds in simi-
lar fashion, but here the adjectival root combines with the ponologically empty absolute mor-
pheme/0ABS. Definition 6 gives us the following interpretation to the adjectivetall:
[
/0ABS tall
]
Z⇒ (λW.λv.∃w.W(w)∧v = epo(w)∧S= spo(w)∧|w| > 0)
(λu.HEIGHT(u)∧pos(u))
= λv.∃w.(λu.HEIGHT(u)∧pos(u))(w)∧v= epo(w)
∧S= spo(w)∧|w| > 0
= λv.∃w.HEIGHT(w)∧pos(w)∧v = epo(w)∧S= spo(w)∧|w| > 0
(1.7)
1.3.3 Adjectives and Measure Phrase Modifiers
There is a considerable literature on the syntax of comparatives and gradable adjectives; within
a broadly generative framework, we find, among others, Lees [109], Smith [147], Pilch [130],
Huddleston [75], Hale [63], and Hendrick [68], as well as Joan Bresnan’s [17, 18] landmark
studies of the comparative clause in English. Much of this work, especially Bresnan’s, influ-
enced subsequent developments in X′ theory, from Jackendoff [76] to Abney [1], whose work
on phrasal projection forms the basis of the syntactic framework adopted by Kennedy [92],
where measure phrases occur as specifiers of the functional head of a degree phrase (DegP).
The head position of the degree phrase is occupied by a comparative marker (‘less’, ‘more’) or
a (phonologically empty) ‘absolute’ degree morpheme whichtakes a gradable adjective as its
complement, as in Figures 1.2 and 1.3.
Faller [46] claims that the same simple mechanism that VSS uses for measure phrase modi-
fication in the case of spatialPPs can be applied to the measure phrase modification of gradable
adjectives. Thus, we take the phrasetwo metresto have the translation given in (1.8) below,
[ 2 metres] Z⇒ λW.λv.W(v)∧|v| = 2m (1.8)
Given an interpretation in whichtall denotes a set of vectors, as in (1.7) above, we can combine
this with the above semantics for the measure phrase to obtain the interpretation for the phrase
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DegP
MP
ten centimetres
Deg′
Deg′
Deg
less
AP
tall
PP
P
than
NP
N
Bill
Figure 1.2: comparative degree phrase with MP modifier
DegP
MP
at least two metres
Deg′
Deg
/0
AP
A
tall
Figure 1.3: absolute degree phrase with MP modifier
2 metres tallin (1.9).
[
[ 2 metres]
[
/0ABS tall
]]
Z⇒ (λW.λv.W(v)∧|v| = 2m)
(λv.∃w.HEIGHT(w)∧pos(w)∧v = epo(w)∧S= spo(w)∧|w| > 0)
= λv.(λv.∃w.HEIGHT(w)∧pos(w)∧v = epo(w)∧S= spo(w)
∧|w| > 0)(v)∧|v| = 2m
= λv.∃w.HEIGHT(w)∧pos(w)∧v = epo(w)∧S= spo(w)
∧|w| > 0∧|v| = 2m
(1.9)
As Faller herself notes, the semantics of/0ABS, as defined in Definition 6 above, require the
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d-vector to be longer (or shorter) than a contextually-given standardSHEIGHT introduced by the
(null) absolute morpheme; but, in the presence of a measure phrase, the contextual standard is
no longer relevant—a child that is one metre tall is not necessarily tall relative to a contextually-
salient standard of height. Moreover, the measurement in absolute adjectives is always taken
from zero.
One approach Faller considers, and which is in fact the one adopte by Kennedy [92], is the
introduction of asecondinterpretation for the null absolute morpheme which does not make
reference to any standard of evaluation; in other words, in addition to the interpretation of the
null morpheme in (1.10), we would have the additional interpr tation in (1.11).
/0ABS Z⇒ λW.λv.W(v) (1.10)
or, alternatively,
/0ABS Z⇒ λW.λv.∃w.W(w)∧v = epo(w)∧S= spo(w)∧S= 0∧|w| > 0 (1.11)
The use of an ambiguous null morpheme is ultimately rejectedby Faller [46, p. 161], who
points out that since there is nothing to prevent either nullmorpheme from being applied, this
predicts that a sentence such asBob is 2 m. tallis ambiguous between a reading in which the
contextual standard is present and a reading in which it is absent, an ambiguity that does not
appear to exist.
Ultimately, Faller simply assumes thatS is set to zero in measure phrase constructions
containing absolutes, but, having eschewed the option of anambiguous absolute morpheme,
does not provide an explicit compositional mechanism to accmplish this.
1.3.4 The Modification Condition
As mentioned earlier in this section, VSS analyses locativeprepositions as functions from
entities to sets of vectors representing spatial regions. Zwarts [180] examines the characteristics
of these vector sets, in particular theirclosureandcontinuityproperties.
Two properties of particular importance for our discussionare those ofclosure under short-
ening, andclosure under lengthening. Closure under shortening means that, ifv is a vector in
the regionV denoted by a prepositional phraseP, thenk ·v also belongs toV, for all 0< k < 1,
while closure under lengthening means that, ifv is a vector in the regionV denoted by a prepo-
sitional phraseP, thenk · v also belongs toV, for all k > 1. A vector set is said to beupward
monotone(VMON ↑) iff it is closed under lengthening of its members, anddownward mono-
tone(VMON ↓) iff it is closed under shortening. Zwarts argues that the class of ‘simple’ (i.e.,
unmodified) prepositions satisfy the following universal pro erty:
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Claim 1 All simple locative prepositions are downward monotone (VMON ↓).
By contrast, only a subset of simple prepositions areupwardmonotone; the class of upward
monotone prepositions includes ‘behind’, ‘in front of’, ‘over’, ‘under’, ‘above’, ‘below’, ‘out-
side’, for example, but not ‘beside’, ‘next to’, ‘inside’, ‘near’, ‘in’, ‘on’, ‘at’, or ‘inside’.
Zwarts [180] noted that upward monotonicity appears to be a distinguishing feature of prepo-
sitions that can be modified by a measure phrase, as in (38) below.
(38) a. The bird is 10 m. in front of the house.
b. * The bird is 10 m. near the house.
The preposition ‘in front of’ is upward monotone because, ifsome objectx is in front of the
house and moves further away from it, it still remains in front f the house.8 By contrast, ifx
is ‘near’ the house and moves further away from it, at some point it will no longer be near the
house, so the preposition ‘near’ is not upward monotone.
TheModification Condition(MC), proposed by Zwarts [180] and subsequently refined by
Zwarts and Winter [182], is intended to capture the contrasting behaviour of certain spatial
prepositions in the presence of measure phrase modifiers, asexemplified in (38a) and (38b)
above. The MC is couched in terms of the monotonicity properties of the vector sets denoted by
the prepositional phrases; the particular formulation in definition 9 below is from Winter [176,
p. 252], and corresponds essentially to the version in Zwarts and Winter [182].
Definition 9 (Modification Condition (MC)) An expression that is associated with a set of
vectors W can be modified by an MP only if W is non-empty, upwardand downward monotone
and does not contain zero vectors.
However, as we noted earlier, there is a similar contrast in acceptability in the use of the MP
modifiers with gradable adjectives, as in (39) below (cf. example (6) in section 1.2.1 above).
(39) a. The table is 1 metre wide/long/high.
b. * The table is 1 metre narrow/short/low.
Given the parallel between the examples in (38) and (39), it is natural to consider the possibility
of a common explanation for the behaviour of MP modifiers in both cases. In [176], Winter
attempts to account for the behaviour of MP modifiers with gradable adjectives in terms of the
MC.
8It is assumed that the vectors in the set denoted by ‘in front of the house’ have their starting points at the
outside boundary of the house, and point away from it.
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The formal details of Winter’s account differ from Faller’sin certain respects; for example,
where Faller uses a single scale structure for antonymic adjective pairs such as ‘tall’/‘short’,
‘fat’/‘slim’, etc., Winter follows Kennedy [93] in employing a pair of distinct scales with oppo-
site orientations. An adjectiveA in the positive form is associated with a set of located vectors
of the form〈zS,w〉, wherezS is a vector representing thez ro valuefor the adjectiveA, or, as
Winter [176, p. 243] puts it, “the minimal amount ofA-ness relative to the scaleS”; the vector
w, for its part, represents the degree ofA-ness of an entity inA’s denotation, where this must
be greater than some standarddS.
Winter [176, p. 245] then assigns an interpretation to adjectiv s in terms of sets of located
vectors as follows: the positive form of an adjective is associated with a set of located vectors
of the form〈zS, t ·uS〉, wherezS is the zero vector, andt.uS is some vector greater in magnitude
than the standard vectordS (the product of a scalart and the unit vectoruS of the scaleS).
In the case of ‘tall’ and ‘short’, for example, we end up with the interpretations in (40)
below, wheret0 is a scalar derived from the contextual standard of evaluation, anduH is a unit
height vector:
(40) a. tall ′ = {〈0, t ·uH〉 : t > t0}
b. short′ = {〈0, t ·uH〉 : 0 < t < t0}
Winter’s [176, p. 245] principal reason for treating the positive form of degree adjectives as
located vectors of the form〈0,w〉 is the general semantics of MP modification: unlike compar-
atives such as ‘2m. longer than the garage’, where the lengthis taken relative to the length of
the garage, when something is ‘2 m. long’, this is invariablytaken to meantwo metres longer
than zero.
We can paraphrase the interpretations Winter assigns to thebasic adjective forms very
roughly as follows:
(41) a. JtallK = λv.v is on the height scaleH ∧v starts at 0∧v is greater thandH
b. JshortK = λv.v is on the height scaleH ∧v starts at 0∧v is less thandH
The interpretation he provides forfive feet tallis then:
Jfive feet tallK = λv.v is on the height scaleH ∧v starts at 0∧v is greater thandH
∧v has a magnitude of 5 feet
(1.12)
However, as Winter [176, p. 250] himself observes, the translation in (40), which we para-
phrased informally in (1.12), is not in itself an adequate representation of the meaning of the
phrase: the translation still requires the vectors in the int rpretation of ‘five feet tall’ to be
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greater than the contextual standarddH. This means that, given a standarddH for tallness
somewhere around 6 feet (say), the sentence ‘Bob is 5 feet tall’ would be false even if Bob
is indeed 5 feet in height, simply because Bob does not count as tall according to the contex-
tual standard. The standard must be set to zero, as pointed ouby Faller, or done away with
altogether, in order to obtain the correct interpretation (cf. Section 1.3.3 above).
Winter claims that it is the Modification Condition which produces the correct interpreta-
tion; in particular, the standardH is set to zero in contexts of MP modification in order to
satisfy thedownwardmonotonicity constraint of the MC. The set of vectors corresponding to
tall ′ is upward monotone for any value ofdH, but it is only downward monotone ifdH = 0H; in
this case, the denotation oftall ′ comprises the entire height scale and satisfies both the upward
and downward monotonicity constraints, and thus the MC, as shown graphically in Figure 1.4.
0 ∞
dH bobH
-
0 ∞
bobH dH
-
0 ∞
bobHdH
-
Figure 1.4: Downward monotonicity and the scale for ‘tall’
By contrast, the vector set denoted byshort′ is downward monotone for any value ofdH,
but upward monotone only ifdH = 0H, in which case the set is empty (because there are no
vectors shorter than 0H). It is this contrast that explains why unbounded adjectives, such as
‘tall’, can undergo modification by measure phrases, while bounded adjectives like ‘short’ do
not.
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1.3.5 A Critique of VSS
The inclusion of vectors in the semantic ontology makes VSS apowerful framework within
which to express geometric constructs. This is immediatelyuseful in capturing the semantics
of spatial expressions, where geometric notions are directly relevant, but it also applicable to
other domains which share aspects of meaning with the spatial domain at an abstract level. One
such domain is time, which in our modern conception is isomorphic to the real number line; this
shared structure is manifested in the use of spatial expressions in the temporal domain, as when
we speak of the ‘near’ and ‘distant’ future, or a ‘long’ or ‘short’ duration. Several researchers
regard the spatial dimension of length as more fundamental than the time dimension, and regard
the spatial domain as the structuring domain for many other domains; Lakoff and Johnson [102]
have argued that the concept of time ismetaphoricallystructured by the concept of space.
Herskovits [70] presents a detailed study of spatial preposition , and discusses several instances
where spatial structure is transferred to other domains: a sentence like ‘We met Aliceat six
oćlock’, for example, shares the same abstract structure as ‘We met Aliceat the races’, or ‘Bob
is at the station’ (cf. Herskovits [70, p. 51], Gärdenfors [53, ch. 5]).
A vector-based semantics, being especially suited to interfac with geometric models of
conceptual structure, is thus well-suited to modelling these and other abstract structural paral-
lels among conceptual domains (see Gärdenfors [53, ch. 5]). However, there are also certain
areas where VSS is incomplete or inadequate.
As Herskovits has pointed out,9 one problem for VSS, at least in its original formulation,
is that the meaning of a prepositional phrase is not fully reducible to geometric properties. In
many cases, inclusion in the relevant region is often a necessary but notsufficientcondition for
the use of the preposition: e.g., ‘upon’, ‘against’ demand spatial contiguity, while ‘on’ requires
both contiguity and support (see Herskovits [70], Gärdenfors [53, ch. 5]). More recent work
within the framework (e.g., Zwarts [181]) has begun to address this issue, using Talmy’s [155]
notion of force dynamics.
Another issue is that VSS analyses spatial relations astwo-placerelations between a located
object and reference object. However, in Chapter 2, Section2.2 below we shall see that a two-
place relation is insufficient to capture the properties of spatial prepositions with a directional
character, where we also need to take into account thepoint of viewfrom which a spatial scene
is described.
There are two further problems with VSS which are especiallypertinent to the semantics of
gradable adjectives, which we shall refer to as the ‘divergent type problem’ and the ‘coordina-
9Personal communication, cited by Gärdenfors [53, pp. 172–3]; see also Zlatev [178].
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tion problem’.
1.3.5.1 The Divergent Type Problem
The defining feature of scalar theories is the presence of abstract representations of measure,
such as degrees, intervals, or vectors, as ‘first-class’ members of the semantic ontology. Such
theories typically assign gradable and non-gradable adjectives logical representations of differ-
ent semantic types: on a predicative analysis, non-gradable adjectives are usually interpreted
as properties of individuals (i.e., as sets of entities), while gradable adjectives are interpreted
as relations between individuals and degrees, or, as in VSS,as properties of degrees or vec-
tors. The distributional characteristics of gradable adjectiv s, including in particular the fact
that gradable adjectives, unlike non-gradable ones, can appear with degree modifiers, are then
explained in terms of this difference.
In scalar theories, gradable adjectives are analysed as relations involving abstract measures,
and in some theories are assigned a logical type that is distinct from non-gradable adjectives.
We see this in VSS, for example, where non-gradable adjectives are given a traditional analysis
as properties of individuals, but gradable adjectives are instead analysed as properties ofvectors
(see Faller [46] and Winter [175, 176]).
While adjectives form a very diverse class, it is nevertheless the case that gradable adjec-
tives, like other predicative adjectives, are intuitivelyconstrued as properties of individuals,
not properties of vectors. This fundamental fact is obscured by the assignment of completely
distinct types to gradable and non-gradable adjectives.
Thus one criticism that can be levelled at VSS, along with other scalar theories, is that it
fails to capture the underlying unity of the class of adjectives. Adjectives in English exhibit
a diverse range of semantic behaviour; the challenge for a semantic theory is to model this
diversity, while still recognising the underlying unity ofthe class within the grammar. This
leads to a situation where, in order to cope with even the simplest redicative and attributive
constructions, VSS needs to supplement the semantic composition rules with powerful type
coercion mechanisms to ensure basic type compatibility.
1.3.5.2 The Coordination Problem
The introduction of additional entity types into the ontology has other disadvantages; for exam-
ple, the increase in the formal complexity of the semantic theory, in the form of additional rules
for type conversion and semantic interpretation. Worse than is, however, is the fact that the
introduction of vectors (or degrees) appears to give rise toparadoxical interpretations for even
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quite simple constructions that are unproblematic for non-scalar approaches. One example of
this is the problem VSS has with intersective constructions, such as coordinate structures and
determiner phrases with restrictive modifiers, as in (42) and (43) below.
(42) a. Bill is tall and slim.
b. Bill is taller and slimmer than John.
c. Bill is taller and slimmer than some student.
d. John is shorter and heavier than Bill.
e. Bill is taller than Jack and slimmer than Jill.
(43) a. The tall ugly bloke is my brother.
b. My sister is a beautiful slim girl.
c. I would like a big red juicy apple for dessert.
The problem is that VSS is unable to assign interpretations tintersective constructions involv-
ing multiple gradable adjectives, or indeed spatial and temporal PPs. There exists a venerable
tradition of analysing both conjunction and restrictive modification in terms of set-theoretic
intersection.10 However, as Zwarts and Winter [182] point out, a Boolean approach to con-
junction appears to be incompatible with the VSS account of spatial prepositions, because one
cannot interpret the conjoined VSS denotations (which are sets of vectors) in terms of set-
theoretic intersection. For example, VSS assigns completely disjoint denotations to the PPs
above the houseandbelow the cloudin sentence (44a) below (since the vectors have a different
starting point in each set), so their intersection yields the empty set; but (44a) is not in any
way contradictory or impossible to interpret, and has an interpretation roughly paraphrased by
sentence (44b).
(44) a. The bird is ten meters [above the house and below the cloud].
b. The bird is ten meters above the house and the bird is ten meters below the cloud.
As Faller [46] recognises, this problem with coordination carries over to the VSS analysis of
degree adjectives, which assigns completely disjoint denotations to sentences such as those in
(42) and (43) above; as in the case of (44), the conjoined elements are again not contradictory,
nor otherwise semantically incompatible.
10The cross-categorial treatment of coordination in formal semantics has been developed over the years in the
work of von Stechow [168], Keenan and Faltz [91], Gazdar [54], Partee and Rooth [129], and others.
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1.4 Aims and Scope
The case for treating gradable adjectives along the lines ofspatial and temporal expressions
is based on a number of structural and conceptual analogies among these domains. These are
explored in greater detail in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 2, we shall see that there are certain aspects of the meaning of spatial and tem-
poral expressions which show that locative relations cannot be adequately analysed in terms
of a binary relation between a located object and a referenceobject alone. This can be seen,
for example, in the apparent inconsistencies that can arisein d scribing a given Figure-Ground
pair; for example, Bob may say that the church is on the left side of the road, while Bill may
equally insist that it is on the right. Of course, it is quite possible for both Bob and Bill to be
right, since they might be looking at the church from different points of view. As Barwise and
Etchemendy [10] observe, whenever one encounters an apparent incoherence in the world, it is
often a symptom of some implicit parameter whose value is changing: in this case, the incon-
sistency can be resolved by recognising that one and the samearrangement of objects may be
viewed from different points-of-view, orperspectives.
Chapter 3 present a formal semantics for gradable adjectives within a general theory of loca-
tive semantics, which we refer to asLocative Structure Semantics(LSS). Our main hypothesis
is that there is a common locative structure underlying the semantics of gradable adjectives,
spatial expressions, and tense. We claim that gradable adjectives, along with spatial and tem-
poral expressions, have a common underlying semantics couched in terms of ternary relational
structures calledlocative structures(L-structures), and refer to the semantic framework based
on locative structures asLocative Structure Semantics(LSS). A central notion in our theory
of locative structures will be the notion ofperspective, as found in the work of Barwise and
Perry [9], Seligman [141, 142], Barwise and Seligman [11], and Talmy [157]; in particular,
we will regard the norm or standard corresponding to a gradable djective as aconceptual
perspective, whose variability is a form ofdeictic shift.
In the locative theory we propose, the standard of evaluation is tied to the notion of aper-
spectiveor point of view. The standard refers to a location in conceptual space, aonceptual
deictic akin to the locative indexicals ‘here’ and ‘now’; the variability of the standard of evalua-
tion can then be viewed as a form ofdeictic shift, akin to the variability exhibited by ‘here’ and
‘now’. Moreover, the vagueness that characterises both gradable adjectives and spatio-temporal
deictic expressions like ‘here’ and ‘now’ can also be seen asderiving from their shared locative
nature.
The notion of perspective is also highly relevant to the phenomenon of tense, where it is
38
usually associated with themoment of speech. Here, too, there are good grounds for assuming
that tenses have an underlying ternary structure. While alltraditional theories of tense recognise
a binary relation between the described event and a temporaldeictic centre relative to which
the description is made (usually, the moment of speech), Hans Reichenbach [134] famously
proposed that each temporal expression is associated with three time points: aspeech point, S,
anevent point, E, and areference point, R, thought of as a situation or context that is relevant
to the utterance. Reichenbach’s tripartite scheme can capture subtle differences between tenses
that are difficult if not impossible to express in a frameworkthat only admits of binary relations
between pointsE (then) andS(now).
We will argue that locative relations in general comprise thr e essential elements: an object,
event or location being described, which we write asF and call theFigure(or located entity); an
object, event or location in relation to which the target is de cribed, which we write asGand call
theGround(or reference entity); and, a location or event corresponding to the perspective, or
point of view, from which the description is made, which we write asP and call thePerspective
point.
Our claim is that L-structures enable us to capture important p rallels between the semantics
of adjectives and spatial and temporal locatives. L-structures can be thought of as a generali-
sation of Reichenbachian tenses, abstracted from a specifically temporal setting and applied to
the interpretation of locatives in general, including spatial and adjectival expressions; in much
the same way that Reichenbachian theories of tense associate all tensed clauses with an event
point, E, a reference point,R, and a speech point,S, we will associate locative expressions
with an L-structure comprising a figure,F, a ground,G, and a perspective,P. In fact, in our
view, Reichenbach’sS, E, R points are simply specialised temporal instances of more abstr ct
locativecategories ofPerspective, Figure, andGround; in particular, the event point (or located
event)E is the temporal Figure, the reference pointR he temporal Ground, and the speech
pointS the temporal Perspective Point.
Another issue we shall touch on is vagueness, which we view asconceptually distinct from
gradability. We provide an overview of vagueness in the context of in Section 5.2. Although we
will argue in favour for a form of epistemicism, our main concern is not to provide a definitive
account of vagueness per se, but rather to clarify its relationship to locative expressions in
general, and gradable expressions in particular.
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1.5 Chapter Overview
In the following chapters, we present a formal semantics forgradable adjectives couched in
terms of a general theory of locative semantics we refer to asLocative Structure Semantics
(LSS). The chapters are organised as follows:
Chapter 2: A New Perspective on the Semantics of LocativesWe introduce the notion ofper-
spectiveand its role in semantic accounts of spatial and tense phenoma. We explain
the influence of the perspective on the interpretation of figure-ground relations in the
spatial and temporal domains, and argue for a uniform treatmnt in terms of ternary se-
mantic structures we refer to aslocative structures(L-structures). We motivate the view
of gradable adjectives as locatives, and discuss the relevanc of the notion of perspective
to the standard of evaluation. We discuss how L-structures acontextually anchored,
and propose an account of gradability in terms ofdeictic shift.
Chapter 3: Locative Structures and the Semantics of Gradable Adjectives We define a for-
mal locative structure semantics(LSS) for gradable adjectives. We examine the issue of
measure phrase modification, and propose anadjectival modification condition(AMC)
to capture the semantics of adjectival constructions involving measure phrases.
Chapter 4: A Dynamic Semantics for LocativesThis chapter develops a dynamic model of
LSS. We will argue that a dynamic semantics not only providesa means to capture
anaphoric dependencies involving L-structures, but also enabl s us to resolve some of
the problems facing vector-based theories (including bothVSS and LSS), notably the
Divergent Type Problemand theCoordination Problem, using a modified version of Paul
Dekker’s notion ofexistential disclosure(Dekker [35], [36]).
Chapter 5: Conclusion We discuss some of the issues raised by the theory developed in the
previous chapters, and some directions for further research.
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Chapter 2
A New Perspective on the Semantics of
Locatives
2.1 Introduction
The locative theory of adjectives is based on the hypothesisthat an abstract locative struc-
ture is shared by expressions from several different categories, including spatial and temporal
PPs, tense constructions, and gradable adjectives.
There are two basic elements at the heart of most spatial relations: one is typically some
object which is the focus of interest, while the other acts a landmark or reference point relative
to which the position of the first is specified. In the view of some theorists, however, there is
at least one other additional element of semantic relevance, the perspectiveor point of view
from which the spatial scene is conceptualised or described. Following Talmy [153], we refer
to these elements as theFigure, GroundandPerspective, and represent them symbolically as
F, G, andP, respectively.
We shall see that the same notions can be applied to the semantics of tense. Hans Re-
ichenbach [134] proposed that each temporal expression is associated with three time points: a
speech point, S, anevent point, E, and areference point, R, whereE refers to the time point cor-
responding to the event described by the tensed clause,S i (usually) taken to be the speaker’s
time of utterance, andR is a temporal reference point relevant to the utterance. Reichenbach
argued that this tripartite scheme can capture subtle differences between tenses that are difficult
if not impossible to express in a framework that only admits of binary relations. We will pro-
pose a correspondence between Reichenbach’sS, E, Rpoints and the categories of Perspective,
Figure, and Ground; in particular, we can look upon the eventpoint (or located event)E as
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a temporal Figure, the reference pointR as a temporal Ground, and the speech pointS as a
temporal Perspective point.
On the basis of the cross-categorial applicability of the notions of Figure, Ground and Per-
spective, we will propose a generalisation of the Reichenbachian ternary notion of tense to the
domain of locative concepts. We will conjecture that there exists an abstract ternary conceptual
structure we call alocative structure, or L-structure, underpinning the semantics of a broad
class of ‘locative’ expressions, including both tense and spatial and temporal PPs.
We will furthermore claim that the notions of Figure, Groundand Perspective also underpin
the semantic analysis of gradable adjectives. The central importance of the notion ofpoint of
view or perspectivein semantic theory has been a tenet of the theory of SituationSemantics
since its inception (see Barwise and Perry [9, p. 39]), and the view that the notion of perspec-
tive is applicable to the semantics of gradable adjectives is found in the work of Barwise and
Seligman [11]. We will adopt the hypothesis that there is a pers ctival parameter,P, in the
semantic representation of gradable adjectives, which is responsible for the context-variable
standard that characterises gradable predicates such as ‘tall’, ‘heavy’, etc., effectively treating
adjectival gradability as a form of pronominal value assignme t. This parametric analysis of
gradability is supported by a number of structural parallels between gradable adjectives, pro-
nouns and tenses, of the sort originally observed by Partee [127] between tenses and pronouns.
2.2 Perspectives
2.2.1 Figure and Ground
Many spatial expressions can be modelled as a relation between two elements, one of which
is the theme of interest, while the other functions as a reference point or landmark relative to
which the position of the first is specified. Leonard Talmy [153], [154], [156] employs the
terms ‘Figure’ and ‘Ground’ for these two fundamental cognitive roles,1 while other roughly
equivalent terms found in the literature include ‘located object’ and ‘reference object’ (Zwarts
and Winter [182]), ‘trajector’ and ‘landmark’ (Langacker [106]), or ‘target’ (‘cible’) and ‘land-
mark’ (‘site’) (Vandeloise [165, p. 21 ff.]).
Talmy characterises the Figure as a moving (or conceptuallymovable) entity, whose loca-
tion, path, or orientation is conceived of as variable, while the Ground is a reference entity
which serves as an aid in specifying the figure’s location or path (see Talmy [156, p. 312]).
1Talmy borrows these terms from Gestalt psychology, and writes them with capitals to distinguish their specif-
ically linguistic usage from their original, psychological usage—see Talmy [156, pp. 312–313].
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Thus, the Figure is typically associated with features suchas relative mobility, small size, and
perceptual inaccessibility as compared with the Ground, which tends to be comparatively im-
mobile, large in size, and of known or easily knowable location. The Figure-Ground relation is
fundamentally asymmetric, and is moreover associated witha contrast between new and given
information: the position of the Figure (located object) isnew information, while that of the
Ground (reference object) is given or old information. The asymmetric nature of the relation
means that we find many examples where interchanging the roles of Figure and Ground is
not acceptable, even though the purely physical relationship between the objects is unchanged
(e.g., comparethe cat is near the housewith ?the house is near the cat). In cases where the
Ground is not explicitly specified, it is usually identified with a contextually salient location,
such as the speaker or hearer’s location; thus, an utteranceof th station is very far awaymight
naturally be taken to mean very far awayfrom here.
For example, in a physical situation perceived as involvinga objectA located or moving
relative to another objectB, A takes on the role of the figure whileB becomes the ground; thus,
“Bob” is the Figure and “the house” is the Ground in (45a) below, while in (45b), the Figure is
“the bird” and the Ground is “the cloud”.
(45) a. Bob(F) sat in front of the house(G).
b. The bird(F) flew through the cloud(G).
Talmy [156, p. 334] observes that the linguistic expressionof Figure-Ground relations appears
to be governed by a ‘precedence principle’: there is a pronounced tendency for the Figure to
enjoy syntactic precedence over the Ground. Thus, in complex sentences, the Figure tends to
be specified in the main clause and the Ground in a subordinateclause, while within a single
clause the precedence takes the form of a case hierarchy: in non-agentive clauses, the Figure
may be expressed as subject and the Ground as (oblique) object, while in agentive clauses,
with an Agent as subject, the Figure appears as direct objectand he Ground as oblique object.
Talmy [156, p. 334 ff.] provides reasons for taking sentences that violate of the precedence
principle as non-basic or derived.
As Talmy and others note, Figure-Ground relations are evident in other domains, notably
in the temporal use of prepositions, where the Figure is an eve t whose location in time is
the relevant issue, and the Ground is a reference event with reference to which the Figure’s
temporal location is characterised (cf. Talmy [156, p. 320 ff.]).
(46) a. The reception(F) will come after the wedding(G).
b. The explosion(F) occurred at noon(G).
c. Bob will arrive(F) before John signs the contract(G).
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d. Alice slept(F) through the raising of the flag(G).
In (46a) and (46b), the Figure is indicated by the grammatical subject and the Ground as prepo-
sitional object, just as in example (2.2.1) above; in (46c) and (46d), both the Figure and Ground
correspond to clausal constituents.
2.2.2 Perspective and the Figure-Ground Relation
While a Figure-Ground relation is apparent, in some form, inmany spatial and temporal expres-
sions, a binary relation is not in general sufficient to modelth meaning of spatial expressions.
This can be seen in the apparent inconsistencies that can arise in describing even quite simple
Figure-Ground relations. For example, Bob says that the church is on the left side of the road,
but Bill insists that it is on the right; it is of course quite possible for both Bob and Bill to be
right, since they might be looking at the church from different points of view. As Barwise and
Etchemendy [10] observe, whenever one encounters an apparent incoherence in the world, it
is often a symptom of some implicit parameter whose value is changing: once one recognises
that one and the same arrangement of objects may be viewed from differentperspectives, the
apparent inconsistency melts away.
One and the same situation or event can be viewed, or, in a broader sense,experienced,
from different points of view. Bob, looking down the road at the church, sees an image that
is dependent on his location and the direction of his gaze: his view of the church is partial,
since he cannot see the far side; objects of the same size may appear to be larger or smaller,
depending on how far away they are; the sides of the road, although parallel to each other,
seem to converge; and so on. There is a correspondence between how the entities and relations
that constitute a situation are perceived, and the particular location from which that situation
is observed (as well as the perceptual and inferential abilities of the observer, of course); we
refer to the observer’s point of view as theP rspective point. A Perspective, being relative
to the location of the observer, has a subjective aspect: Bob’s perception and experience of
a situation is specific to his location: observers at other locati ns will usually perceive the
same situation or event in a different way. However, Bob’s pers ctive on the situation is
not completely subjective, since if another similarly-endowed observer were to occupy exactly
the same position as Bob, he or she would be able to perceive the situation in the same or
similar way. Thus perspectives ultimately have an objectivbasis, and are, in principle at least,
intersubjectively shareable (cf. Seligman [141, p. 151]).
The phenomenon of perspectival relativity appears to be so ubiquitous that some researchers,
notably Barwise and Perry [9], Seligman [141, 143, 142], andTalmy [154, 157, 158], have pro-
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posed that the notion of perspective be recognised as a fundament l part of semantic theory as
a whole.
There are many words, such as ‘come’, ‘go’, ‘left’, ‘right’,and so on, whose meaning
appears to make reference to the point of view or perspectiveof an actual or hypothetical
observer. Fillmore [49] has shown that references to pointsf view is ubiquitous in discourse,
while Talmy [154, 157, 158], Vandeloise [165], and others, have investigated in considerable
detail the role of perspective in the analysis of spatial prepositions: for example, the sentence
‘The chicken is in front of the chair’, can be truthfully usedto describe (at least) two quite
distinct configurations, illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
Figure 2.1: The chicken is in front of (behind) the chair
Figure 2.2: The chicken is in front of (behind) the chair
Conversely, both spatial configurations can also be truthfully described by the sentence ‘The
chicken is behind the chair’. In all cases, the chicken is theFigure and the chair is the Ground.
However, in the first case the Figure is between the speaker and the Ground (the ‘front’ of the
Ground is taken to be the side facing the speaker), while in second the Figure is on the far
side of the chair (the ‘front’ of the Ground is the side facingaway from the speaker). This
difference can be attributed to a change in the point of view adopted by the speaker: in one
case, the point of view (Perspective point) is the speaker’sown physical location, whereas in
the other the point of view corresponds to the Ground. The point of view need not correspond
to the speaker’s location or that of the reference object; the speaker might adopt the point of
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view of the hearer or addressee of the utterance. For example, in a situation where Alice is
helping Bob to find something, the pragmatically preferred option might well be for Alice to
describe the spatial environment from Bob’s point of view, rather than her own.
Vandeloise [165, ch. 2] describes this in terms of a contrastbetweencontextualorientation
andintrinsic orientation. People recognise certain objects, such as chairs and houses, as having
canonical front and back sides, regardless of the position of the objects around them; this is
their intrinsic orientation. However, orientation is also sometimes contextually determined, as
when, for example, the speaker regards the ‘front’ of an object as that side which she is facing
or interacting with. The contrast between contextual and intrinsic orientation can be explicated
in terms of a difference in point of view: in cases of intrinsic orientation, the point of view
coincides with the object itself, whereas in the case of contextual orientation the point of view
is that of some other object.
Depending on the point of view, a Figure object (such as the cat in the above example)
may concurrently bear several distinct spatial relations tone and the same Ground object (the
chair). Indeed, there will generally be an indeterminate number of possible points of view in a
given situation, some of which may be ‘embedded’ within others. This is illustrated particularly
well in Talmy’s [157, p. 226] example of the church, illustrated in Figure 2.3 below (as in
Talmy’s original diagram, the circles represent people, and their “noses” indicate the direction
in which they are facing): in this scenario, a speaker (‘S’) and hearer (‘H’) are in the back of
a church (near the entrance), where a queue of people runs from left to right (facing the right
wall); John (‘J’) is standing in the queue, but has turned completely around so that he is facing
the person behind him; on either side of John, perpendicularto the queue, are two people facing
the altar (one slightly closer to the entrance than John, theot r closer to the altar). Given this
scenario, Talmy [157, pp. 226–227] points out that the answer to the questionwho is in front of
John? will vary according to what we take as our reference frame, and in fact may be any of
the four persons labelled by numbers in the diagram: person 1is in front of John with respect
to John’s own intrinsic orientation; person 2 is in front of Jhn with respect to the contextual
orientation provided by the queue; person 3 is in front of John with respect to the contextual
orientation provided by the church’s interior; and person 4is in front of John with respect to the
vantage point of the speaker and hearer (cf. Figure 2.1 above). If we extend Talmy’s scenario to
consider the spatial surroundings of the church itself, we find that the church may be assigned
an externalorientation distinct from itsinternal one: whereas the internal orientation of the
church places the ‘front’ of the church at the altar, the external orientation typically locates the
‘front’ of the church at the entrance of the building.
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Figure 2.3: Multiple orientation
2.3 Tense
Tense has been traditionally regarded as the grammaticalised expression of location in time
(Comrie [26, p. 9]). If we adopt a simple represention of timeas a straight line, with the past
represented to the left and the future to the right (as per theusual convention), and indicate the
present moment by 0, we arrive at the conventional timeline shown in Figure 2.4 below (cf.
Comrie [26, p. 2]):
-
NOW
past future
Figure 2.4: Timeline
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Traditional theories of tense recognise two important temporal locations: an event which
is the focus of interest, and a point relative to which the event is located (usually, but not
always, the moment of speech). If we designate the former byE and the latter byS, then the
relative precedence of the points on the timeline gives riseto three basic temporal categories,
shown in Figure 2.5 below, according to whether the event is located before, at, or after the
deictic centre. A binary precedence relation on a linear timeline gives rise to the three basic
-
E S
0
Brutus killed Caesar
-
S, E
0
Brutus is killing Caesar
-
0
S E
Brutus will kill Caesar
Figure 2.5: Simple Tenses
configurations in Figure 2.5, which is clearly not enough to capture the range of tenses to be
found in English, let alone other languages. Hans Reichenbach [134] famously proposed that
each temporal expression is associated with three time points: aspeech point, S, anevent point,
E, and areference point, R. As above,E refers to the time point corresponding to the event
described by the tensed clause, andS is (usually) taken to be the speaker’s time of utterance.
Reichenbach’s innovation was to introduce the reference point R, to be thought of as a situation
or context that is relevant to the utterance. Reichenbach’stripartite scheme can capture subtle
differences between tenses that are difficult if not impossible to express in a framework that
only admits of binary relations between pointsE (then) andS (now), such as the difference
between the simple past and present perfect: the former tense makes a statement about a past
time, while the latter makes a statement about the present (se Figure 2.6 below).
Another characteristic of Reichenbach’s analysis of tenseis that the reference pointR is
present even in the simple tenses, where it is apparently superfl ous (see Figure 2.7 below).
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-
R, E S
0
Brutus killed Caesar
-
E R S
0
Brutus had killed Caesar
-
E S, R
0
Brutus has killed Caesar
Figure 2.6: English Past Tenses: Perfect, Pluperfect, and Present Perfect
While there is much more to tense phenomena than a purely structural account can capture,2
Reichenbach’s proposal has been widely influential; in particular, the idea that tense relations
have aternary structure, with a reference pointR distinct from the speech pointS, has been
incorporated into several contemporary theories of tense (e.g., see Comrie [26], Hornstein [74],
and Steedman [151]).
2.3.1 From Tenses to Locative Structures
As in the case of space (Section 2.2.2 above), the conceptualisation of time embodied in the
English tense system is inherently perspectival in nature.The point of speech,S, marks the
fundamental boundary between past, present and future; it is the component of tense that re-
lates the timeline to the speech situation and its participants (above all, the speaker), and thus
corresponds to thetemporal perspective pointin terms of which events are conceptualised.
Reichenbach’s event timeE and reference pointR, for their part, stand in a Figure-Ground
2There are aspects of tense that are arguably better modelledusing tense operators, as in Priorian tense logic,
and there also appear to be tense phenomena that cannot be capured in terms of temporal relations alone; in partic-
ular, there is experimental evidence that suggests a strongc nection between tense and goal-oriented reasoning
(see Trabasso and Stein [159]), a notion that has recently been advanced within computational semantics by van
Lambalgen and Hamm [164].
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-
R, E S
0
Brutus killed Caesar
-
S, R, E
0
Brutus is killing Caesar
-
S R, E
0
Brutus will kill Caesar
Figure 2.7: Simple Tenses Redux
relation:E indicates the temporal point of interest, and displays the characteristics of Talmy’s
Figure, whileR functions as a temporal landmark or Ground.
Thus it appears plausible to regard Reichenbach’sS, E, R points as specialised temporal
instances of the categories of Perspective, Figure, and Ground; in particular, we can look upon
the event point (or located event)E as a temporal Figure, the reference pointR as a temporal
Ground, and the speech pointSas a temporal Perspective Point. Indeed, given the importance
of these three elements in the semantics of both spatial and temporal expressions, we can regard
a Reichenbachian tenseS, E, R triple as a specific instance of a more general ternary structure,
shared by tense expressions as well as spatial and temporal PPs, which we call alocative
structure(L-structure).
One way to represent an L-structure is inrecord format, as in (2.1) below, where we refer to
the Perspective, Figure and Ground componentsP, F andG in lowercase using ‘dot’ notation
(so thatu.g denotes the Ground of the L-structureu, for example).
u =





p = v1
f = v2
g = v3





(2.1)
A Reichenbachian tense, in our framework, is simply a temporal L-structure, in whichP (or
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u.p) is Reichenbach’s speech point,S, F (or u. f ) is Reichenbach’s event point,E, andG (or
u.g) is Reichenbach’s reference point,R. Just as Reichenbachian theories associate a tensed
clause with a ternary tense structure comprisingS, E, andR points, we claim that spatial PPs
are associated with a spatial locative structure, where theP, F andG parameters are instantiated
as spatial locations, and that gradable adjectives are associ ted withconceptualL-structures
comprisingP, F, andG points. Moreover, we claim that these three components are present in
all cases, just as all three time points are always present in a Reichenbachian tense, even where
this may not be immediately obvious (as in the case of the ‘basic’ tenses). Similarly,
2.4 Adjectives as Locatives
Certain adjectival constructions appear to exhibit the same Figure-Ground relation as spatial
and temporal locative constructions; this is particularlyevident in comparative constructions,
such as those in (47) below. The focus of interest in the adjectival ase is the degree of posses-
sion of a given property by a given entity (the Figure), wherethis is often specified with respect
to another entity which manifests this property to a known extent (the Ground).
(47) a. Bob(F) is older/younger than Alice(G).
b. Bob(F) is older/younger than Alice is(G).
c. Bob(F) is older/younger than I thought he was(G).
(48) a. Bob (A) likes Alice(F) more than Eve(G).
b. Bob (A) likes Alice(F) more than I like Eve(G).
c. Bob (A) likes Alice(F) more than Eve does(G).
d. Bob (A) likes Alice(F) more than she likes him(G).
The Figure is grammatical subject in the sentences in (47), while in (48) the Agent, “Bob”,
is subject and the Figure is direct object; the Ground is expressed as the complement ofthan
throughout these examples, where it can take the form of a noun phrase, as in (47a), (48a), or a
clause, as in (47b), (47c), and (48b), (48c), (48d).
Typically, we find that the expression of the Figure-Ground relationship in comparative
constructions also conforms to Talmy’s precedence principle: as in the case of spatial and
temporal locatives, thus, the Figure typically enjoys syntactic precedence over the Ground,
which usually appears lower than the Figure in the case hierarchy, often as the nominal or
clausal complement ofthan, as in the sentences in (47) and (48) above.
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2.4.1 The Deictic Centre
Deixis or indexicality is a universal feature of language that grounds the use of language with
respect to a particular time, place, and person(s); it is thefunction that connects all language to
situations, and thus often involves extralinguistic, occasion-specific and subjective considera-
tions.
Most contemporary theories of tense agree that tense expressions are indexical, because
they may refer to different times, or time intervals, according to the properties of the context,
such as the time of utterance (see Reichenbach [134], Partee[127], Salmon [139], Enc [41],
Ogihara [121], and King [94]). In Reichenbach’s [134] theory f tense,S is a deictic element
that is typically anchored to the moment of speech; as several linguists and philosophers have
noted, it is similar in this regard to pronouns such as ‘I’ and‘here’, which are also interpreted
deictically.
The psychologist Karl Bühler [20] introduced the notion ofa ‘deictic field’ (Zeigfeld),
whose origin point, orOrigo, is associated with the notions ofHERE, NOW, and I. The most
straightforward instance of a deictic system is one where the speech situation is taken as deictic
centre: for the category of person, this defines the first person a the speaker and second person
as the hearer or hearers, with everything else being third person; for the category of place, the
location of the speech situation is defined ashere, everywhere else asthere; for the category of
time, the temporal location of the speech situation is defined asnow, every other time isthen
(see Comrie [26, pp. 14–18]). We refer to this as theegocentric perspective.
There are cases, though, where the deictic centre is not identical with the speech situation.
We saw in Section 2.2.2 above that it is possible for the speaker to adopt a vantage point that
is not her own. As in the case of spatial relations, where the point of view does not have to
correspond to the speaker’s location, the pronounI does not always indicate the speaker, nor the
temporal point of view always coincide with the time of utterance; we find this, for example, in
the “narrative” tenses of English, as in (49) below.
(49) It is the morning of 16th of June, 1815, outside Waterloo, and the moment of battle
has now arrived. Having noticed the exposed Prussian front,now clearly visible
in the morning sun, the general orders a furious artillery barrage as his men surge
forward towards the enemy positions.
In its most basic form, deixis sets the position of the perspectiv point at the speaker’s current
location and time. In this case, however, thehereis somewhere outside Waterloo, and thenow
of the narration is itself in the past: the (syntactic) present and perfect are interpreted relative
to a past point, distinct from the current speech point 0. A time is specifiedin the first clause
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of (49) and referred to in subsequent clauses, suggesting ananaphoric dependency between the
clauses.
This example demonstrates how the hearer can project herself to a deictic centre distinct
from the actual here and now. Just as a visual scene can often be described from more than one
viewpoint, speakers can adopt temporal viewpoints other than e actual moment of speech.
There are multiple possible temporal perspectives, just asthere are many possible spatial per-
spectives; thehereandnowof the speaker are just two contextually prominent ones.
Indeed, through the use of the appropriate linguistic expressions, the hearer may be induced
to project her viewpoint to a number of virtual locations, orto adopt the viewpoint of a particu-
lar individual, by employing such devices as descriptions of ubjective experience, perception
or thought (cf. Zubin and Hewitt [179]).
2.4.2 Conceptual Perspectives
As with tenses and pronouns, there is also widespread agreement that gradable adjectives are
contextually sensitive, based on the variability in the truth value of sentences in which such
adjectives occur; for example, the truth of a sentence such as ‘Bill is rich’ appears to vary
from context to context, and it seems plausible to attributethe responsibility for this contextual
variation to the semantic properties of ‘rich’ (cf. Richard[135], McFarlane [114]).3 Gradable
adjectives such as ‘tall’, ‘rich’, ‘good’, etc., appear to havevariable standards of application.
Some researchers (Partee [128], Condoravdi and Gawron [27]) have argued for a hidden pa-
rameter analysis for certain adjectives, such as ‘local’. Atypical speaker who utters ‘A local
pub is selling cheap beer’ is likely to mean (roughly) that there is a barnear himthat is selling
cheap beer. But a speaker who utters ‘Every football fan watched the Cup Final at a local pub’
probably does not mean that every football fan watched the Cup Final at a pub near him (that is,
3There is also the view that adjectival meaning is not contexts nsitive (appearances to the contrary notwith-
standing). Cappelen and Lepore [22], for example, have claimed that comparative adjectives cannot be context-
sensitive, basing their argument partly on the behaviour ofadjectives in assertion reports. If Alice says ‘Bill is
rich’, then Bob can truly say ‘Alice said that Bill is rich’; but if ‘rich’ were context-sensitive, then ‘rich’ could have
a different content in Alice’s context than it does in Bob’s:the content of ‘rich’ in Alice’s context might berich
for a lecturer, while the content of ‘rich’ in Bob’s context might be, say,rich for an investment banker; but then
Bob’s report would be incorrect, so rich cannot be context-snsitive. In Cappelen and Lepore’s view, this supports
the conclusion that the content of ‘rich’ is a single, uniform property acrossall contexts. The contextualist, by
contrast, holds that the truth ofBill is rich depends on some contextual factor, perhaps a standard of ‘richness’
which may vary according to a variety of factors, such as social class, culture, age group, and profession. See
Atlas [2], Korta and Perry [98], Richard [135], McFarlane [114]), and several other articles in [133] for a critique
of Cappelen and Lepore’s claims and a defense of the contextualist position.
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the speaker); rather, he is likely to mean that each footballfanx watched the Cup Final at some
pub that is local tox. This variation can be explained by supposing that ‘local’ hs a hidden
variable associated with it (y is local tox), whose value is supplied by context in the first case,
but which gets bound by the quantifier ‘every football fan’ inthe second.
Like Barwise and Seligman [11, Lecture 18], we interpret thecontextually variable (and of-
ten vague)normsor thresholdsassociated with gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’, ‘rich’, ‘good’,
etc., in terms of shifting perspectives or points of view. Inour approach, the norm corresponds
to a hidden perspectival parameter in the semantic representation of the adjective, which is
assigned a value in a context-sensitive manner.
The locative analysis of adjectives generalises Bühler’sZeigfeldto the conceptual realm,
and treats properties as dimensions in a conceptual space. Th notion of a ‘perspective’ is
applicable to conceptual structure in general because theris a level of mental structure that
is, in fact, geometric in nature; this claim is at the heart ofthe theory ofconceptual spaces, as
developed by Peter Gärdenfors [53]. Gärdenfors’ theory is based on a reification of geometrical
models as a level of mental structure: concepts are represented asn-dimensional regions in
a conceptual space, which is defined as a set of quality dimensions with a certaingeometric
structure; the notion of conceptual similarity is defined interms of the notion of metric distance
in the space.4
As in the case of tense, where the temporal Perspective point(Reichenbach’s “moment of
speech”,S) divides the time line into past and future, a conceptual pers ctive point divides a
given conceptual dimension into non-overlapping segments. If we representHEIGHT in terms
of a unidimensional scale, bounded by zero at one extreme andunbounded at the other, then we
may represent a given heightby an interval bounded by zero and a particular locationa on
this scale; similarly, we may represent the conceptual perspective point from which we evalu-
ate or describe this interval by another locationx on this scale; we claim that the nature of the
evaluation is sensitive to the geometric relation betweenx a da, so that we evaluateh as ‘tall’
if a is further from zero than the perspective pointx, while, conversely, we regard the same
heighth as ‘short’ if a is closer to zero thanx. A given height, say 6 feet, may be described as
‘tall’ or ‘short’ according to the speaker and circumstance; Bill might be ‘short’ according to
Bob but ‘tall’ according to Eve; but Bob might reckon that Bill is ‘tall’ for a thirteen-year-old,
and Eve might consider him ‘short’ for a basketball player, and so on. Thus, the sameobjective
property (in this case, a given height) is evaluated differently (as ‘tall’ or ‘short’) according
4In fact, Gärdenfors’ theory does not require all dimensionto have a metric: a dimension can consist of a sim-
ple ordering, or even a bare graph with no associated notion of rder or distance whatsoever; cf., Gärdenfors [53,
Section 1.8].
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to the possiblysubjectiveperspective adopted by the evaluator. However, while angocentric
perspectivemay be the most natural and basic one for someone to adopt, interpersonal interac-
tion and especially communication depends on the ability toenvisage points of view other than
one’s own.
2.4.3 Some Structural Analogies between Tenses, Adjective s and Pro-
nouns
In [127], Barbara Partee suggests that tenses in natural languages might not be operators, but
pronouns. Like pronouns, they have indexical, anaphoric, and bound variable uses. For exam-
ple, there are cases where tense is not interpreted deictically at ll, a phenomenon traditionally
called sequence of tense, as in (50):
(50) a. It was Alice’s birthday last Saturday and Bob boughther a present.
b. Bill decided last Friday that as soon as he finished his dissertation he would tell his
wife that they weremoving to Italy.
c. Bob said he would look for a pharmacy that wasstill open.
The underlined tenses in (50) are not necessarily interpreted as past tenses; all three sentences
have readings where the tenses seem to merely agree with a previous governing past tense,
without making any semantic contribution of their own (cf. Partee [127, p. 605]). In (50a), a
time is specified in the first clause and then referred to by thetense of the subsequent clause.
Partee notes that this is akin to the phenomenon of anaphoricdependency in pronouns, such as
the relation between the underlined pronouns and their antecedents in sentence (51) below:
(51) a. Alice boughta cakeyesterday, and Bob ate itthis morning.
b. Alice loves herchild.
c. Bob bites hisnails when heis nervous.
Sometimes a distinction is made among those indexicals whose c ntextual assignment appears
automatic and rule-governed, and those whose assignment appears to have a pragmatic basis:
for example, the reference of ‘I’ is usually determined automatically on the basis of a linguistic
rule, without taking into account such factors as the beliefs and intentions of the speaker, while a
possessive phrase such as ‘Bill’s car’ may mean something vague likethe car that bears relation
P to Bill; the free variableP must be assigned a value in context, but here the assignment is
not fully determined by the meaning of the possessive, and isat least partly dependent on the
speaker’s intention.
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In actuality, the matter is far from clear-cut; although thepronoun ‘I’ may appear at first
blush toonly have a deictic use, this is not the case, as we can see from example (52), which
Kratzer [99] attributes to Irene Heim.
(52) Only I got a question that Iunderstood.
(52) has (at least) two readings, depending on the interpretation of the second (underlined)
occurrence of ‘I’. On one reading (the strict reading), ‘I’ has its usual indexical interpretation:
that is, the sentence describes a situation where nobody else got a question that ‘I’ (the speaker)
understood. On the second reading (the loose reading), the sent nce says that, apart from me,
there was no personx such thatx got a questionx understood; the person and number features of
the second ‘I’ are not interpreted, and the pronoun has a bound variable interpretation. Thus, we
have cases ofunderdetermination, where the pronominal features are insufficient in themselves
to fully determine the referent, and we also have cases wherecertain pronominal features are
ignored. Kratzer [99] argues that this loss of interpretable features is another property that is
shared by pronouns and tenses.
We regard deixis and referential anaphora as special cases of the same phenomenon: in both
cases, the pronoun refers to an entity intended by the speaker that is present in the context of
interpretation. On this view, deictic pronouns and cases ofreferential anaphora are interpreted
using the same general strategy: in disambiguating the pronoun’s reference, the hearer assigns
to it the most salient individual that allows them to make sense of the utterance—subject to
pragmatic constraints of relevance, informativeness, etc. (see Sperber and Wilson [150], Heim
and Kratzer [66, Chapter 9]).
We can observe cases of deictic and anaphoric dependency in adjectival constructions, in-
volving both the standard and comparative forms. For example, the adjective in (53a) below,
considered as an isolated utterance, can be construed deictically as referring to the height of
some contextually salient person or thing, such as Bob’s ownheight at some point in the past;
in (53b), however, the positive form ‘tall’ is contextuallyanchored to some appropriate norm
or standard of height,sH, which Bill’s height is claimed to exceed.
(53) a. Bob is taller.
b. Bill is tall.
The kind of contextual dependency involved in each case is quite distinct. This is most clearly
seen in examples involving anaphoric dependency, such as (54) below.
(54) a. Bill is tall. Bob is also tall.
b. Bill is tall. Bob is also tall (for his age).
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c. Bill is tall. Bob is taller.
d. Bill is short. Bob is taller.
e. Bill is strong, but Bob is taller.
In (54a), the first clause ‘Bill is tall’, interpreted relative to some contextual standard, call it
sH, makes up part of the interpretive context for the second occurrence of ‘tall’. One natural
interpretation is for this to be interpreted relative to thesame standardsH, as may further uses
of the same adjective.
Where the standard is not itself precise, these further refeenc s to the samesH may have
the effect of providing further information aboutsH. Several researchers have noted that the
use of a vague predicate may itself have an effect on the discour e context (see Kamp [84],
Klein [95], Pinkal [132], Parikh [122], Eikmeyer and Reiser[40], Ballweg [3], Kyburg and
Morreau [100], Barker [5]), and in particular contribute toi s ‘precization’ (Pinkal [131]) or
‘sharpening’ (Williamson [172]). In (55a) below, the first clause establishes a standard of
height, which is referred back to in the subsequent clauses which assert that Bob, Bill, and
Alice are tall. In this case, the use of the adjective isde criptive: the attribution of tallness
tells us something about Bob, Bill, and Alice—namely, that they are all over 6 ft. in height.
However, where the standard is unclear, but the heights of various exemplars are known, such
attributions may have ametalinguisticuse, in which they are used to convey information about
the standard of height itself, as in (55a) and (55b) below (cf. Barker [5, p. 2]).
(55) a. According to regulations, anybody over 6 ft. is tall:so, Bob is tall, Bill is tall, and
Alice is not tall.
b. Well, according to Eve Bob is tall, Bill is tall, but Alice is not.
In general, however, it cannot be assumed that in a discoursether can only be a single standard
for tokens of the same adjective to refer to. While it is possible that a single standard may
underpin adjectival use over an extended segment of discoure, new standards of evaluation
may be introduced, and there may even be several standards inplay at a given point. In example
(54b), the hedge ‘for his age’ suggests that the standard of tallness for Bob is different to that
for Bill (Bob might be Bill’s five-year-old son, for instance). The standard may vary according
to the characteristics of the object described (e.g., ‘big’as applied to elephants and fleas, or
‘tall’ in the case of adults and children, etc.), or to the point of view of an observer (e.g., Eve
may have a different standard for what counts as ‘rich’ than Bill), or any practical tasks or goals
relevant to the conversation (e.g., ‘clean’ has different standards of application in a kitchen and
a surgical theatre).
57
In (54c), the first clause ‘Bill is tall’, interpreted relative to some standardsH, again provides
an antecedent for the comparative ‘taller’ in the second clause. In this case, however, the
comparative form does not make reference to the standard of tallness,sH, but rather to Bill’s
height; the claim made by the sentence is that Bob is tallerthan Bill. Of course, in (54c), if
Bob’s height exceeds Bill’s, it follows by transitivity that it also exceedsH, and thus that Bob
also counts as ‘tall’.5 As (54d) and (54e) demonstrate, it is ‘Bill’ that is taken as the antecedent
of the comparative, rather than the adjective, which need not even involve the same dimensional
scale.
If we compare these cases, we find that the anaphoric dependency involving the compara-
tive in (54c) has a strikingly different quality from that displayed by the standard form of the
adjective in (54a). Our view is that the different forms of context-dependence exhibited by the
comparative and standard forms of the adjective involve diff rent parameters of the L-structure:
the anaphoric dependency in (54c) involves the Ground parameter of the L-structure associated
with the comparative adjective ‘taller’, while in (54c) it is the Perspectival parameter that is
assigned a value in context. We shall present this in formal terms in Chapter 3, and given a
treatment in terms of dynamic semantics in Chapter 4.
2.5 Extended Locations
Thus far we have been speaking of locations as if they were entirely punctual in nature, but in
fact locations typically have an extension in time or space.For many purposes, it is perfectly
valid to abstract away from this: for instance, if we are concer ed with determing the config-
urational relationship among several locations, as when drawing a map to show a friend the
route from the station to our house, there may well be harm choose to represent buildings and
landmarks as points rather than extended regions. However,there are circumstances where the
extension of an object or event is relevant; In the case of spatial relations, for instance, certain
prepositions make reference to the interior of objects. Also, measurement of distance is often
made relative to the exterior boundary of a reference object; for example, if we say “Bob is
5 metres in front of (behind) the house”, then Bob’s positionis typically measured from the
boundary of the house, not from some point within the building. In general, the fact that the
reference object has a spatial extension means that there isa r gion that is neither ‘behind’ nor
‘in front of’ the reference object; thus, if Bob is inside theouse, he is neither in front of it nor
behind it.
5Assuming that the relevant standard of height is applicableto Bob.
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Temporal extension is relevant to the aspectual system of some languages. For example, the
imparfaitandpasśe d́efini in French differ in that theimparfait is an extended tense, whereas the
pasśe d́efini is not—cf. Figure 2.8 below, from Reichenbach [134]. This corresponds roughly
to the contrast between “I was seeing John” and “I saw John” inEnglish, where the present
participle conveys that the event covers a certain amount oftime.
-
R, E S
Je voyais Jean
-
R, E S
Je vis Jean
Figure 2.8: French imparfait and passé défini
The boundaries of a location are also typically both contextually variable and vague.6 For
example, the spatial locatives ‘here’ and ‘there’ contrasta region that (typically) includes the
speaker’s location, and another region that does not; a similar contrast holds between the tem-
poral locatives ‘now’ and ‘then’. The boundaries of the denot d spatial and temporal locations
may vary according to the context: thus, ‘here’ in one conversation may refer to a region within
arm’s reach of where I am standing (“Come over here and take this!” said to a child), while
in another it may refer to the city where I live, or a continent, even the entire planet (“here in
the United Kingdom”, “over there in the US”, “here on planet earth”); ‘now’ may refer to a
brief interval of a few minutes, or a period lasting years (“we are now living through a period
of rapid climate change”)–cf. Figure 2.9 below. In additiont this contextual variation, loca-
tions are also typically vague: that is, the boundary of the region will still be ‘fuzzy’ even after
contextual variability has been taken into account (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2).
We find the same phenomenon in the case of gradable adjectives, wh re we often find a single
dimension associated with an antonymic pair (e.g., ‘tall’ /‘short’, ‘wide’ / ‘narrow’, ‘old’ /
‘young’, etc.). These pairs are usually semantically contrary ather than complementary; that is,
one is not short simply in virtue of being not-tall, because being not-tall includes the possibility
6This is often cited as a canonical instance of ‘ontic’ vagueness, or vagueness in the world. See Chapter 5,
Section 5.2 for further discussion and citations.
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-
NOW
past future
-
NOW
past future
Figure 2.9: Temporal extension of ‘now’
of being neither short nor tall. One way to model this is by assigning distinct thresholds to ‘tall’
and ‘short’; however, if we separate the thresholds in this way, we need to provide a system of
what the Kyburg and Morreau [100] refer to as ‘penumbral connections’ which will ensure,
among other things, that the threshold for tall must be greate or equal to the threshold for short
in the same context of evaluation.
An alternative approach, we assume a single threshold between th members of an antonymic
pair, thought of as aconceptual locationcorresponding to an extended continuous region on
the height scale rather than a single, extensionless point,as illustrated in Figure 2.10 below.
-
0 ∞
S
short tall
-
0 ∞
S
short tall
Figure 2.10: The extended height threshold for ‘tall’ / ‘short’
On this account, tallness and shortness are determined relative to the upper and lower bound-
aries of the threshold. Note that, by treating the thresholdas a single entity with upper and
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lower boundaries, we automatically ensure that the appropriate penumbral connections be-
tween instances of ‘tall’ and ‘short’ are maintained, without resorting to an explicit system of
penumbral constraints. Moreover, in line with the properties of spatial and temporal locations,
the boundaries for conceptual locations are typically vague, even after contextual variability
has been taken into account.
We shall revisit the topic of vagueness and locatives in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5. How-
ever, since we shall be primarily concerned with relations between locations in the following
chapters, we shall generally employ a simple representatioof locations as points.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the foundational ideas underpinning the locative view of adjectival
semantics. At the heart of our approach is the notion ofpoint of viewor perspective. Gradable
properties are associated with dimensions in aconceptual space, wherein specific locations can
function asconceptualperspective points and reference points. As in the case of tense, where
the temporal perspective pointS acts as a threshold between past and future, a perspective
pointP along a conceptual dimension acts as a standard or norm separating entities which have
a property from those which do not.
We have introduced the notion of an L-structure, a generalisation of a Reichenbachian
ternary tense structure to the realm of concepts, and have provided some motivation for the
view that the notions ofPerspective, Figure, andGround can be extended from the spatio-
temporal domain to the semantics of gradable adjectives; wehav claimed that, just as tensed
clauses are associated with ternary tense structures, gradable adjectives are associated with
ternaryconceptualstructures.
In a similar way to how a Reichenbachian theory models certain features of tense in terms
of configurations ofS, E, andRpoints on a timeline, we propose to account for certain semantic
properties of adjectives in terms of configurations ofP, F , andG points on a dimensional scale.
This is the task we undertake in the next chapter, where we devlop a formal semantics for
gradable adjectives along these lines.
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Chapter 3
Locative Structures and the Semantics of
Gradable Adjectives
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 introduced the hypothesis that gradable adjectives are semantically a species of loca-
tive expression, sharing certain aspects of their semanticstru ture with certain spatial and tense
expressions. In particular, we proposed the idea that thereis an abstract semantic representa-
tion, akin to a Reichenbachian tense, called alocative structure(L-structure), that is shared by
gradable adjectives, spatial and temporal prepositions, and tense, and that this L-structure has
a ternary structure comprising elements we represented symbolically asF, G, andP, standing
respectively forFigure, Ground, andPerspective.
In this chapter we consider several of the topics introducedin Chapter 2 from a more formal
standpoint. Using the notion of L-structure as our startingpoint, we develop a formalloca-
tive structure semantics(LSS) for gradable adjectives in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. In Section 3.4,
we consider measures and measure phrases, and propose anadjectival measurability condi-
tion (AMC) to account for the phenomena related to measure phrasemodification, including
sortal restrictions (Section 3.4.3). We then consider the issue of how to incorporate seman-
tic constraints such as the AMC into the compositional semantic definition of the language in
Section 3.5, where we propose aconstruction-basedapproach to semantic constraints. In Sec-
tion 3.6, we re-examine the structural parallels between adjectives, tense and pronominals that
we discussed in Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2, using the concepts of dynamic semantics.
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3.2 Vectors, Dimensions, and Locative Structures
In Chapter 2, we proposed that the semantics of gradable adjectives, along with spatial and
temporal expressions, involves ternary structures calledL-Structurescomprising a Figure f, a
Ground g, and a Perspective point p, as set out in record format in (3.1).
u =





f = ~v1
g = ~v2
p = ~v3





(3.1)
In line with VSS and certain other trends in Cognitive Science (notably Gärdenfors [53]),
we shall think of properties in geometric terms as qualitative dimensions in a multidimensional
vector space, and assume a set ofindividualsU, a set ofdimensional vectorsV, and a set of
dimensionsD, which is a partition ofV. We also assume aconstant interpretation function
ℑ, whose role is to assign semantic values to the basic lexicaland logical constants of the
language; e.g.,ℑ(‘Bob’) = b (b∈ U).
In addition, we will have aprojection function, ∂, which takes as argument an individ-
ual a ∈ U, and yields a function∂(a) from property dimensionsd ∈ D to position vectors
in d; applying function∂(a) to a particular dimensiond′ returns a particular position vec-
tor in d′, which we call theprojection of a onto (the dimension) d′.1 For example, ifD =
{HEIGHT,WEIGHT,AGE, . . .}, andℑ(Bob) = b (b∈ U), then
∂(b) =







HEIGHT 7→ bH
WEIGHT 7→ bW
AGE 7→ bA
...







Thus, givenℑ(Bob) = b (b∈ U) and a dimensionHEIGHT ∈ D, then∂(b)(HEIGHT) = bH is a
position vector belonging to the dimensionHEIGHT which represents Bob’s height. Since∂(b)
yields a position vector for every dimensiond ∈D,2 it follows that∂ assigns to each individual
b ∈ U a location in the multidimensional vector spaceV, corresponding to thesumof all its
projections.
Since each dimensional vector inV belongs to a uniqued ∈ D, we can define a functionρ
that, given a vector, returns itsdimensional type, as in Definition 10.
1This can be straightforwardly generalised to an intensional context, if so desired, by relativising the projection
function to a time and/or possible world.
2Note that sortal restrictions may require abandoning the assumption that∂ is a total function; see Section 3.4.3
below.
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Definition 10 (ρ) For all dimensions d∈ D and vectors v∈ d,
ρ(v), d
We define the setTYPE of LSS types as follows:
Definition 11 (LSS types) TYPE is the smallest set such that
1. e,v, t ∈ TYPE.
2. if a,b∈ TYPE, then(a→ b) ∈ TYPE.
3. if a,b∈ TYPE, then(a•b) ∈ TYPE.
where
• e is the type of individuals;
• v is the type of (basic) vectors;
• t is the type of truth values;
• (a→ b) is the type of functions from type a into type b.
• (a•b) is the type of products of type a and type b.
The valuesv1,v2,v3 in (3.1) are vectors in a multidimensionalconceptualspace, whose
dimensions represent properties. Each of these elements isa ba ic vector, so L-Structures are
triples of basic vectors, and therefore of type(v• v• v), which we abbreviate tov3. Where
convenient, we shall represent L-Structures in record format, as in (3.1) below, and specify
their components using ‘dot’ notation (so thatu.g denotes the Ground or reference point of the
L-Structureu, for example).
3.2.1 Polarity
In Chapter 2, Section 2.2, we discussed some examples of spatial and temporal domains, and
proposed that expressions with a directional character3 annot be modelled in terms of a binary
relation between Figure (located object) and Ground (reference object), but require considera-
tion of thepoint of viewor perspectivefrom which the scene is described.
3E.g., ‘in front of’, ‘behind’, ‘left of’, ‘right of’, etc., as opposed to ‘next to’, ‘near’, ‘around’, and so on.
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Consider again the situation represented in Figure 2.1 of Chapter 2, repeated here for conve-
nience as Figure 3.1. As we observed in Chapter 2, the same scen can be described using either
member of the contrary pair of prepositions ‘in front of’ or ‘behind’, according to whether we
adopt the point of view of the observer, or the point of view associated with the canonical use
of the chair.
Figure 3.1: The chicken is in front of / behind the chair
The primacy of the Perspective point in fixing orientation isparticularly evident in the case
of tense, where it is the relative position of the event time (the Figure) and the moment of
speech (the Perspective point) on the timeline that determines the fundamental classification of
the tense as Past, Present, or Future (cf. Chapter 2, Figure 2.5). The relative position of Figure
and Ground (Reichenbach’s reference timeR) constitutes asecondaryorientational principle,
which modulates the initial classification; for example, within the class of Past tenses, the
relative position of Figure-Ground distinguishes betweenthe Perfect, Pluperfect, and Present
Perfect (cf. Chapter 2, Figure 2.6).
Along a single dimension, the orientational possibilitiesr duce to two opposedpolarities,
which we call ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, plus the absence ofp larity. Polarity is simplyori-
entation along a single dimension; for example, the vectorsu and(−u) have opposite polarity,
while 2· u has the same polarity asu, but twice the magnitude. In the case of tense, polar
opposition takes the form of the contrast between past and future, while in the case of grad-
able adjectives it is evident in antonymic pairs associatedwith the same dimension, e.g., ‘tall’
/ ‘short’ for HEIGHT, ‘rich’ / ‘poor’ for WEALTH , etc.
As far as gradable adjectives are concerned, we find that it issufficient to consider the
primary orientation determined by the relative position ofthe Figure and Perspective points, as
set out in Definition 12.
Definition 12 (Polarity) Given an ordering< on a dimension d, an L-structureu is said to be
1. positiveif u. f > u.p,
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2. negativeif u. f < u.p, and
3. neutral if u. f = u.p.
The members of an antonymic pair, such as ‘tall’ and ‘short’,a e associated with positive and
negative polarities in accordance with the ordering on the dimension.
Definition 12 has the effect of partitioning a dimension intothree parts, relative to the
position of the Perspective. The Perspective thus plays therole of a boundary or threshold
between segments of the dimensional scale. For the most part, we shall ignore the extension of
the Perspective itself in the following, and treat it as a point n the scale, even though strictly
speaking the Perspective should be treated as aregion(i.e., a set of points) rather than a single
point. This will make little difference to the issues we consider.
3.2.2 Magnitude
In contrast to polarity, the magnitude of a spatial relationis often largely independent of Per-
spective. In the situation depicted in Figure 3.2, for example, the distance between the chicken
and the chair remains constant at one metre, regardless of whether we describe the chicken as
being ‘in front of the chair’ or ‘behind the chair’.
1 m
Figure 3.2: Separation between Figure and Ground
Here the magnitude of the interval between the Figure and theGround is invariant across the
change in viewpoint. The same phenomenon is apparent in (56), where the magnitude of the
relation between church and road remains constant, even though the orientation of the relation
changes with the shift in perspective. This perspective-inar ance is also apparent in the case
of certain temporal example in (57), where the interval betwe n Figure and Ground is the same
regardless of the shift in temporal perspective point.
(56) a. The church(F) is 10 metres to the left of the road(G).
b. The church(F) is 10 metres to the right of the road(G).
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(57) a. The meeting(F) took place two hours before the inauguration(G).
b. The meeting(F) will take place two hours before the inauguration(G).
In light of this, we define the magnitude of an L-structure in terms of the interval between
the Figure and Ground.4 The expressionu.~xy in Definition 13 denotes the vectoru.y−u.x.
Definition 13 (Magnitude) If u is an L-structure, then itsmagnitudeis defined as
|u| , |u.~gf|
In other words, we take the magnitude of the L-structure to beequivalent to the magnitude of
the interval between the Figure and the Ground.
In sum, we have defined the polarity and magnitude of an L-structu e in terms of two
distinct relations among its elements: the Figure-Perspective relation in the case of polarity, and
the Figure-Ground relation in the case of magnitude. As we shall ee in the next section, the
interesting feature of this arrangement, as far as the analysis of gradable adjectives is concerned,
is that it allows for cases where the standard of evaluation (he Perspective) may not coincide
with the reference point for measurement (the Ground).
3.3 A Locative Structure Semantics for Gradable Adjectives
Along the lines of the Reichenbachian representation of tenses as configurations ofS, E and
R points on a timeline (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.3), we shall represent L-structures as config-
urations ofP, F, andG points along a linear property dimension, as shown in Figure3.3 and
Figure 3.4. Certain aspects of the representation differ from that of tense, reflecting certain im-
portant differences between property dimensions and the tim line: first, whereas the timeline
is not bounded a priori, a property dimension such as height,weight, etc., may be bounded at
one end (or conceivably both); second, while the timeline has no natural landmark intrinsically
associated, for many if not most properties we can identify anatural ‘zero’ point.
As we discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, we shall represent th standard of evaluation
for a gradable adjective as a Perspectival parameter in an L-structure. In the case of the the
standard (non-comparative) form of the adjective, the Perspectival component is free to be
assigned a value implicitly from context, as in (58a) below,r a ‘for’-phrase may be used to
4It is important to stress, as in the case of polarity above, that t is is a simplification. For example, the point
of view is central to determining theperceiveddistances in a spatial scene, a fact exploited in systematicw ys by
painters since the Renaissance.
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specify a relevant comparison class, as in (58c); however, as we can see in (58b), the Perspective
cannot be designated using a ‘than’-phrase.
(58) a. Bob is tall.
b. * Bob is tall than Bill.
c. Bob is tall for a five-year-old.
The variable nature of the Perspective means that, even if the Figure remains constant across
contexts, the ordering relation between the Figure and the Perspective point may vary, causing
a shift in polarity; thus the same object may be described by anegative form in one context
(e.g., ‘short’), and a positive form in another (e.g., ‘tall’).
Each L-structure describes a particular region or interval, which is bounded by the locations
of the Ground and the Figure; for example, in the scene depicted n Figure 3.2, this region lies
between the chicken and the chair. One way to determine the boundaries of the relevant region
is to take into account the semantic contribution of modifiers such as measure phrases, which
describe properties of the region in question; for example,in a sentence such as ‘The chicken is
one metre in front of the chair’, uttered as a description of the scene in Figure 3.2, the measure
phrase modifier ‘one metre’ describes the region between thechicken and the chair.
In the case of the standard, non-comparative form of a gradable adjective, the relevant
interval is always thetotal or absoluteextent of possession of the property in question; for
example, in the sentence ‘Bob is two metres tall’, the relevant interval described by the measure
phrase spans Bob’s total height, extending from zero (the Ground point) to the position vector
bH representing Bob’s height (the Figure). This is represented diagrammatically in Figure 3.3,
where the Ground point is fixed at zero in the configurations corresponding to the adjectives
‘tall’ and ‘short’.
One of the obvious differences between the standard and the comparative form is that,
in the comparative case, the Ground is an independent variable that can be specified either
implicitly, as in (59a), or by means of a ‘than’-phrase, as in(59b). A further difference is that
it is not possible to freely specify the Perspective in the comparative case, as exemplified by
the contrast between (58c) on the one hand and (59c) on the other. Specifically, what we find
is that the Perspective isboundto the Ground point, in the sense that the same point that is
used as a reference point for comparison is also necessarilythe determinant of the polarity of
the adjective; that is, given a vectorbH corresponding to Bill’s height, thenb′H is not only
the Ground of the comparison in (59b) below, but also the point relative to which polarity is
determined. The configurations for positive and negative comparative forms are illustrated in
Figure 3.4.
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0 ∞
G P F
tall
-
0 ∞
G F P
short
- 
Figure 3.3: Standard forms
(59) a. Bob is taller.
b. Bob is taller than Bill.
c. * Bob is taller (than Bill) for a five-year-old.
0 ∞
P, G F
taller
-
0 ∞
F P, G
shorter

Figure 3.4: Comparative forms
3.3.1 A Simple Fragment
We now show how the semantic interpretations of adjectival phrases are compositionally con-
structed, using a simple fragment. Since we shall be dealingw th logical expressions contain-
ing a large number of conjoined formulae, we introduce the following ‘box’ notation (Defini-
tion 14).
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Definition 14 (Box notation) For ♠ ∈ {λ,∀,∃}:
♠x1
· · ·
♠xm
φ1
φ2
· · ·
φn
,♠x1. . . .♠xm.φ1∧φ2∧· · ·∧φn
Following Kennedy [92] and Faller [46], we shall employ the syntactic analysis described
in Section 1.3.2 of Chapter 1, in which a DegP is headed by a (possibly null) degree term with
an adjective root as its complement (cf. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 in Section 1.3.3 of Chapter 1),
and the basic semantic definitions follow the same pattern asthose described in Chapter 1,
Section 1.3.2.
Definition 15 (Adjective roots)
1. tall Z⇒ λu
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
2. shortZ⇒ λu
HEIGHT(u)
u.p > u. f
Definition 16 (Degree terms)
1. more / -erZ⇒
λW
λV
λw
W(w)
V(w)
w.p = w.g
2. lessZ⇒
λW
λV
λw
W(w̃)
V(w)
w.p = w.g
3. /0ABS Z⇒
λW
λw
W(w)
w.g = 0
Definition 17 (‘Than’)
than Z⇒
λy
λu
u.g = ∂(y)(ρ(u))
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In the standard (non-comparative) case, the phrase[ /0ABS tall] is assigned the interpretation
in (3.2) below.
[
/0ABS tall
]
Z⇒
λW
λw
W(w)
w.g = 0 λu
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
= λw
λu HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
(w)
w.g = 0
= λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
= λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
(3.2)
Note that, while the Ground component of the L-structure is set to zero in (3.2), the value of
the componentw.p is not specified directly, and may take a range of contextualvalues; how-
ever, the set of explicit constraints, together with the basic geometry of theHEIGHT dimension
(which is bounded below by zero), conspire to limit the rangeof values that the parameter can
take.
In the comparative case, the complement of ‘than’ in the PP may be nominal (as in ‘x is
taller than John’) or clausal (as in ‘x is taller than John is wide’). For the sake of simplicity, the
interpretation given in Definition 17 considers only the case where the complement of ‘than’ is
nominal (as indeed Faller and Winter do).5 This definition states that ‘than’ takes an argument
of typeeand produces a ‘than’-phrase of type(v3 → t). Given ‘John’Z⇒ j, we then have
[ than John] Z⇒
λy
λu
u.g = ∂(y)(ρ(u)) ( j)
= λu u.g = ∂( j)(ρ(u))
(3.3)
5One strategy for providing a general account of the complements of ‘than’ would be to treat all cases as
involving a covert clausal complement, so that, for example, ‘Bob is taller than John’ is analysed as ‘Bob is taller
than John is tall’.
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Then by Definition 16 above, we have the following translation of ‘taller’:
[ taller] Z⇒
λW
λV
λw
W(w)
V(w)
w.p = w.g
λu
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
=
λV
λw
λu HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
(w)
V(w)
w.p = w.g
=
λV
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
V(w)
w.p = w.g
(3.4)
Combining this with the translation of ‘than John’ gives us:
[ taller than John] Z⇒
λV
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
V(w)
w.p = w.g
λu u.g = ∂( j)(ρ(u))
= λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
λu u.g = ∂( j)(ρ(u)) (w)
w.p = w.g
= λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w))
w.p = w.g
= λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w))
w.p = w.g
Whereas the translation for ‘tall’ in (3.2) allows for the Perspective point to be contextually
specified (e.g., ‘tall for a five-year old’), this is not possible in the comparative case (e.g., *‘Bob
was taller than Bill for a five-year old’), since the translations of the comparative markers
‘more’ and ‘less’ given in Definition 16 incorporate the constraint (w.p = w.g). On the other
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hand, the comparative form of the adjective in English allows for the explicit specification of
the Ground point g (by means of a ‘than’-phrase), whereas thebas or standard form of the
adjective does not, since the Ground pointw.g is fixed at zero. This fits in with our earlier
observation that magnitude in the case of the non-comparative form of the adjective is always
determined relative to thezero pointof the scale: e.g., in the sentence ‘Bob is two metres tall’,
the interval measured spans Bob’stotal height, i.e., from zero to two metres, whereas in ‘Bob is
two centimetres taller than Bill’, the measured interval isthe difference between Bob’s height
and the reference point corresponding to Bill’s height.
In order for the adjective to combine predicatively with a subject, however, we need to
convert the expression into one of the appropriate type. Definition 18 below presents a modified
form of the dim− function proposed by Faller [46, pp. 158–159], adapted to L-structures (cf.
Definition 8 in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2).6
Definition 18 (∂−)
∂− ,
λW
λx
∃u
W(u)
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u))
Given the translation ‘Bob’Z⇒ b, we can now combine the type-converted adjectival predi-
cates ‘is tall’ or ‘is taller than John’ with the subject ‘Bob’, as shown in (3.5) and (3.9) below
(we assume the copula is semantically empty):
[
Bob
[
is /0ABS tall
]]
Z⇒ ∂−
(
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
)
(b) (3.5)
6We use the symbol ‘∂−’ instead of ‘dim−’, to avoid confusion with Faller’s definition.
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The application of∂− to the semantic translation of ‘tall’ gives us the followingexpression, of
type(e→ t):
[
is /0ABS tall
]
Z⇒ ∂−
(
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
)
=
λW
λx
∃u
W(u)
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u)) λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
=
λx
∃u
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
(u)
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u))
=
λx
∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = 0
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u))
=
λx
∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = 0
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u))
(3.6)
Substituting this expression into (3.7), we obtain the following translation, of typet:
[
Bob
[
is /0ABS tall
]]
Z⇒ ∂−
(
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
)
(b)
=
λx
∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = 0
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u))
(b)
= ∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = 0
u. f = ∂(b)(ρ(u))
(3.7)
The expression∂(b)(ρ(u)) denotes the projection of Bob onto the dimension to whichu be-
longs, namely, theHEIGHT dimension; thus, we have∂(b)(ρ(u)) = ∂(b)(HEIGHT) = bH, where
bH is simply the vector corresponding to Bob’s height (cf. Section 3.2 above). Hence, we can
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simplify the expression further as follows:
[
Bob
[
is /0ABS tall
]]
Z⇒ ∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = 0
u. f = bH
(3.8)
Informally, this states that there exists an L-structureassociated with theHEIGHT dimension
(i.e., all the vector components of the L-structure belong to the set of vectorsHEIGHT) such that
Bob’s heightbH is the Figure ofu, and Bob’s height is greater than the criterion of tallnessu.p
in the ordering corresponding to the dimension; note that the translation does not provide any
information regarding the exact location of the Perspectivpoint on theHEIGHT dimension,
only the relational constraint that it is less than Bob’s heig t, so the expression is compatible
with a range of values forup7.
In exactly the same fashion, we obtain the following translation for ‘Bob is taller than John’:
[ Bob [ is [ taller than John]]] Z⇒ ∂−
(
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w))
w.p = w.g
)
(b)
= . . .
=
λx
∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = ∂( j)(ρ(u))
u.p = u.g
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u))
(b)
= ∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = ∂( j)(ρ(u))
u.p = u.g
u. f = ∂(b)(ρ(u))
(3.9)
Again, we have∂(b)(ρ(u)) = ∂(b)(HEIGHT) = bH, and ∂( j)(ρ(u)) = ∂(b)(HEIGHT) = jH
wherebH and jH correspond to the heights of Bob and John, respectively, so we can simplify
7Of course, given the that the dimension has a lower bound at zero, w can also infer that the Perspective point
is greater than or equal to zero.
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the translation to the following:
[ Bob [ is [ taller than John]]] Z⇒ ∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = jH
u.p = u.g
u. f = bH
(3.10)
Here the conjuncts(u.p= w.g) and(u.p< u. f) together entail that(u.g < u. f), that is, Bob’s
heightbH is greater than John’s heightjH.
3.3.2 The Than-Phrase as Modifier
We often find cases where the ‘than’-phrase is omitted, and the reference point for the compar-
ison is understood from the context.
(60) a. Bob is taller now.
b. John is stronger, but Bill is younger.
One way to handle this is to treat the ‘than’-phrase as amodifierof the comparative, instead of
an argument; for example, we can assign ‘than’ the interpretation in Definition 19.
Definition 19 (‘Than’ as modifier)
than Z⇒
λy
λV
λu
V(u)
u.g = ∂(y)(ρ(u))
Here ‘than’ is a mapping from sets of dimensional vectors to se s of dimensional vectors. Since
the comparative forms no longer take a ‘than’-phrase compleent, we can simplify the defini-
tions of the degree terms as follows (cf. Definition 16 above):8
Definition 20 (Simplified degree terms)
1. more / -erZ⇒
λW
λw
W(w)
w.p = w.g
2. lessZ⇒
λW
λw
W(w̃)
w.p = w.g
3. /0ABS Z⇒
λW
λw
W(w)
w.g = 0
8Note that the definition of/0ABS remains unchanged.
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Using the same definition of the root form (Definition 15), we now have the following interpre-
tation for ‘taller’:
[ taller] Z⇒
λW
λw
W(w)
w.p = w.g λu
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
= λw
λu HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
(w)
w.p = w.g
= λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.p = w.g
(3.11)
Given this interpretation, we can combine ‘taller’ with a ‘than’-phrase such as ‘than John’, as
in (3.12) below:
[ taller than John] Z⇒
λV
λu
V(u)
u.g = ∂( j)(ρ(u)) λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.p = w.g
= λu
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.p = w.g
(u)
u.g = ∂( j)(ρ(u))
= λu
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.p = u.g
u.g = ∂( j)(ρ(u))
= λu
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.p = u.g
u.g = ∂( j)(ρ(u))
(3.12)
The translation for ‘taller’ in (3.11) can also combine semantically with a subject NP, such
as ‘Bob’, by means of the∂− function (cf. Definition 18). First, the application of∂− to the
bare comparative ‘taller’ gives us an expression of type(e→ t):
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[ taller]− Z⇒∂−
(
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.p = w.g
)
=
λW
λx
∃u
W(u)
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u))
(
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.p = w.g
)
=
λx
∃u
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.p = w.g
(u)
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u))
=
λx
∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.p = w.g
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u))
=
λx
∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.p = w.g
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u))
(3.13)
Combining (3.13) with the translation ‘Bob’Z⇒ b, we get the following translation for ‘Bob is
taller’ (as before, we assume the copula is semantically empty):
[ Bob [ is taller]] Z⇒ ∂−
(
λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.p = w.g
)
(b)
=
λx
∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.p = w.g
u. f = ∂(x)(ρ(u))
(b)
= ∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.p = w.g
u. f = ∂(b)(ρ(u))
(3.14)
The expression∂(b)(ρ(u)) denotes the projection of Bob onto the dimension to whichu be-
longs, namely, theHEIGHT dimension; thus, we have∂(b)(ρ(u)) = ∂(b)(HEIGHT) = bH, where
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bH is simply the vector corresponding to Bob’s height. The above expression then simplifies
further to
[ Bob [ is taller]] Z⇒ ∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.p = w.g
u. f = bH
(3.15)
Informally, this states that there exists an L-structure associated with theHEIGHT dimension
(i.e., all the vector components of the L-structure belong to the set of vectorsHEIGHT) such that
the L-structure ispositive(the Figure is above the Perspective point in the ordering correspond-
ing to the dimension), the Perspective point coincides withthe Ground point (u.p = w.g), and
the Figure corresponds to Bob’s height,bH. Since the Perspective point and the Ground point
are the same, it follows thatu.g< u. f, so Bob’s heightbH is greater than the height of whatever
it is being compared to. Since the Ground point is unspecified, all this says is that Bob is taller
thansomething.9
We have discussed the basic semantics for both standard and comparative adjectival con-
structions. In the next section, we turn to the interpretation of measure phrases.
3.4 Measures and Measure Phrases
Measurement can be viewed as a form of comparison in which thedegree of possession of
a property can be numerically expressed as a ratio of some identifiable extent, known as a
measureor unit of measurement. We will treat measures as abstract entities, and refer to the
terms used to denote them asmeasure terms. In English, when a measure phrase modifies the
standard, non-comparative form of a gradable adjective, asin (61), what is measured is the total
or absolute extent of possession of the property it denotes.
(61) a. Bob is 2 metres tall.
b. The hotel is 4 storeys high.
c. John is 30 years old.
d. The film was 2 hours long.
e. Her watch is 5 minutes slow.
By contrast, when the measure phrase modifies a comparative form, as in (62), what is mea-
sured is thedifferencein degree between the things being compared.
(62) a. Bob is 60 kilogrammes heavier/lighter than Alice.
9Note that the the existence of an L-structurentails the existence of its component elements.
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b. Her watch was 400 dollars more expensive/cheaper than my car.
c. Bob is 2 million dollars richer/poorer than Bill.
d. The bedroom was 30 degrees hotter/colder than the kitchen.
e. My car is 10 metres-per-second faster/slower than your motorcycle.
While the admissibility of a measure phrase modifier is a sureindicator of gradability in an
adjective, the converse is not the case. First of all, there are adjectives for which measure
terms are simply not readily available (e.g., ‘beautiful’); however, there are also many gradable
adjectives which readily take a measure phrase modifier in their comparative form, yet seem
unable to do so in their absolute form, as we can see if we compare the sentences in (62) with
those in (63).
(63) a. * Bob is 60 kilogrammes heavy/light.
b. * My watch was 400 dollars expensive/cheap.
c. * Bob is 2 million dollars rich/poor.
d. * The bedroom was 30 degrees hot/cold.
e. * My car is 10 metres-per-second fast/slow.
Even in those cases where measure phrase modification is felicitous, the absolute form is con-
strained in other ways. Given an antonymic pair of gradable adj ctives in absolute form, as in
the sentences in (64), we often find that measure phrase modification is acceptable with one
member of the pair, but not the other—by contrast, with the comparative form, measure phrase
modifiers are typically acceptable with both members of the pair, cf. (62).
(64) a. Bob is 2 metres tall/*short.
b. The table is 1 metre wide/*narrow.
c. The hotel is 4 storeys high/*low.
d. John is 30 years old/*young.
However, there are some pairs, such as those in (65), where this asymmetry is not present.
(65) a. My watch is 2 minutes fast/slow.
b. Bob was 2 hours late/early.
One of the challenges facing a theory of adjectival semantics is to provide an account of these
facts.
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3.4.1 The Structure of Measure Phrases
We follow Landman [105] in taking a numerical measure phraseto be a species of deter-
miner phrase whosesemanticscomprises three elements (which may not all be phonologically
present) shown in Figure 3.5 below: a numerical relation Rel(e.g., ‘exactly’, ‘at least’, ‘at
most’, . . . ), a number term Num (e.g., ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘four-and-a-half’, . . . ), and a measure term
M (e.g., ‘metre’, ‘inch’, ‘litre’, ‘gramme’, ‘ounce’, ‘kilogramme’, ‘storey’, . . . ). As shown in
the diagram, we will treat the relation and number as a quantificational phrase modifying a
measure term in head position, although there exist other plausible syntactic analyses (we refer
the interested reader to [105, Chapter 1] for discussion).
MP
NumP
Rel
at least
Num
two
M
metres
Figure 3.5: Measure phrase
We translate numerical expressions using numerals, which in turn denote numbers (e.g.,
‘two’ 7→ 2), and we interpret measure terms as constants that denote an abstract entity, amea-
sure. In the case of measure phrase modifiers, we analyse numerical relations as shown in
Definition 21 (this particular formulation assumes an orderof combination in which the nu-
merical relation combines with the number and then with the measure; clearly, it would be
straightforward to change the definition to suit a differentorder of combination).
Definition 21 (Numerical relations)
1. ‘at least’ Z⇒
λy
λx
λW
λu
W(u)
|u| ≥ y· |∂(x)(ρ(u))|
2. ‘at most’ Z⇒
λy
λx
λW
λu
W(u)
|u| ≤ y· |∂(x)(ρ(u))|
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3. ‘exactly’ Z⇒
λy
λx
λW
λu
W(u)
|u| = y· |∂(x)(ρ(u))|
4. /0 Z⇒
λy
λx
λW
λu
W(u)
|u| = y· |∂(x)(ρ(u))|
The above definitions assign the following interpretation tthe measure phraseat least two
metresas follows:
[ [ at least two] metres] Z⇒
λy
λx
λW
λu
W(u)
|u| ≥ y· |∂(x)(ρ(u))| (2)(m)
=
λx
λW
λu
W(u)
|u| ≥ 2 · |∂(x)(ρ(u))| (m)
=
λW
λu
W(u)
|u| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(u))|
3.4.2 Measure Phrases as Adjectival Modifiers
We mentioned earlier the fact, pointed out by Faller [46] andWinter [176], among others, that
in cases where a measure phrase modifies a standard (non-comparative) adjectival form, the in-
terval measured is always between the Figure and the ‘zero’ point on the relevant scale. More-
over, in English the standard form of the adjective loses itsevaluative quality in the presence
of a measure phrase modifier, a phenomenon that Winter [176] refers to as “neutralisation”: an
entity of any height can be described as ‘x units tall’, even if it would be described asshort
in the absence of the measure phrase. Further evidence that the djective is no longer evalua-
tive in character is the fact that it is no longer possible to contextually specify the standard of
evaluation in the presence of a measure phrase, as in example(66) below.
(66) * Alice is 5 ft. tall for a five year-old.
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One way to explain this loss of evaluative character is to view the introduction of the measure
phrase as ‘binding’ the Perspective parameter in the L-structu e in some way, so that it is no
longer free to take a value from the context. Thus Definition 22 below states anadjectival
measurability condition(AMC) on gradable adjectives, which requires that the Perspective
parameter be bound to the value of the Ground component of theL-Structure in the presence
of a measure phrase.
Definition 22 (Adjectival Measurability Condition)
An adjectival L-Structureu is measurableonly if u.p = u.g.
Note that, by definition, the interpretation of the comparative already satisfies the AMC (cf.
Figure 3.4 and Definition 16 in Section 3.3 above). In the non-c mparative case, however,
where the Ground parameter is the zero point of the dimension(cf. Figure 3.3 and the definition
of /0ABS in Definition 16), the combination of the constraintsu.g = 0 andu.p = u.g entails
u.p = 0; that is, the standard of ‘tallness’ is set to zero, whereupon it follows that objects of
anyheight can be described as ‘tall’. The three acceptable configurations licensed by the AMC
are shown in Figure 3.6 below; note that there is no configuration corresponding to the adjective
‘short’.
0 ∞
P, G F
tall
-
0 ∞
P, G F
taller
-
0 ∞
F P, G
shorter

Figure 3.6: Configurations satisfying the measurability condition
There are several possible ways of integrating this measurability condition into a composi-
tional semantic theory. Since the condition only applies inthe presence of MP modification,
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a natural and technically straightforward choice is to incorporate the measurability condition
into the semantics of the measure phrase, as in Definition 23 below (although see Section 3.5
below for an alternative).
Definition 23
2 metresZ⇒
λW
λu
W(u)
|u| = 2m
u.p = u.g
This in turn gives us the following semantics for the phrase2 metres tall:
[
[ 2 metres]
[
/0ABS tall
]]
Z⇒ λu
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = 0
|u| = 2m
u.p = u.g
(3.16)
In similar fashion, the phrase*2 metres shortreceives the interpretation shown in (3.17) below.
[
[ 2 metres]
[
/0ABS short
]]
Z⇒ λu
HEIGHT(u)
u.p > u. f
u.g = 0
|u| = 2m
u.p = u.g
(3.17)
The constraints in (3.17) simultaneously require thatu. f < 0 and|u| = 2m; however, because
the height scale has a lower bound at zero,u.f cannot take values less than zero and so these
constraints cannot be jointly satisfied. The upshot is that te negative form ‘short’ cannot be
combined with a measure phrase modifier. This is consistent with the evidence from English,
where the negative absolute form is often unacceptable in the presence of a measure phrase,
while the positive absolute and both positive and negative comparative forms are permitted—
cf. the examples in (67) below.
(67) a. Bob is 2 m. tall.
b. * Bob is 2 m. short.
c. Bob is 4 cm. taller than Bill.
d. Bill is 4 cm. shorter than Bob.
It is important to note, however, that it is not always the case that at most one of a pair of
complementary adjectives in absolute form can be used with ame sure phrase; for example,
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in the complementary pairs ‘late/early’ and ‘fast/slow’, both members admit measure phrase
modification—cf. the sentences in (68) and (69) below.
(68) a. Bob was 2 hours late.
b. Bob was 2 hours early.
c. Bob was 2 hours later than Bill.
d. Bill was 2 hours earlier than Bob.
(69) a. My watch is 2 min. fast.
b. Bob’s watch is 10 min. slow.
c. My watch is 12 min. faster than Bob’s.
d. Bob’s watch is 12 min. slower than mine.
The crucial difference in this case is that in both pairs the temporal dimension in question is
unbounded inboth directions, whereas the dimension of ‘height’ is unboundedin one direc-
tion alone, viz., the ‘positive’ one. This is consistent with the semantics we have presented,
since when the dimension is unbounded in the negative direction, the conditionu. f < 0 can be
satisfied.
In short, the AMC appears to account for the phenomena involving measure phrases men-
tioned at the beginning of this section, and it can be incorporated directly into the compositional
semantic machinery, for instance in the semantic definitionof the measure phrase itself.
3.4.3 Sortal Restrictions on Measure Phrases
We can use the projection function∂ to apply to measures, just as to other kinds of entity;
however, we will associate measures with a very restricted set of dimensions (usually one):
thusyear andminuteare associated withTIME , kilogrammewith WEIGHT, and so on. This
is motivated by the sortal restrictions governing the possible combinations of measure phrases
and dimensional adjectives, as in (70), (71), (72), and (73)below.
(70) a. Bob is 2 m. tall.
b. * Bob is 2 m. old.
(71) a. Bob is 3 kg. heavier than John.
b. * Bob is 3 kg. taller than John.
There are also sortal restrictions on subject-predicate combinations:
(72) a. The film was 2 hours long.
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b. * The chair was 2 hours long.
(73) a. The lake was 2 fathoms deep.
b. * The theorem was 2 fathoms deep.
Measures may be associated with a single dimension, or more than one; for example, there are
measures of extension, such as ‘metre’, ‘foot’, and so forth, which are compatible with several
distinct dimensions, such asHEIGHT, LENGTH, DEPTH, etc., but not withAGE or WEIGHT.
(74) a. Bob is 6 ft. tall.
b. The swimming pool 3 m. deep.
c. The rampart is 50 m. high.
One way to can capture sortal restrictions on measure phrases, well as sortal restrictions
on entities in general (cf. Lappin [107]), is by means ofpartial functions. This approach treats
the ill-formed ‘(b)’ sentences in examples (70), (71), (72), and (73) as semantically undefined.
We can model the sortal restrictions between subject and predicat by means of a partial
interpretation function: we assume a domain of individual entitiesU, a denotation functionℑ,
a set of dimensionsD, asortal functionσ : U 7→ 2D, and a projection function∂ : U 7→ D 7→ V
that assigns to each elementa ∈ U a (point) vector from each dimensiond in σ(a). In effect,
σ(a) assigns asort to the entitya, and∂(a)(d) becomes apartial function that assigns a location
in dimensiond to entitya (possibly zero) just for thosed ∈ σ(e). ThemeaningJtKof a termt is
then a location in a subspace of dimensionalityn = |σ(t)|; for example, if we suppose that the
denotation functionℑ assigns the individualb to the proper name ‘Bob’,ℑ(Bob) = bob, then
its meaningis given by
JBobK = {∂(ℑ(Bob))(d) : d ∈ σ(ℑ(Bob))} = {∂(b)(d) : d ∈ σ(bob)}
Each vector belongs to a dimension, given byρ(v). Since the predicate, according to VSS,
is a set of co-dimensional vectors, we simply require that the dimension associated with the
predicate belong to the sort of the subject:ρ(v) ∈ σ(b)
The same basic mechanism applies to the relation between measure phrase and adjective
within the predicate. As with proper nouns, we can let a measure term such as ‘metre’ have a
denotationℑ(metre) = m (an abstract entity),10 and thus an associated sort
σ(m) = {HEIGHT, LENGTH,WIDTH ,DEPTH, . . .}.
10An alternative would be to treat ‘metre’ as a common noun, by letting its denotation consist of all entities that
are one metre long.
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In order to ensure that the dimension associated with the adjective (in this case,HEIGHT) is
compatible with the sort of the measure phrase in a phrase such as2 metres tall, it is sufficient
to require that the dimension of the measured vector belongsto the sort of the measure term:
ρ(v) ∈ σ(m).
Thus, by treating measure terms as nouns, we are able to employ the same mechanism for
ensuring sortal compatibility between measure phrases andadjectives as we use for clausal
subjects and predicates; indeed, the choice to treat measure terms just like other nouns means
that we can also assign them a meaning, namely, the set of projections of the entity it denotes
onto its sortally compatible dimensions:
JmetreK = {mHEIGHT,mLENGTH,mWIDTH,mDEPTH, . . .}
This allows us to handle sentences in which a measure term is itself in subject position, without
modifying the semantics; e.g.,One metre is just over three feet.
Since we are modelling sorts as sets of dimensions, the subset relation effectively gives rise
to asortal hierarchy, in which sorts may havesupersortsandsubsorts. For example, the spatial
measure terms ‘metre’, ‘foot’, ‘yard’, etc., are associated with asupersort
{HEIGHT,WIDTH ,DEPTH, . . .},
corresponding to the full set of physically measurable spatial dimensions, while certain others
may be more restricted in application; this appears to be thecas for measures such as ‘storey’
and ‘fathom’, which are usually employed as measures of vertical extension, and which there-
fore correspond to the subsort{HEIGHT,DEPTH}.11
3.5 Constraints and Compositionality
In Section 3.4.2 above, we integrated the AMC into the compositional semantic mechanism
by making it part of the representation of the measure phrase. It is important to note that this
move has certain cross-categorial ramifications, arising from the fact that measure phrases do
not only appear with adjectives, but with spatial and temporal expressions as well. So, by
incorporating the AMC into the measure phrase itself, we areimplicitly claiming that the AMC
is valid for other locative expressions, such as spatial andtemporal PPs. However, the AMC is
far too restrictive to apply to L-structures in general—at least in its current form. In the spatial
case, for example, measurability clearly does not require the Perspective and Ground points to
11This is true of current usage, although ‘fathom’ was originally used as a general measure of spatial extension.
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coincide. This is evident in the example ‘The chicken is one metre in front of/behind the chair’,
given in Figure 3.2 of Section 2.2.2 above, where the location of the Perspective point clearly
does not affect the acceptability of measure phrase modification: that is, we can express the fact
that the chicken is one metre away from the chair, regardlessof whether we take the chicken to
be ‘in front of’ the chair or ‘behind’ the chair.
It is important to note that this counterexample does not by iself rule out the correctness of
the AMC in the specific case of adjectival constructions, even though it does establish that the
AMC is not an accurate characterisation of the cross-categorial constraints on measurability.
While it might of course be the case that the AMC is simply incorrect, or correct only in virtue
of some accidental feature, the possibility remains that the AMC is an accurate, if partial,
characterisation of measurability.
This, in itself, should not be controversial: it is reasonable to expect that L-structures,
while sharing the same basic structure and properties, may be su ject to constraints that are
domain-specific and not universal. We expect there to be diffrent constraints on spatial and
tense L-structures, for instance, arising in part from the diff rent underlying geometries of their
domains; for a start, tense is typically associated with a one-dimensional timeline, unbounded
in both directions (for all linguistic purposes), whereas the semantics of spatial expressions
displays a much richer, three-dimensional structure. Certainly, the thesis that there are under-
lying structural commonalities at the semantic level amongspatial, temporal, and adjectival
expressions does not commit us to the (muchstronger) claim that these domains do not have
domain-specific constraints; we should not expect, for insta ce, to find an exact spatial ana-
logue of the Future Perfect tense.
Given that we should expect there to be domain and even category-specific constraints on
grammaticality, we need some way of incorporating such constrai ts into the grammar while
at the same time limiting the extent of their application. One common way of coping with
such cases is by introducing an ambiguity of some sort; for insta ce, we could claim that
measure phrases are ambiguous among MPs that incorporate the AMC and others which do
not; however, in the absence of any other independent evidence of ambiguity, this ‘solution’
is completely ad hoc, and hardly deserving of the name. A moresatisfactory approach, which
we will pursue in this section, is to find a way to state local, domain-specific constraints on
L-Structures in a way that integrates smoothly with the overall compositional machinery.
The Fregean principle of compositionality holds that the meaning of a complex expression
is a function of the meanings of its (immediate) constituents and their mode of combination. In
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the mainstream of formal semantics,12 this is usually interpreted as the requirement that there
be a structure-preserving mapping, or homeomorphism, fromthe syntax to the semantics; that
is, if s is a syntactic combination rule,A1, . . . ,An the syntactic constituents to which the rule
applies, andJ·K is some mapping from syntax to semantics (whether direct or via translation),
then compositionality requires that
Js(A1, . . . ,An)K = JsK(JA1K, . . . ,JAnK) (3.18)
So far, we have assumed a type-theoretic semantics in which te principal semantic combi-
nation rule is function application, @ in Definition 24 below; one of the constituents (typically
the head of the phrase) is a functor that takes the other constituents as its arguments. In the
case of degree phrases, the interpretations of the Deg′ and the MP are of type(v3 → t) and
((v3 → t) → (v3 → t)), respectively.
Definition 24 (@)
@, λβ.λα1 . . .λαn.β(α1) · · ·(αn),
where eachαi : ai andβ : (a1 → (a2 → ·· ·(an → b) · · ·)), for ai ,b∈ TYPE.
However, it is only on a particularly restrictive view of semantic composition, in which
the semantic combination rules are “bleached” of all construction-specific content, that we are
forced to incorporate the AMC into the semantics of the measure phrase; there is nothing in
the notion of compositionality, as described above, that prevents us from associating meanings
with the syntactic constructions themselves. If we insteadview syntactic constructions them-
selves as bearers of content, then we can associate the measurability condition not with the
measure phrase but with the syntactic structure of the degree-modified adjective phrase itself
(for the purposes of this discussion, we will follow Faller [46] and Kennedy [92] in assuming
the structure shown in Figure 3.7).
DegP
MP Deg′
Deg AP
Figure 3.7: Degree phrase
12We take this to be the tradition of which Montague [117], [118] and [116] are representative.
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The view that syntactic constructions themselves have content is associated with traditional,
construction-oriented conceptions of grammar, as well as contemporary theories such as Con-
struction Grammar.13 In a construction-based framework, we can assign a distinctsemantic
combination rule, @C, to each syntactic constructionC. There are several ways in which this
can be done, but for the moment we will assume that Deg and MP both denote simple properties
of L-structures, and thus have translations of type(v3 → t), and assign the translation specified
in Definition 25 below to the degree phrase construction
[
DegPMP Deg′
]
.
The simplification of the type of the MP to(v3 → t) is possible because the mechanism for
semantic combination mechanism no longer relies on the MP toserve as a functor which takes
Deg′ as its argument; it would of course be straightforward to prese ve the assumption that MP
is of type((v3 → t)→ (v3 → t)), by defining
[
DegPMP Deg
′
]
Z⇒ λM.λA.λw
M(A(w))
w.p = w.g
This version of the rule encapsulates the original mechanism of functional application, where
the modifying expression is the functor and the modified constituent is the argument, while
adding the constraintw.p = w.g.
There are several ways in which one can organise a construction-based system, including
the assignment of semantic combination rules to syntactic shemata. For example, one might
isolate the mechanism for semantic combination from the construction-specific content (in the
form of constraints), and introduce a variant of functionalapplication, @2, that takes as its
arguments not only the semantic interpretations of the immediat constituents of a construction,
but also a construction-specific constraint, expressed as aλ term.
@2, λγ.λβ.λα.γ(β(α)),
whereα : a, β : (a→ b), andγ : (b→ c), for a,b,c∈ TYPE.
The function @2 is thusa rule that generates construction-specific semantic combination
rules; that is, it takes as its argument the semantic content associated with a given syntactic
construction,C, to give a semantic composition rule, @C, corresponding to that construction.
We can therefore redefine @DegP using @2 as follows:
[
DegPMP Deg
′
]
Z⇒ @2( λW.λw
W(w)
w.p = w.g
)
13This view is most pronounced within Construction Grammar, as found in the work of Fillmore et al. [48],
Fillmore [50], Fillmore and Kay [47], Goldberg [57], [58], Goldberg and Jackendoff [59], Lakoff [101], [19] [19],
and Lambrecht [103], among others; a construction-oriented approach is also evident in some of Jackendoff’s
recent research (Jackendoff [78], [79], [80]).
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By λ-conversion,RHS is equivalent to
λβ.λα.( λW.λw
W(w)
w.p = w.g
)(β(α)).
Definition 25
[
DegPMP Deg
′
]
Z⇒ λM.λA.λw
M(w)
A(w)
w.p = w.g
Thus the meaning of the phrase is given by (3.19), which is consistent with the scheme in
(3.18).
J
[
DegP[MP α]
[
Deg′ β
]]
K = J
[
DegPMP Deg
′
]
KJ[MP α]KJ
[
Deg′ β
]
K (3.19)
We then have the following translation of the degree phrasetwo metres tall, where @DegP1
abbreviates the translation of
[
DegPMP Deg′
]
given in Definition 25.
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[
DegP[MP 2 metres]
[
Deg’ /0ABS tall
]]
Z⇒@DegP1( λu |u| = 2m )( λv
HEIGHT(v)
v.p < v. f
v.g = 0
)
= ( λM.λA.λw
M(w)
A(w)
w.p = w.g
)( λu |u| = 2m )( λv
HEIGHT(v)
v.p < v. f
v.g = 0
)
= ( λA.λw
( λu |u| = 2m )(w)
A(w)
w.p = w.g
)( λv
HEIGHT(v)
v.p < v. f
v.g = 0
)
= λw
( λu |u| = 2m )(w)
( λv
HEIGHT(v)
v.p < v. f
v.g = 0
)(w)
w.p = w.g
= λw
|w| = 2m
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w.p = w.g
= λw
|w| = 2m
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w.p = w.g
(3.20)
Note that we obtain the same result (modulo ordering of the constraints) as (3.16) in Sec-
tion 3.4.2 above. Moreover, since the measurability condition is no longer part of the lexical
semantics of the measure phrase, the translation of the measure phrase2 metrescan be simpli-
fied, and is now of type(v3 → t).
Some support for adopting a construction-oriented approach c n be found in certain other
phenomena discussed earlier in this chapter. In the introduction, we remarked that there are
many gradable adjectives which readily take a measure phrase modifier in their comparative
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form, yet seem unable to do so in their absolute form; cf. the sentences in (63), reproduced here
for convenience as (75).
(75) a. * Bob is 60 kilogrammes heavy/light.
b. * My watch was 400 dollars expensive/cheap.
c. * Bob is 2 million dollars rich/poor.
d. * The bedroom was 30 degrees hot/cold.
e. * My car is 10 metres-per-second fast/slow.
In fact, the list of adjectives thatdo take a measure phrase modifier with their absolute
form in the structure
[
DegPMP
[
Deg′ /0 AP
]]
is severely restricted, and appears to be limited to
a handful of adjectives denoting basic spatial and temporalproperties, such asLENGTH (of
spatial extension or temporal duration),HEIGHT, WIDTH, DEPTH, AGE, and so on. The appar-
ent absence of any systematic feature, syntactic or semantic, that distinguishes these adjectives
from the others supports the idea that the structure[ MP [ /0 Adj]] perhaps ought to be anal-
ysed as aconstructional idiom, one which specifically licenses only a closed list of gradable
adjectives.
3.6 Adjectival Anaphora
In Chapter 2, we discussed cases of deictic and anaphoric depen ncy in adjectival construc-
tions, involving both the standard and comparative forms ofthe adjective (see Chapter 2, Sec-
tion 2.4.3). We will now re-examine this topic from a slightly more formal point of view, using
a dynamic model of anaphoric dependency.
3.6.1 Dynamic Semantics
Dynamic semantics is one of the principal contemporary approaches to the study of anaphora
within formal semantics. In dynamic semantics, the characte istic phenomena of discourse
anaphora arise from the semantics of indefinite expressions, which differ from other quantified
expressions in that they introduce discourse referents thacan be picked up in subsequent dis-
course; this idea, which can be found in the work of Lewis [110] and Karttunen [85], lies at the
heart of Heim’s [65] theory of File Change Semantics (FCS) and Kamp’s [82] Discourse Rep-
resentation Theory (DRT), both developed in the early 1980sas formal theories of discourse
anaphora (see also Kamp and Reyle [83], Groenendijk and Stokhof [61], [60], and van Eijk
and Kamp [163], among others, for some later developments).The central insight of dynamic
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semantics is that the meaning of a discourse can be seen as a series of transitions between con-
texts. Each sentence in a discourse transforms the context,e.g., by introducing new discourse
referents or supplying new information about already existing ones, and dynamic semantics
claims that it is precisely this potential for transformingthe context, which Heim calls the
context change potential(CCP), that should be taken as the basis of linguistic meaning.14
Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) (Kamp [82], Kamp andReyle [83]) is a paradig-
matic example of a dynamic semantic theory. Like other theories of discourse interpretation,
DRT comprises two components: a language with a model-theoretic semantics in which the
logical forms of discourse are represented, and an account of how these logical forms are mod-
ified or extended as discourse proceeds. In DRT, the discourse is represented as a discourse
representation structure (DRS); a DRS is a pair of sets〈U,C〉, whereU is a set of discourse
referents andC is a set of discourse conditions; these conditions may be properties and relations
involving discourse referents, or other DRSs.
One basic way in which DRT departs from traditional, ‘static’ semantic theories (such
as those of Montague [117], [116] and Davidson [31], [32]) isthat it claims that indefinite
noun phrases such as a man or a donkey are essentially predicates with free variables,man(x),
donkey(y) rather than existential quantifiers. In effect, an indefinite introduces a new vari-
able, or discourse marker, and a pronoun anaphoric on an indefinite is interpreted as the same
variable as was introduced by its indefinite antecedent. Forexample, let us consider a simple
discourse consisting of the two sentences in (76):
(76) John sees a woman. She is singing.
In DRT, the first sentence can be represented using the following Discourse Representation
Structure(DRS):
(77)
x y
x = john
woman(y)
sees(x,y)
14While dynamic semantics arguably provides, at present, themost detailed and extensive model-theoretic
framework for analysing intersentential anaphoric dependencies, it is not the only approach; thed scriptive pro-
nounor E-typetheory, for instance, attributes the special properties ofdiscourse anaphora to a special interpre-
tive strategy governing the anaphoric pronominal expression, rather than its indefinite antecedent; on this view,
anaphoric pronouns basically act as proxies for definite descriptions (Geach [56], Evans [42], [44], [45], Par-
sons [124], Cooper [28], Davies [34]), and pronouns used in this fashion are sometimes referred to as “pronouns
of laziness” (Geach [56]) or “E-type pronouns” (Evans [44],[ 5]).
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On an anaphoric reading of the pronoun, the interpretation of the complete example is then
represented as in (78):
(78)
x y
x = john
woman(y)
see(x,y)
sing(y)
Since DRT builds in to the assignment of truth conditionsdefault existential quantificationover
free variables, the DRS in (78) is true if there is something that is John and something John sees
that is a woman who is singing. Crucially, the fact that indefinites appear to have the force of
existential quantifiers is not because they are existentialqu ntifiers, but arises from the default
existential quantification over free variables.
3.6.2 Adjectival Anaphora from a Dynamic Perspective
Armed with the basic notions of dynamic semantics, we can nowrevisit some of the examples
we considered at the end of Chapter 2, repeated here for convenie c as (79) and (80).15
(79) a. Bob is taller.
b. Bill is tall.
(80) a. Bill is tall. Bob is also tall.
b. Bill is tall. Bob is also tall (for his age).
c. Bill is tall. Bob is taller.
d. Bill is short. Bob is taller.
e. Bill is strong, but Bob is taller.
Recall that in Section 3.3.2 above, we assigned (79a) the following interpretation:
[ Bob [ is taller]] Z⇒ ∃u
HEIGHT(u)
u. f > u.p
u.p = w.g
u. f = bobH
(3.21)
As mentioned in Chapter 2, an isolated utterance of sentence(79a) can be construed deictically
as referring to the height of some contextually salient person or thing, such as Bob’s own height
15These corresponds to examples (53a) and (54), respectively, in Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2.
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at some point in the past; in (79b), however, the positive form ‘tall’ is contextually anchored to
some appropriate norm or standard of height,sH, which Bill’s height is claimed to exceed. The
kind of contextual dependency involved in each case is quitedistinct. This is most clearly seen
in examples involving anaphoric dependency, such as (80).
In (80a), the first clause ‘Bill is tall’, interpreted relative to some contextual standard, call
it sH, makes up part of the interpretive context for the second occurrence of ‘tall’. One natural
interpretation is for this to be interpreted relative to thesame standardsH, as may further uses
of the same adjective.
A standard DRS for the sentence ‘Bill is tall’ would be (81) below.
(81) a. Bill is tall.
b.
x
x = bill
tall(x)
In LSS, each adjective token introduces an L-structure intothe discourse; thus in (82) below,
‘tall’ introduces the L-structureu into the DRS universe. In the zero context, there is no an-
tecedent available for an anaphoric interpretation, so thePerspectival parameter is assigned
the values1 deictically (for clarity, we omit reference to the Figure and Ground parameters,
which we assume to be assigned in accordance with the compositional machinery set out in the
previous chapter).
(82) a. Bill is tall1.
b.
x u
x = bill
u. f = bill H
u. f > u.p
u.g = 0
u.p = S1
In the two-clause discourse fragment in (80a), the additionof the sentence ‘Bob is also tall’ has
the DRS in (83) as one of its possible representations, wheret perspectival parameter of the
L-structurew, introduced by the second occurrence of ‘tall’, is anaphorically identified with
the value of the perspectival parameter of the first occurrence.
(83) a. Bill is tall1. Bob is also tall1.
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b.
x y u w
x = bill
y = bob
u. f = bill H
u. f > u.p
u.g = 0
u.p = S1
w. f = bobH
w. f > w.p
w.g = 0
w.p = u.p
As with pronouns, it would be possible for the second token of‘tall’ to refer deictically to some
differentstandard, call its2; we see this more clearly in (80b), where the hedge ‘for his age’
prompts the selection of a different standard, as in (84) below.
(84) a. Bill is tall1. Bob is also tall2 (for his age).
b.
x y u w
x = bill
y = bob
u. f = bill H
u. f > u.p
u.g = 0
u.p = S1
w. f = bobH
w. f > w.p
w.g = 0
w.p = S2
In the case of the comparative, it is the Ground parameter that is free for specification,
and the relevant antecedent in this case is not a prior Perspective point, but the height of some
contextually accessible entity, such as Bill, representedashbill in (85).
(85) a. Bill is tall. Bob is taller.
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b.
x y u w
x = bill
y = bob
u. f = bill H
u. f > u.p
u.g = 0
u.p = S1
w. f = bobH
w. f > w.p
w.p = w.g
w.g = bill H
3.6.3 Vagueness in Dynamic Semantics
One feature of dynamic semantics which is relevant to the interpretation of gradable and vague
expressions is its ability to model informational updates over the course of a discourse. Kyburg
and Morreau [100] have claimed that vague utterances involving gradable adjectives involve
negotiation about how to use vague terms, and argue that we require the following in order to
handle such cases:
1. a semantic account of vagueness (Kyburg and Morreau favour a version of supervalua-
tionism, together with a system of ‘penumbral connections’);
2. a theory of conveyed meanings (such as implicatures and presu positions);
3. a theory of context update; and
4. a theory of belief accommodation
Part of what is accommodated is the extension of the vague predicat . Kyburg and Morreau
define the contextual update process as follows:
Definition 26 (Context Update) If c is a context and s is a sentence uttered in c, then
cg(c+s) = cg(c)+cm(s)(c)
wherecg(·) indicates the common ground andcm(·) denotes the conveyed meanings.
The basic definition of context update takes care of cases where t information in the common
ground grows monotonically. However, it cannot cope with cases where the use of a vague
predicate introduces an inconsistency. This is where the theory of belief accommodation comes
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in, and proceeds roughly as follows: we take the conveyed meanings of an utterance; then we
add the contribution of the non-vague sentences of the common ground; finally, we add as many
of the remaining vague sentences as we can, without introducing inconsistency.
3.6.3.1 Metalinguistic Sharpening
In addition to the standardescriptiveuses, as in (86) below, gradable adjectives can also
be employedmetalinguisticallyto provide information regarding their own applicability.As
several commentators have pointed out (e.g., Kamp [84, p. 149], Klein [95, p. 14], Pinkal [132,
p. 223], among others), the very act of asserting a sentence containing a vague predicate may
cause the context to change in certain ways, for instance, bycontributing to the ‘sharpening’ of
its intended denotation, as in (87) below.
(86) A: “Who is tall in this neighbourhood?”
B: “Well, Jürgen is tall, Englebert is tall, and Bob is tall, but Bill is not.”
(87) A: “What counts as tall around here?”
B: “Well, Jürgen is tall, Englebert is tall, and Bob is tall, but Bill is not.”
This phenomenon is addressed within a dynamic framework by Barker [5], who uses it to model
cases involving the metalinguistic sharpening of vague predicates. Barker makes use of the no-
tion of adelineation, as defined by David Lewis [111]. Intensions in Lewis’s system of general
semantics are functions from indices to extensions, where indices are tuples of coordinates for
aspects of the context which affect the evaluation of the truth-value of a sentence, and may also
enter into the determination of the extension of a term, suchas time, possible world, place, etc.
Lewis suggests adding adelineation coordinateto the set of indices, which specifies how vague
or indeterminate terms are to be made precise.16
Barker [5] proposes a functiond(·) that maps possible worlds into delineations for the vague
predicates in that world, where the latter are functions from gradable adjectives to degrees. For
example,d(c) is the set of delineations associated with worldc, andd(c)(JtallK) denotes the
absolute standard of evaluation for ‘tall’ in worldc.
As in other dynamic theories, Barker takes propositional expr ssions to denote context
update functions (i.e., functions that take a context as an argument and return an updated context
16In Lewis’s original proposal (see [111, pp. 64–65]), these delineations take the form of boundary-specifying
real numbers, one for each vague term in the language; e.g., in a language containing the vague terms ‘tall’ and
‘hot’, the delineation coordinate would include a boundarynumber specifying the height threshold for tallness
and the temperature threshold for hotness. For a discussionof the use of real numbers and scales, see Section??
below.
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as a value). Ifφ is a natural language expression andC andC′ are contexts (modelled as
sets of possible worlds), thenJφK is anupdate functionbetween contexts, such thatJφK(C,C′)
holds only if C′ is a legitimate way of updatingC with the content ofφ. The only update
functions Barker considers are filters, so thatC′ ⊆ C for all C, C′ such thatJφK(C,C′). Barker
sometimes writesC ⊆ JφK in lieu of JφK(C) = C, and similarly forc ∈ C, he writesc ∈ JφK
instead ofJφK({c}) = {c}. Thus, if RAIN is the set of worlds in which it is raining, then
JIt is rainingK = λC.{c∈C: c∈ RAIN} (Barker [5, p. 6]).
Letting TALL (d,x) denote the set of worlds in whichx is tall to (at least) degreed, then the
expressionTALL (d(c)(JtallK),x) is the set of possible worlds in which the degree of tallness of
x is greater or equal to the standard of tallness inc. The semantic interpretation of ‘tall’ is then
given as follows [5, p. 7]:
JtallK = λxλC.{c∈C: c∈ TALL (d(c)(JtallK,x)} (3.22)
Simple copular constructions involving adjectives then receive an interpretation as follows (cf.
Barker [5, p. 8]):
(88) a. Bob is tall.
b. JBob is tallK = λC.{c∈C: c∈ TALL (d(c)(JtallK,bob)}
The update function in (88) filters out possible worlds basedon two criteria: the standard of
tallness in that world and Bob’s height in that world. However, where the standard of tallness
is not known, as in (87) above, successive predicative uses of ‘tall’ above will have the effect of
filtering out those possible worlds in which the standard fortallness is greater than the degree
of tallness possessed by Jürgen, Englebert, and Bob, as well as those worlds where it is lower
than the degree to which Bill is tall.
The dynamic treatment of adjectives we presented in Section3.6 above, although quite
different in certain respects, is also able to capture the diff rence between descriptive and met-
alinguistic usage. The standard of evaluation is an entity in the discourse context, and the
anchoring of the Perspectival parameter of the adjective functions in a manner akin to pronom-
inal reference and anaphora. Nevertheless, in spite of thisdifference with Barker’s approach,
the basic dynamic nature of the framework enables us to capture the effect of metalinguistic
uses of adjectives. In example (83), we saw that successive predications adds more informa-
tion regarding the properties of the standardS1; in cases where the extent ofS1 on the height
scale were known, sayS1 = 1.8metres, then subsequent reference to this standard would be
interpreted descriptively; on the other hand, in cases where we know nothing aboutS1, then
instances of ‘tall’ that make reference toS1 may function metalinguistically to provide further
information about its location.
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3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a formal semantics for gradable adjectives centred around the notion
of an L-structure, which we introduced in Chapter 2. We defined an L-structure formally as
a ternary structure whose components are vectors, which in the case of adjectival L-structures
belong to dimensions in a conceptual space (cf. Section 3.2). We also defined notions of ori-
entation and magnitude for L-structures in terms of the relations between their components
(Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2), and presented a small formal fragment for adjectival constructions
(Section 3.3).
We distinguished the semantic properties of gradable adjectives in terms of configurations
of P, F, andG points on a dimensional scale, in a manner reminiscent of theReichenbach
treatment of tenses in terms of configurations ofS, E, andR points on the timeline, and pro-
posed anadjectival measurability condition(AMC) in order to account for the phenomena
associated with MP modification (Section 3.4.2). We showed how to incorporate the AMC into
the semantic composition mechanism, as part of the lexical semantic definition of the measure
phrase.
The AMC has certain properties that make it appealing: (i) itis extremely simple; (ii) it ap-
plies uniformly to both comparatives and non-comparatives; (iii) it can be incorporated straight-
forwardly into the compositional semantic definition of thelanguage.
Unfortunately, it turns out that the AMC, as stated in Definition 22, appears to be far too
restrictive to provide an accurate cross-categorial characte isation of measure phrase behaviour.
However, we noted that this does not automatically entail tht t e AMC is not applicable to the
adjectival domain, and we suggested a way to express the AMC as alocal rather than a global
constraint, in the context of a construction-oriented semantic framework (Section 3.5).
In Section 3.6 we revisited the idea, inspired by Partee [127], that adjectives are structurally
analogous to tenses and pronouns (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3), and presented a brief treatment
of intersentential adjectival dependencies in a dynamic semantic framework.
The theory of Locative Structure Semantics (LSS) presentedi this chapter can be regarded
as both an extension of and a deviation from Vector Space Semantics (VSS). LSS shares the
same basic semantic ontology, and the same preoccupation with structural parallels across do-
mains; from a purely technical standpoint, the principal difference so far hinges on the use of
ternary L-structures instead of located vectors. Conceptually, LSS deviates from VSS princi-
pally in the central role it assigns to the notion ofperspective, as found in the spatial, temporal,
and conceptual domains (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.2), and theincorporation of notions from
Reichenbach’s theory of tense (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.3).
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The technical similarity between LSS and VSS means that, unfortunately, LSS inherits two
of the problems with VSS described in Section 1.3.5 of Chapter 1: (i) the type incompatibility
between gradable and non-gradable adjectives (and other predicates), which we called the ‘Di-
vergent Type Problem’; and, (ii) the problem posed by intersective constructions, which Winter
and Faller refer to as the ‘Coordination Problem’. Chapter 4p esents a solution to both prob-
lems in terms of a dynamic model of semantic interpretation;we shall see that, in the process,
the divergence between LSS and VSS becomes more pronounced.
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Chapter 4
A Dynamic Semantics for Locatives
4.1 Introduction
We introduced dynamic semantics briefly at the end of Chapter3 (Section 3.6), where we
explored its relevance to modelling anaphoric dependencies involving gradable adjectives. In
this chapter, we will employ a dynamic approach to address a quite distinct issue, which we
consider to be of equal or even greater importance; in particular, we will show how a dynamic
model enables us to tackle the two problems faced by vector-based theories such as LSS and
VSS which we discussed in Section 1.3.5 of Chapter 1, namely,the ‘Divergent Type Problem’
and the ‘Coordination Problem’.
We shall develop a dynamic version of LSS based on the theory of dynamic semantics
known as ‘Dynamic Binding’ (DB), developed by Gennaro Chierchia [25], which is a variant
of Groenendijk and Stokhof’s [60] Dynamic Montague Grammar(DMG).
There are two main reasons for choosing DB or DMG over other dynamic theories, such as
DRT. The first is that the divergent type problem and the coordination problem areintrasenten-
tial rather thanintersententialphenomena, and, although DRT is well-suited to modelling de-
pendencies between sentences, it is less suited to modelling dynamic phenomena at a sentence-
internal level (cf. Section 4.4 below); by contrast, the semantic composition mechanism used in
Dynamic Binding/Dynamic Montague Grammar is the same as in traditional Montague-style
formal semantics. The second reason is that our proposals inthis chapter rely heavily on the
Existential Disclosureoperation (ED), originally introduced into DMG by Paul Dekkr (cf.
Dekker [35], [36]), and which has no equivalent in DRT (cf. Section 4.5 below).
The fundamental feature of dynamic semantics is that existent ally quantified objects are
not completely closed off to further specification; as Dekker originally noted in the context of
Dynamic Montague Grammar, this means that implicit arguments can be ‘hidden’ by existen-
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tially quantifying over them in the lexicon, while remaining accessible to further specification
by modifier phrases. This has two consequences for an L-structure-based (or vector-based) the-
ory of gradable adjectives. First, by existentially quantifying over the L-Structure parameter,
it becomes possible to interpret the gradable adjective as a(dynamic) property of individuals,
rather than a property of L-structures or vectors, as in VSS and the version of LSS presented
in Chapter 3, which means that gradable adjectives can be assigned exactly the same type as
non-gradable adjectives and other predicates. Second, we will see that by using a modified
form of existential disclosure, it becomes possible to develop a dynamic form of generalised
coordination for L-structures, thereby resolving the Coordination Problem.
4.2 The Problem with Intersective Constructions
There are many constructions that may involve more than one adjective; for example, adjectives
may appear conjoined in a coordinate structure or as restrictive modifiers within a determiner
phrase, as in (89) and (90) below, and we require our semantics to assign an interpretation to
these cases (and others).
(89) a. Bill is tall and slim.
b. Bill is taller and slimmer than John.
c. Bill is taller and slimmer than some student.
d. John is shorter and heavier than Bill.
e. Bill is taller than Jack and slimmer than Jill.
(90) a. The tall ugly bloke is my brother.
b. My sister is a beautiful slim girl.
c. I would like a big red juicy apple for dessert.
There exists a venerable tradition of analysing both conjunctio and restrictive modification in
terms of set-theoretic intersection;1 however, this Boolean approach to conjunction is incom-
patible with VSS as standardly formulated (cf. Zwarts and Winter [182]). The standard VSS
semantics for adjectives assigns completely disjoint denotations to adjectives from different
dimensions, so their intersection produces the empty set; this implies that the adjectival con-
structions in (89) and (90) above are contradictory, which is evidently not the case. Hence,
there appears to be a conflict between the standard account ofthe semantics of coordination
1The cross-categorial treatment of coordination in formal semantics has been developed over the years in the
work of von Stechow [168], Keenan and Faltz [91], Gazdar [54], Partee and Rooth [129], and others.
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(and other ‘intersective’ structures) and a vector-based semantics, which is referred to as the
“coordination problem” in the VSS literature (e.g., Faller[46]).
4.2.1 Coordination in VSS
One of the basic accepted claims regarding coordination in natural language is that if two
natural language expressionsα1,α2 belong to the same syntactic categoryX, then they can be
coordinated, and their coordination will also belong toX. This is usually expressed, in the case
of English, by a rule schema such as the following (cf., Ross [136], Dik [37], Gazdar [54]).
Definition 27
X → X1 · · ·µ Xn
where2≤ n, µ∈ {and,or}, and X is any syntactic category.
A number of researchers have observed that the semantics forsuch coordinate structures is
generally Boolean in nature, withand interpreted as set-theoretic intersection andor as union
(see von Stechow [168], Keenan and Faltz [91], Gazdar [54], and Partee and Rooth [129],
among others).
Boolean semantics generally requires that the coordinatedelements belong to the same
type. In a Montague-style theory, this is usually enforced by the application of type-shifting
operations which raise (or possibly lower) the type of one orb th conjuncts until they both
belong to the same conjoinable Boolean type.
Definition 28 (Boolean conjunction)
1. S1 and S2 7→ S1′∧S2′
2. NP1 and NP2 7→ λX.NP1′(X)∧NP2′(X)
3. A1 and A2 7→ λx.A1′(x)∧A2′(x)
4. VP1 and VP2 7→ λx.VP1′(x)∧VP2′(x)
5. V1 and V2 7→ λx1 . . .λxk.V1′(x1) . . .(xk)∧V2′(x1) . . .(xk)
As we noted earlier in Section 1.3.5.2 of Chapter 1, Zwarts and Winter [182] acknowledge that
the standard Boolean account of conjunction appears to be incompatible with the VSS account
of spatial prepositions, because one cannot interpret the conjoined VSS denotations (which are
sets of vectors) in terms of set-theoretic intersection. For example, VSS assigns completely
disjoint denotations to the PPsabove the houseandbelow the cloudin sentence (91a) below
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(since the vectors have a different starting point in each set), o their intersection yields the
empty set; but (91a) is not in any way contradictory or impossible to interpret, and has an
interpretation roughly paraphrased by sentence (91b).
(91) a. The bird is ten meters [above the house and below the cloud].
b. The bird is ten meters above the house and the bird is ten meters below the cloud.
As Faller [46] points out, this problem with coordination carries over directly to the VSS anal-
ysis of degree adjectives, which assigns completely disjoint denotations to sentences such as
those in (89) and (90) above; as in the case of (91), the conjoined elements are again not con-
tradictory, nor otherwise semantically incompatible.
Note that a strategy of paraphrasing a sentence such as (92a)below as (92b) cannot work in
the general case, as the two forms are not always equivalent;this is exemplified by sentences
(93a) and (93b) (cf. Faller [46, p. 167, footnote 16]).
(92) a. Bob is taller and slimmer than Alice.
b. Bob is taller than someone and Bob is slimmer than someone.
(93) a. Bob is taller and slimmer than someone.
b. Bob is taller than someone and Bob is slimmer than someone.
Zwarts and Winter [182] perceive certain structural and semantic parallels between conjunction
in VSS and certain cases of ‘wide-scope’ conjunction in NPs,illustrated by (94) below:
(94) a. Most [cats and dogs] swim.
b. Most cats swim and most dogs swim.
Examples such as (94) are well-known in the literature (cf. Partee and Rooth [129], Keenan [90],
Dowty [38]). As in sentence (91) above, instances of wide-scope conjunction are characterised
by the fact that the compositional intersection of the ‘standard’ denotations of the N′ predicates
(e.g.,catsanddogs) yield a set that is empty or corresponds to a peculiar and uninte ded inter-
pretation (such as the set of all cat-dog hybrids), yet have astandard interpretation that is neither
contradictory nor bizarre, and indeed roughly equivalent to the sentence-level conjunction in
(96b).
Zwarts and Winter [182] conjecture that the same mechanism that is responsible for wide-
scope coordination in NPs might also account for the interpretation of conjoined PPs in VSS,
but they do not develop this idea any further (cf. Zwarts and Winter [182, section 4.2]), nor do
they provide a strategy for how this might be formally implemented.2
2As far as we can ascertain, the coordination problem in VSS has not been resolved to date (Yoad Winter,
personal communication).
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4.3 Existential Closure
The LSS semantics for gradable adjectives in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3 assigned the translation
in (4.1) below to the standard form of the adjective ‘tall’.
[
/0ABS tall
]
Z⇒ λw
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
(4.1)
This expression is of type(v3 → t). Consider now the alternative translation in (4.2) below:
[
/0ABS tall
]
Z⇒
λx
∃w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(4.2)
(4.2) differs from (4.1) in three simple respects:
1. the projection function∂ is part of the hidden or “subatomic” semantics of the adjectiv ;3
2. the L-structure parameter is not abstracted over, butexis entially quantified;
3. the type of the logical expression is(e→ t) (a property of individuals), not(v3 → t) (a
property of L-structures).
Note in particular that the semantic type( → t) in (4.2) is the type traditionally assigned to
adjectives and common nouns in a Montague-style grammar. Thus, t ere is no longer a type
mismatch between the subject and predicate interpretations, and the translation of the adjective
can combine directly with an argument of typee to yield an expression of typet, without the
need to resort to type-conversion operations like dim− n VSS (Definition 8, Chapter 1) or its
LSS correlate∂− (Definition 18, Chapter 3).4
On the assumption that the relevant use of the copula ‘be’ is smantically transparent,5 then
3In the sense of Parsons [126].
4Recall that these type conversion operations are triggeredby the type mismatch between the predicate and its
argument, as explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.
5E.g., ‘be’ Z⇒ λX.X, and ‘Bob’ Z⇒ b.
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we have the translation for ‘Bob is tall’ shown in (4.3).
[ Bob [ is tall]] Z⇒
λx
∃w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(b)
= ∃w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(b)(HEIGHT)
(4.3)
Note that, unlike (3.7) in Chapter 3, there is no longer any appe l to the type-conversion oper-
ation∂− in the course of the derivation.
In line with (4.2) above, we get the translation for ‘heavy’ shown in (4.4):
[
/0ABS heavy
]
Z⇒
λx
∃u
WEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = 0
u. f = ∂(x)(WEIGHT)
(4.4)
Given (4.2) and (4.4), we can employ the definition of Booleanco junction in Definition 28 to
assign an interpretation to the conjunction of ‘tall’ and ‘heavy’, as in (4.5):
[ [
/0ABS tall
]
and
[
/0ABS heavy
]]
Z⇒ λy
λx
∃w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(y)
λx
∃u
WEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = 0
u. f = ∂(x)(WEIGHT)
(y)
= λy
∃w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(y)(HEIGHT)
∃u
WEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
u.g = 0
u. f = ∂(y)(WEIGHT)
(4.5)
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At this point, it would appear that the modified interpretation of ‘tall’ in (4.2) does not suffer
from the two problems with (4.1) we originally discussed in Section 1.3.5 of Chapter 1 in con-
nection with VSS, namely, the divergent type problem and thecoordination problem. However,
there is a crucial problem with the new approach, as presented thus far: the existential closure
in (4.2) means that the adjective is not accessible to any modifiers involving the L-structure
parameter. In particular, the parameter is no longer accessibl to measure phrase modifiers.
One solution to this problem is to turn all modifiers into logical arguments of the adjectival
expression. Indeed, in some treatments of gradable adjectives, such as Heim [64], measure
phrases are treated as formal arguments of the adjective, not modifiers. While this does indeed
work for individual cases of measure phrase modification, itis very hard to generalise this strat-
egy toall modifiers, including adverbial and prepositional phrases,where it is often difficult
or impossible to list in advance the number of possible modifiers an expression may take. It is
concerns such as these regarding the possibility of treating ll modifiers as arguments that lead
Winter [176] to reject this as a comprehensive solution to the coordination problem.
In Section 4.6.1 below, we will present a ‘hybrid’ theory of modification in which all mod-
ifiers behave as arguments of the expressions they modify. Ininformal terms, the basic idea
is to define a mechanism whereby the modified expression cansystematicallygenerate as few
or as many argument places as required to accommodate its modifiers. In the case of measure
phrases, this approach retains the analysis of MPs as modificational expressions, while treating
them as arguments of the adjective.
This is where a dynamic semantics can help. In a dynamic semantics, indefinite objects,
that is, objects which are existentially quantified over, are vailable for further specification.
This means that, within a dynamic theory, implicit arguments can be assumed to be existen-
tially quantified over in the lexical translation itself; since existential quantification is dynamic,
such arguments are still accessible to further specification by modifier phrases. As Dekker [35,
p. 585] points out, the advantage of using a dynamic framework is that we are able to deal with
implicit arguments at the level of lexical specification; the alternative, in a static framework,
would be to complicate the syntax-semantics mapping with optional and potentially ad hoc
closure operations. Furthermore, since the implicit arguments are ‘hidden’ by the quantifier, it
enables us to give auniform treatment of expressions within the same syntactic category, re-
gardless of what implicit arguments they might have: for example, relational and non-relational
nouns, eventive and non-eventive verbs, and, as we shall see, gradable and non-gradable adjec-
tives.
In the following sections, we define a dynamic semantics for L-Structures that is compatible
with a generalised Boolean notion of conjunction, yet preserves the modificational character of
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measure phrases.
4.4 Dynamic Locative Structure Semantics (DLSS)
We introduced dynamic semantics briefly in Section 3.6 of Chapter 3, where we explained its
relevance to modelling anaphoric dependencies involving gradable adjectives. In the following
sections we shall employ a dynamic version of LSS based on thetheory of dynamic semantics
known as ‘Dynamic Binding’ (DB), developed by Gennaro Chierchia [25], and which is itself
a variant of Groenendijk and Stokhof’s [60] Dynamic Montague Grammar (DMG).
There are two main reasons for employing DB/DMG instead of DRT. The first is that the
semantic composition process used in Dynamic Binding is more in keeping with traditional
Montague-style formal semantics, including the version wehave been employing in the pre-
vious chapters: “classical” DRT (e.g., Kamp [82], Kamp and Reyle [83]) does not employ
a lexically-based bottom-up compositional mechanism (cf.Groenendijk and Stokhof [61]),
and, although there are more recent versions of DRT that do employ a bottom-up composi-
tional mechanism, such as, e.g., theλ-DRT of Pinkal and others (Latecki and Pinkal [108],
Bos et al. [16]) and Muskens’ [120] Compositional DRT, thesear still less developed and/or
widespread than DMG. The second reason is that our proposalsin this chapter rely on the
Existential Disclosureoperation in DB/DMG (cf. Section 4.5 below), which is not available
in DRT. This is because discourse markers in DRT arefre variableswhich are interpreted
existentially at the level of the discourse; the fact that discourse markers in DRT have exis-
tential force comes about, not because they are explicitly bound by existential quantifiers, but
because there is aglobalassumption of default existential quantification over freevariables (cf.
Chapter 3, Section 3.6.1). In DB/DMG, by contrast, discourse markers arexplicitlybound by
existential quantifiers; however, the dynamic interpretation of the quantifiers and connectives
allows existential quantifiers to bind variables outside their syntactic scope, and, under certain
conditions, also allows modifiers to make reference to existntially quantified variables that
would be inaccessible in a ‘static’ semantics.
4.4.1 Dynamic Intensional Logic
As before, we translate natural language expressions into aformal language withλ-abstraction
and application. The language of DLSS is basically that of a dynamic version of Montague’s
Intensional Logic (DIL), with an expanded set of types that includes vectors and product types.
We will briefly outline those essential features of Intensioal Logic and its dynamic variant
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that are required to understand the rest of the chapter, refering the reader to the literature for a
detailed exposition of the theory.6
The set ofextensionaltypes in Montague’s IL comprises the basic typese (for ‘entity’) and
t (for ‘truth value’), and the complex type(a → b), wherea andb are themselves types. For
each extensional typea, there corresponds ani tensional typeof the form(s→ a);7 this has
an intensionas its semantic value, which is modelled as a function from a set of indices or
parameters8 into an extensional object of typea. We will employ an expanded set of types, in
which we have an additional basic typev (for ‘vector’), and an additional product type of the
form (a•b). The result is the setTYPE set out in Definition 29 below, an intensional version of
the type system in Winter [176]:
Definition 29 (TYPE ) TYPE is the smallest set such that
1. e,v, t ∈ TYPE.
2. if a,b∈ TYPE, then(a→ b) ∈ TYPE.
3. if a,b∈ TYPE, then(a•b) ∈ TYPE.
4. if a∈ TYPE, then(s→ a) ∈ TYPE.
We will adopt the standard policy of simplifying expressions where possible by omitting paren-
theses, subject to the convention that the functional type operator,→, is right associative and
has a lower precedence than•, and by employing abbreviations where this does not give rise to
confusion: as before, L-Structures have type(v•v•v), abbreviated asv3.
Definition 30 (SYMB ) The symbolic repertoireSYMB includes that of standard intensional
logic:
1. for every type a, an infinite setVARa of variables of type a.
2. for every type a, a (possibly empty) setCONa of constants of type a.
6The collection of papers in Montague [119] is the ‘classical’ reference for Montague’s Intensional Logic and
its application to grammar, while extensive and authoritative introductions can also be found in Dowty et al. [39]
and Gamut [52, Chs. 5 & 6], inter alia. Groenendijk and Stokhof’s [60] Dynamic Montague Grammar is based
on the Dynamic Intensional Logic developed by Janssen [81],which employs the notion of a ‘state switcher’ to
achieve dynamic effects; unlike DMG, Chierchia’s [25] Dynamic Binding does not employ state switchers.
7Note that here we introduce the typessyncategorematically, as is done in most treatments of IL.
8Examples of intensional parameters include possible worlds, points in time, spatial locations, or computa-
tional states.
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3. the connectives:¬ , ∧ , ∨ , → .
4. the quantifiers:∀ , ∃ .
5. the abstraction symbol:λ .
6. the identity symbol:= .
7. the brackets: ‘(’ and ‘)’.
In addition, SYMB also contains symbols for discourse markers as well as the dynamic
quantifiers and connectives:
8. for every type a, an infinite setDMa of dynamic markers of type a.
9. the dynamic connectives:∼ , ; ,g , .
10. the dynamic quantifiers:A , E .
11. the dynamic identity symbol:∼= .
Definition 31 specifies the set of meaningful expressions of each type, where the total set of
meaningful expressions is given byEXP =
S
EXPa.
Definition 31 (EXPa) For each type a∈ TYPE, the setEXPa of expressions of type a is the
smallest set such that:
1. DMa ⊆ EXPa.
2. CONa∪VARa ⊆ EXPa.
3. if α ∈ VARa+ andβ ∈ EXPb thenλα.β ∈ EXP(a→b).
4. if α ∈ EXP(a→b) andβ ∈ VARa+ then(α(β)) ∈ EXPb.
5. if φ,ψ ∈ EXPt then(¬φ),(φ∧ψ),(φ∨ψ),(φ → ψ) ∈ EXPt .
6. if α,β ∈ EXPa then(α = β) ∈ EXPa.
7. if α ∈ VARa+ andφ ∈ EXPt then(∀α.φ),(∃α.φ) ∈ EXPt .
8. if α ∈ EXPa, then∧α ∈ EXP(s→a).
9. if α ∈ EXP(s→a), then∨α ∈ EXPa.
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whereVARa+ = VARa∪DMa.
Clauses 2–7 in Definition 31 are familiar from extensional systems of logic: clause 2 states
that there is a set of logical variables and constants for each type; clauses 3 and 4 defineλ-
abstraction andλ-application function in the standard fashion; clause 5 state that formulae are
closed under the standard set of logical connectives; clause 6 states that there exists an equality
statement for each type; and, clause 7 states that quantifiers can bind variables of any type.
Clauses 8 and 9 introduce the “cap” operator,∧, and the “cup” operator∨. These operators
expressabstractionover andapplicationto indices, respectively,9 and thus enable us to switch
between intensions and extensions, in a manner described inSection 4.4.3 below.
Clause 1 introduces a set ofdiscourse markers(DM) for each type, distinct from the set
of logical variables inVARa. Discourse markers can be abstracted over usingλ and bound
by the same quantifiers in the same way as ordinary variables;however, with regard to scope,
discourse markers behave in a dynamic manner which is quite unlike the behaviour of variables
in classical logic: ifxi is a discourse marker, then a quantifier expression of the form Qxi will
be able to bind DMs beyond its syntactic scope, in ways that wewill define below.
4.4.2 Model Theory
Our version of DIL is a two-sorted theory in which we have distinct terms for vector and non-
vector entities. As in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, we assume a set of individualsU, a set of
dimensional vectorsV, and a set ofdimensionsD, which is a partition ofV. We take a model
M = 〈W,ℑ〉 to be a structure containing the setW = U∪V (U∩V = /0) of individual and vector
entities, and aconstant interpretation functionℑ such that, for anya ∈ TYPE andα ∈ CONa:
ℑ(α)∈ DOM a. For each typea, the setDOM a of denotations of typea is given by Definition 32.
Definition 32 (Domains of interpretation ) For each type a∈ TYPE, the setDOM a of denota-
tions of type a (relative toU,V) is defined as follows:
1. DOM e = U
2. DOM v = V
3. DOM t = {0,1}
4. DOM (a→b) = DOM b
DOM a = {h | h: DOM a → DOM b}
5. DOM (a•b) = DOM a×DOM b
9Note the parallel with the clauses forλ abstraction and application.
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6. DOM (s→a) = DOM a
S = {h | h: S → DOM a}
The setS is a set of indices relative to which interpretation depends; these normally include pos-
sible worlds and times, as in Montague’s IL, but we shall takediscourse statesas our indices,
as explained in Section 4.4.3 below.
We define the set of all logical variables asVAR =
S
VARa and the set of all discourse
markers asDM =
S
DMa. Semantically, we employ two distinct assignment functions, one for
the logical variables inVAR, writtenγ, and another for the discourse markers inDM, writtenσ.
Definition 33 (Assignment functions) We have two assignment functions, one for logical vari-
ables (VAR) and one for dynamic markers (DM).
• A variable assignment for a variableα ∈ VARa is a functionγ : VARa → DOM a, and we
write γ [α/d] for the assignment identical toγ for all variables inVARa, except possibly
for α, whereγ [α/d] (α) = d.
• A DM-assignmentσ for a dynamic markerα ∈ DMa is a functionσ : DMa → DOM a, and
we writeσ [α/d] for the DM-assignment identical toσ for all dynamic markers inDMa,
except possibly forα, whereσ [α/d] (α) = d.
We now define the semantic interpretation for the setEXP of expressions of the language. In
Definition 34 below, the interpretation functionJ·KM,γ,σ, for a modelM = 〈W,ℑ〉, associates
with every expressionα of typea, written α : a, a memberJαKM,γ,σ of DOM α, relative to aγ
and aσ.
Definition 34 (Interpretation function) Given a model M= 〈W,ℑ〉, we defineJαKM,γ,σ, the
interpretation ofα in M relative toγ andσ, as follows:
1. dynamic markers:
if α ∈ DMa thenJαKM,γ,σ = σ(α).
2. constants:
if α ∈ CONa thenJαKM,γ,σ = ℑ(α).
3. variables:
if α ∈ VARa thenJαKM,γ,σ = γ(α).
4. functional abstraction and application:
4.1. Jλαa.βKM,γ,σ = λd ∈ DOM a.JβKM,σ,γ[αa/d]
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4.2. J(α(β))KM,γ,σ = JαKM,γ,σ
(
JβKM,γ,σ
)
5. connectives:
5.1. J¬φKM,γ,σ = 1 iff JφKM,γ,σ = 0.
5.2. J(φ∧ψ)KM,γ,σ = 1 iff JφKM,γ,σ = 1 andJψKM,γ,σ = 1.
5.3. J(φ∨ψ)KM,γ,σ = 1 iff JφKM,γ,σ = 1 or JψKM,γ,σ = 1.
5.4. J(φ → ψ)KM,γ,σ = 0 iff JφKM,γ,σ = 1 andJψKM,γ,σ = 0.
6. identity:
Jα = βKM,γ,σ = 1 iff JαKM,γ,σ = JβKM,γ,σ.
7. universal quantifier:
7.1. if α ∈ DMa, thenJ∀α.φKM,γ,σ = 1 iff for every d∈ DOM α : JφKM,γ,σ[α/d] = 1.
7.2. if α ∈ VARa, thenJ∀α.φKM,γ,σ = 1 iff for every d∈ DOM α : JφKM,γ[α/d],σ = 1.
8. existential quantifier:
8.1. if α ∈ DMa, thenJ∃α.φKM,γ,σ = 1 iff for some d∈ DOM α : JφKM,γ,σ[α/d] = 1.
8.2. if α ∈ VARa, thenJ∃α.φKM,γ,σ = 1 iff for some d∈ DOM α : JφKM,γ[α/d],σ = 1.
9. cap:
if α ∈ EXPa thenJ∧αKM,γ,σ is that functionh∈ DOM aS such that for all σ′ ∈ S : h(σ′) =
JαKM,γ,σ′ .
10. cup:
if α ∈ EXP(s→a) thenJ∨αKM,γ,σ = JαKM,γ,σ(σ).
Dynamic Binding (and DMG) employsdiscourse assignmentsas intensional indices, instead
of worlds and times as in Montague’s IL; that is, assignmentsσ to discourse markers take the
place of possible worlds in the semantics. Of course, such a minimal notion of intension is
clearly only adequate for modelling extensional meanings (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof [60],
Chierchia [25, p. 80]): despite the intensional form of the tory, it is really extensional in spirit.
However, although it is possible to extend the theory to incorporate modalities proper (c.f.,
Chierchia [25, Ch. 4]), the extensional theory is nevertheless quite sufficient for our purposes.
We will later make frequent use of the following useful fact,which is a straightforward
corollary of the definitions above.
Fact 1 (Cup-Cap) J∨∧αKM,γ,σ = JαKM,γ,σ
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4.4.3 Context Change Potential (CCP)
As we mentioned earlier in Section 3.6.1, at the heart of the dynamic approach to natural
language semantics is the view of meaning in terms ofcontext change potential(CCP), the
transformative effect of a sentence on the discourse context, rather than truth conditions alone.
Consider a discourseD viewed, somewhat simplistically, as a finite series of sentences
S1,S2, · · · ,Sn. A sentence tokenSi in the sequence is interpreted in the informational context
Ci−1 resulting from the contribution of previous sentencesS1,S2, · · · ,Si−1; Si in turn transforms
this context by the introduction of additional information, producing a new informational state
Ci , which then acts as the informational context for the next sen ence tokenSi+1, and so on.
Semantically, a discourse can be seen as a series of transitions among informational states.
The dynamic meaning of sentence (and linguistic expressionin general) is the way it constrains
or determines this transition from state to state. There aresev ral ways to model how linguistic
meaning effects these transitions. One approach is to modelthe meaning of a sentence (or sub-
sentential constituent) as a function from input contexts to output contexts, as in Heim’s [65]
File Change Semantics (FCS) or Groenendijk and Stokhof’s [61] Dynamic Predicate Logic
(DPL). Chierchia’s theory of Dynamic Binding, however, models discourse transitions in terms
of continuations, by building into the semantic representation of each sentence a placeholder
for subsequent discourse (cf. Chierchia [25, pp. 81–84]).
Suppose that the truth-conditional content of a given sentenceS is represented by the IL
translationS′, and consider the conjunction(S′∧ p), whereinp is a free propositional variable
of typet. As Chierchia explains, the variablep can function as a placeholder for what followsS
in the discourse; that is, as a variable over the possible continuations ofS, or the ways in which
the discourse may continue after the utterance ofS. If we take a conjunction of the form(Φ∧p)
as a representation of the dynamic meaning of each sentence in the discourseD = S1,S2, · · · ,Sn,
we obtain a sequence of translations(S′i∧pi), for 1≤ i ≤n. Given this choice of representation,
we can integrate the meaning of eachSi+1 into the the preceding discourse, by substituting its
translation(S′i+1∧ pi+1) into the slotpi provided by the previous sentenceSi ; that is, given
the concatenation(S′i ∧ pi)+(S′i+1∧ pi+1), we substitute(S′i+1∧ pi+1) for pi in (S′i ∧ pi) to
obtain(S′i ∧S′i+1∧ pi+1). Note that this expression has the same form(Φ∧ p) as the original
concatenated elements; in particular, it also contains a free variablepi+1 as a placeholder for the
next sentence in the discourse; proceeding in this fashion,the individual sentential meanings
can be chained together to construct a semantic representation of the discourse as a whole.
In the context of the Dynamic Intensional Logic defined in thepr vious sections, we can
ensure that the appropriate substitution is made by abstracting over the variablep in each case;
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moreover, since we are dealing with an intensional system, we will apply the cup operator∨ to
the substituted element, in order to make it of the appropriate type. This gives us the expression
(λp.Φ∧∨p) as Chierchia’s proposed representation of the CCP of a sentenceS, whereΦ is the
representation of the truth conditions ofS in IL (cf. Chierchia [25, p. 84]). The type of this
expression is((s→ t) → t), which we abbreviate asτ .10
Dynamic Binding employs a ‘lift’ operator,⇑, to map the truth-conditional value of a for-
mula into the corresponding CCP, as in Definition 35.
Definition 35 (Lift ⇑)
⇑ : t → τ
⇑φ, λp.φ∧∨p
The truth conditional meaning of a CCP is recovered by means of a ‘closure’ operator, which
applies the CCP to a tautology (Definition 36). The tautology⊤ fills the continuation parameter
in the CCP, giving us a standard formula of typet containing the tautology as a conjunct; since
conjunction of a formulaΦ with a tautology does not affect the truth value, the truth conditions
of (Φ∧⊤) will be equivalent toΦ alone.
Definition 36 (Closure⇓) Let⊤ denote a tautologous proposition. Then we define
⇓ : τ → t
⇓φ, φ(∧⊤)
Compound sentences and discourses are interpreted by meansof a set of logical operators and
quantifiers defined on CCPs, as given in Definition 37 (cf. Chierc ia [25, p. 87], Groenendijk
and Stokhof [60]).
Definition 37 (The Logic of CCP)
1. (α ∼= β),⇑⇓α =⇓β
2. ∼φ, ⇑¬ ⇓φ
3. (φ ; ψ), λp.φ(∧ψ(p))
4. (φgψ),∼(∼φ ; ∼ψ)
5. (φ ψ),∼φg (φ ; ψ)
10In fact, for reasons explained in [60] and [25, p. 247, note 15], strictly speaking the CCP of a sentence should
be an expression of the type(s→ ((s→ t)→ t)); for present purposes, however, the simpler formulation employed
by Chierchia [25] is more than adequate, and simplifies our exposition considerably.
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6. Ex.φ, λp.∃x.φ(p)
7. Ax.φ,∼Ex.∼φ
In virtue of the dynamic interpretation of ; andE, the existential quantifier is able to bind
variable occurrences that lie outside its syntactic scope,so that even when a discourse marker
d is free in ψ, (Ed.φ) ; ψ is equivalent to(Ed.φ ; ψ):
Fact 2 (Existential Associativity)
(Ed.φ) ; ψ ≡ (Ed.φ ; ψ)
This property is a straightforward corollary of Definition 37 (in particular, clauses 3 and 6), and
is the cornerstone of the account of anaphora in DB and DMG.
The compositional interpretation procedure of Dynamic Binding is similar to Montague
Grammar: meanings are assigned to sub-sentential constituents in accordance with the principle
of compositionality, by examining the contribution these el ments make to the meaning of
the sentence as a whole. In traditional Montague grammar, where meaning is based on truth
conditions, sentences are of typet, and the semantic values of sub-sentential constituents are
assigned on the basis of their contribution to the truth conditions of the whole: thus, a sentence
such as ‘The bird sings’ is assigned the typet, the common noun ‘bird’ and the predicate
‘sings’ are given the type(e→ t), and the determiner ‘the’ is assigned the type(( → t) →
((e→ t) → t)); given this type assignment, the determiner first combines with the common
noun to givethe′(bird′), of type ((e→ t) → t), which then applies to the predicatesings′,
yielding the interpretationthe′(bird′)(sings′), of typet.11 In the case of Dynamic Binding, the
meaning of sentences is given in terms of CCPs instead of truth conditions, and sentences have
typeτ; in accordance with the same principle, we simply assign semantic interpretations to the
subsentential constituents in terms of their contributiono the context change potential of the
whole. Thus, predicates such as ‘bird’ and ‘sings’ will be oftype(e→ τ), while the determiner
will have type((e→ τ) → ((e→ τ) → τ)), and so on. Chierchia [25, p. 94] refers to this
systematic replacement of typet by typeτ as the “Basic Principle of Dynamic Interpretation”.
In this way, the lift operator can be extended from formulae to all expressionsα, which are
assigned a dynamic interpretation⇑α in accordance by means of the systematic replacement
of t with τ in their associated type.
11Naturally, this is only one out of several possible ways in which types might be assigned; what is important is
that these will all be guided by the same basic methodological principle.
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4.5 Existential Disclosure
One consequence of the equivalence(Ed.φ) ; ψ ≡ (Ed.φ ; ψ) is that indefinite objects intro-
duced by discourse markers are semantically available for further specification. Paul Dekker [35],
[36] has shown how this feature can be exploited to give an account of adverbial modification
for implicit arguments of verbs and relational nouns. In Fragment 1 below, which is based
on Dekker’s treatment of non-temporal adverbial phrases in[35, pp. 576–579], we exploit the
dynamic nature of existential binding by including an unbound discourse marker as part of
the definition of modifying expressions, including the degree terms, the numerical relations,
and ‘than’. The definitions are couched in the ‘box’ notationntroduced in Definition 14 of
Chapter 3, adapted to the language of Dynamic Binding.
Fragment 1
1. Adjectival roots
1.1. tall Z⇒ λu
~
w
w
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
1.2. shortZ⇒ λu
~
w
w
HEIGHT(u)
u.p > u. f
1.3. wideZ⇒ λu
~
w
w
WIDTH(u)
u.p < u. f
1.4. narrowZ⇒ λu
~
w
w
WIDTH(u)
u.p > u. f
2. Degree terms
2.1. morei / -eri Z⇒
λW
λx
Ewi
~
w
w
wi .p = wi .g
wi . f = ∂(x)(ρ(wi))
; W(wi)
2.2. lessi Z⇒
λW
λx
Ewi
~
w
w
wi .p = wi .g
wi . f = ∂(x)(ρ(wi))
; W(w̃i)
2.3. /0ABSi Z⇒
λW
λx
Ewi
~
w
w
wi .g = 0
wi . f = ∂(x)(ρ(wi))
; W(wi)
3. Numerical relations
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3.1. at leasti Z⇒
λy
λz
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
|wi | ≥ y· |∂(z)(ρ(wi))|
wi .p = wi .g
3.2. at mosti Z⇒
λy
λz
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
|wi | ≤ y· |∂(z)(ρ(wi))|
wi .p = wi .g
3.3. exactlyi Z⇒
λy
λz
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
|wi| = y· |∂(z)(ρ(wi))|
wi .p = wi .g
3.4. /0i Z⇒
λy
λz
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
|wi| = y· |∂(z)(ρ(wi))|
wi.p = wi .g
4. thani Z⇒
λy
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
wi .g = ∂(y)(ρ(wi))
These definitions are best understood by examining some examples of their application, rather
than in the abstract. We begin by considering the dynamic intepretation of ‘tall’ according to
Fragment 1 (cf. the translation given in example 4.2 above):
[
/0ABS tall
]
i Z⇒
λx
Ewi
~
w
w
HEIGHT(wi)
wi.p < wi. f
wi.g = 0
wi. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(4.6)
The interpretation of the numerical relations in Fragment 1takes advantage of the possi-
bilities offered by dynamic existential binding; the measure phraseat least two metresnow
receives the following interpretation:
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[ at least 2 metres] i Z⇒
λy
λz
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
|wi | ≥ y· |∂(z)(ρ(wi))|
wi .p = wi .g
(2)(m)
=
λz
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
|wi| ≥ 2 · |∂(z)(ρ(wi))|
wi .p = wi .g
(m)
=
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
|wi| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(wi))|
wi .p = wi .g
(4.7)
HereP andx are of type(e→ τ) ande respectively, making the type of the measure phrase
((e→ τ)→ (e→ τ)). This expression combines with the interpretation oftall obtained in (4.6)
to give us the interpretation ofat least two metres tallin (4.8) below:
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[ [ at least two metres]1 tall1]
Z⇒
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
= λx
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(x) ;
~
w
w
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
= λx Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
;
~
w
w
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
= λx Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
;
~
w
w
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
= λx Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
=
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
(4.8)
Then, applying this to the translation ‘Bob’Z⇒ b, we obtain:
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[ Bob [ is [ at least two metres]1 tall1]]
Z⇒
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
(b)
= Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(b)(HEIGHT)
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
(4.9)
Thestatic (i.e., truth conditional) content of this expression can beo tained using the closure
operator⇓ (Definition 36), in combination with the reduction rules forDMG:
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w
w
 Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(b)(HEIGHT)
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
= Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(b)(HEIGHT)
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
(∧⊤)
=
λp
∃w1
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(b)(HEIGHT)
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
∨p
(∧⊤)
= ∃w1
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(b)(HEIGHT)
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
∨∧⊤
= ∃w1
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(b)(HEIGHT)
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
(4.10)
4.5.1 The Than-Phrase as Modifier
We can also treat thethan-phrase complement as an optional modifier of the comparative (cf.
Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2): in a dynamic setting, ‘than’ takes an argument of typeand produces
a than-phrase of type((e→ τ) → (e→ τ)); e.g., given that ‘John’Z⇒ j, we have
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[ than John] i Z⇒
λy
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
wi .g = ∂(y)(ρ(wi)) ( j)
=
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
wi.g = ∂( j)(ρ(wi))
(4.11)
Since thethan-phrase is now of type((e→ τ) → (e→ τ)), this means that we can simplify
the translations for the comparative markers ‘more/-er’ and ‘less’ as shown in Fragment 1.
Consequently, the comparative form ‘taller’ receives the following translation, of type(e→ τ):
[ taller] i Z⇒
λx
Ewi
~
w
w
HEIGHT(wi)
wi .p < wi . f
wi .p = wi .g
wi . f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(4.12)
We then combine (4.11) and (4.12) to obtain
[ [ taller]1 [ than John]1]
Z⇒
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
w1.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w1))
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
= λx
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(x) ;
~
w
w
w1.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w1))
= λx Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
;
~
w
w
w1.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w1))
Since(Ex.φ) ; ψ ≡ (Ex.φ ; ψ), this is equivalent to:
λx Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
;
~
w
w
w1.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w1))
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Further reduction then gives us the following translation of ‘taller than John’, of type(e→ τ):
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
w1.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w1))
(4.13)
Note that the discourse markerw1 is still accessible for further modification, for example bya
measure phrase such as ‘at least two metres’:
[ [ at least two metres]1 [ taller than John]1]
Z⇒
λP
λx
P(x) ;
~
w
w
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
w1.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w1))
= λx
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
w1.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w1))
(x) ;
~
w
w
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
a derivation similar to (4.8) above then gives us (4.14) as the translation of ‘at least two metres
taller than John’:
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
w1.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w1))
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
(4.14)
The resulting expression is of type( → τ), and thus combines with a subject of typee to
give a proposition of typeτ:12
12For convenience, we employ the basic type rather than the princi al ultrafilter, as is standard in Montague
Grammar and Generalised Quantifier Theory.
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[ Bob [ is [ at least two metres taller than John]1]]
Z⇒
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
w1.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w1))
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
(b)
= Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(b)(HEIGHT)
w1.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w1))
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
(4.15)
As before, we can extract the static truth conditions using the closure operator,⇓, to obtain
(4.16).
∃w1
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(b)(HEIGHT)
w1.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w1))
|w1| ≥ 2 · |∂(m)(ρ(w1))|
(4.16)
4.6 Coordination and Existential Disclosure
We can extend generalised conjunction to a dynamic setting by systematically replacing typet
with typeτ:
Definition 38 (Dynamic Generalised Conjunction) Given expressions A1, A2 of type(ζ1 →
(ζ2 → ·· ·(ζn → τ))), their conjunction is given by:
A1 and A2 Z⇒ λβ1 . . .λβn.A1′(β1) · · ·(βn) ; A2′(β1) · · ·(βn)
where each variableβi is of typeζi , for i = 1, . . . ,n.
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Let us note that this immediately gives us the intuitively correct interpretation in the case of
unmodified adjectives (cf. Section 4.3 above):
[ [
/0ABS tall
]
1 and
[
/0ABS heavy
]
2
]
Z⇒ λz
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(z) ;
λy
Ew2
~
w
w
WEIGHT(w2)
w2.p < w2. f
w2.g = 0
w2. f = ∂(y)(WEIGHT)
(z)
= λz Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(z)(HEIGHT)
; Ew2
~
w
w
WEIGHT(w2)
w2.p < w2. f
w2.g = 0
w2. f = ∂(z)(WEIGHT)
The resulting phrase is of the same type as the conjoined constituents, viz.,(e→ τ). Given the
translation ‘Bob’Z⇒ b, and assuming the semantic transparency of ‘be’, we obtain the following
interpretation for the clauseBob is tall and heavy:
[
Bob
[
is
[ [
/0ABS tall
]
1 and
[
/0ABS heavy
]
2
]]]
Z⇒ λz Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(z)(HEIGHT)
; Ew2
~
w
w
WEIGHT(w2)
w2.p < w2. f
w2.g = 0
w2. f = ∂(z)(WEIGHT)
(b)
= Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(b)(HEIGHT)
; Ew2
~
w
w
WEIGHT(w2)
w2.p < w2. f
w2.g = 0
w2. f = ∂(b)(WEIGHT)
As before, we extract the truth-conditions of the dynamic expr ssion by means of the closure
operation⇓ and the reduction rules in Definition 37 to obtain the static expr ssion in (4.17)
below, which is an intuitively plausible representation ofthe truth conditions of the sentence
Bob is tall and heavy.
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∃w1
∃w2
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(b)(HEIGHT)
WEIGHT(w2)
w2.p < w2. f
w2.g = 0
w2. f = ∂(b)(WEIGHT)
(4.17)
We also obtain the correct interpretation in cases where individual conjuncts undergo modi-
fication by a measure phrase orthan-phrase; for example, the phraseten centimetres taller than
Eve and 5 centimetres shorter than Johnreceives the following dynamic interpretation:
[ [ 10 cm. taller than Eve]1 and[ 5 cm. shorter than John]2]
Z⇒ λz Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.p = w1.g
w1. f = ∂(z)(HEIGHT)
w1.g = ∂(e)(ρ(w1))
|w1| = 10· |∂(cm)(ρ(w1))|
; Ew2
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w2)
w2.p > w2. f
w2.p = w2.g
w2. f = ∂(z)(HEIGHT)
w2.g = ∂( j)(ρ(w2))
|w2| = 5 · |∂(cm)(ρ(w2))|
However, examples where the modifier applies to the conjunctio as a wholeare still problem-
atic. We have in mind sentences such as the following:
(95) a. The painting is[ 20 centimetres]? [ tall1 and wide2]
b. Bob is[ taller1 and heavier2] [ than John]?
We can see the problem easily if we consider that the translations assigned to measure phrases
andthan-phrases by Fragment 1 contain asingleindexed discourse marker, while a coordinate
construction contains at least two (and possibly more) discourse markers. If the conjuncts
have different indices, then the modifier can at most modify one f them (viz., the one bearing
the same index); if we were to assignall the conjuncts the same index, then the only the
last conjunct will be modified, in accordance with the dynamic behaviour of the existential
quantifier. In any case, the indexing scheme used in Fragment1 is inadequate, and provides
at best a partial solution to the problem posed by intersectiv onstructions. While it might be
possible to extend or modify the indexing mechanism to handle the case illustrated in (95), we
129
will develop an account that relies on a different semantic me hanism for combining modifiers
and modified expressions.
4.6.1 Existential Disclosure Revisited
Zwarts and Winter [182] have suggested a parallel between thinterpretation of conjoined
PPs under modification and the phenomenon of wide-scope coordination in NPs. One strat-
egy for dealing with wide-scope coordination is makes use ofhigher types; thus, Partee and
Rooth [129] note that one can obtain the correct reading for sentences such as (94), repeated
here for convenience as (96), by assigning interpretationsof higher type to the common nouns,
as in Definition 39 below13.
(96) a. Most [cats and dogs] swim.
b. Most cats swim and most dogs swim.
Definition 39 (Flip-Flop) Let the phrase A have typeα, and letβ be any type. Then A has a
translation A′′ of type((α → β) → β) in addition to its translation A′ of typeα:
A′′ , λF.F(A′),
where F is a variable of type(α → β).
This corresponds to the application of the type-raising combinatorC∗ of Curry and Feys [30]:
Definition 40 (C∗)
C∗x, λp.px
The effect of the higher type is to reverse the function-argument application order in the con-
struction[ Det CN], which has the effect of distributing the quantifiermostacross the conjoined
elements. Although the free application of type raising expr ssed in the ‘Flip-Flop’ rule is ul-
timately at odds with Partee and Rooth’s “lazy” approach to type-shifting (according to which
types combine at the lowest possible level, and only shift ifrequired to do so by the mechanism
of semantic composition), there are more “liberal” systemswith flexible type raising which
allow such higher types to be freely derived.14
13The formulation is due to Partee and Rooth [129], who credit it to Robin Cooper.
14Cf. Dowty [38], Hendriks [69]. The terms “lazy” and “liberal” are used by Winter [174, Chapter 4] to
characterise the two fundamental attitudes to type shifting: the “lazy” approach, exemplified by Partee and Rooth
[129], maintains that type shifting is an interpretive process of last resort, to be done only if necessary, while
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Instead of making implicit use of disclosure, as in the definitio s in Fragment 1, we will
employ an explicit operation that both discloses and abstract over the existentially bound dis-
course marker; such a disclosure operation was originally introduced by Paul Dekker in [35],
[36], and Definition 41 presents the (simplified) formulation due to Chierchia [25, p. 104]).
Definition 41 (Existential Disclosure) We define thexistential disclosureof a discourse marker
d of typeδ in a formulaφ, Λd.φ, as:
Λd.φ, λx.φ ;⇑{x = d}
where x is a variable of typeδ.
As can be seen from this definition, the operation abstracts over a variablex, which is also
identified with the discourse markerd; if φ is of typeη, the effect of disclosure is to create and
expression of type(δ → η).
We can regard the Dekker-Chierchia formulation of existential disclosure in Definition 41
as a specific instance of a higher-order disclosure operation, which we refer to asED in Defini-
tion 42 below:
Definition 42 (ED) We define thehigher-order existential disclosureof dynamic marker d of
typeδ in a formulaφ, EDd{φ}, as:
EDd{φ}, λP.φ ; P(d)
where P is a variable of type(δ → τ).
The Dekker-Chierchia formulation can be recovered in termsof ED as follows:
Λd.φ, λx.EDd{φ}(λy. ⇑{x = y}) (4.18)
It is straightforward to check that this is equivalent to Definition 41.
In order to be able to apply this operation to expressions containi g lambda abstractions,
we need to extend the definition slightly:
the “liberal” approach, of which Hendriks [69] is a good example, allows type-shifting to take place whenever
possible; for his part, Winter [174, Chapter 4] considers both positions to be incorrect, and proposes an approach
in which category shifts are triggered by syntactic mechanisms rather than semantic ones. Interestingly, such
higher types are available without explicit type-shifting“continuised” grammars, such as those investigated in
Barker [4, 6].
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Definition 43 (ED with abstraction) Let φ have the formλx1 . . .λxk.ψ. Then we define the
higher-order existential disclosure (with abstraction)f dynamic marker d of typeδ in φ,
ÊDd{φ}, as:
ÊDd{φ}, λP.λy1 . . .λyk.φ(y1) · · ·(yk) ; P(d)
where P is a variable of type(δ → τ).
We will treat ÊD as a freely applicable type-conversion rule that generatesadditional trans-
lations for expressions containing hidden parameters, as set out in Definition below.
Definition 44 (Implicit Argument Disclosure) Let the phrase A have typeα, and let d be a
discourse marker of typeδ occurring in A. Then A has a translation A′′ of type((δ → τ) → α)
in addition to its translation A′ of typeα:
A′′ , ÊDd{A
′}.
The selection of the appropriate translation during semantic composition will be determined by
the type compatibility requirements of the elements to be combined.
Fragment 2
1. Adjectival roots
1.1. tall Z⇒ λu
~
w
w
HEIGHT(u)
u.p < u. f
1.2. shortZ⇒ λu
~
w
w
HEIGHT(u)
u.p > u. f
1.3. wideZ⇒ λu
~
w
w
WIDTH(u)
u.p < u. f
1.4. narrowZ⇒ λu
~
w
w
WIDTH(u)
u.p > u. f
2. Degree terms
2.1. more / -erZ⇒
λW
λx
Ewi
~
w
w
wi .p = wi .g
wi . f = ∂(x)(ρ(wi))
; W(wi)
2.2. lessZ⇒
λW
λx
Ewi
~
w
w
wi .p = wi .g
wi . f = ∂(x)(ρ(wi))
; W(w̃i)
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2.3. /0ABS Z⇒
λW
λx
Ewi
~
w
w
wi .g = 0
wi . f = ∂(x)(ρ(wi))
; W(wi)
3. Numerical relations
3.1. at leastZ⇒
λy
λz
λu
~
w
w
|u| ≥ y· |∂(z)(ρ(u))|
u.p = u.g
3.2. at mostZ⇒
λy
λz
λu
~
w
w
|u| ≤ y· |∂(z)(ρ(u))|
u.p = u.g
3.3. exactlyZ⇒
λy
λz
λu
~
w
w
|u| = y· |∂(z)(ρ(u))|
u.p = u.g
3.4. /0 Z⇒
λy
λz
λu
~
w
w
|u| = y· |∂(z)(ρ(u))|
u.p = u.g
4. thanZ⇒
λy
λu
~
w
w
u.g = ∂(y)(ρ(u))
Fragment 2 gives us the same basic translation for ‘tall’ as Fr gment 1, repeated here for con-
venience as (4.19):
[
/0ABS tall
]
i Z⇒
λx
Ewi
~
w
w
HEIGHT(wi)
wi.p < wi. f
wi.g = 0
wi. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(4.19)
However, in virtue of Definition 44, we now have the followingadditionalexistentially dis-
closedtranslation of ‘tall’, of type((v3 → τ) → (e→ τ)), obtained from the basic translation
(of type(e→ τ)) by means ofÊD:
[
/0ABS tall
]
Z⇒
λR
λx
Ewi
~
w
w
HEIGHT(wi)
wi .p < wi . f
wi .g = 0
wi . f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
; R(wi) (4.20)
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This expression takes a modifierR of type (v3 → τ) as an argument. Fragment 2 assigns the
type(v3 → τ) to both measure phrases and ‘than’-phrases; for example, the measure phrase ‘53
centimetres’ has the interpretation:
[ 53 centimetres] Z⇒ λu
~
w
w
|u| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(u))|
u.p = u.g
(4.21)
Combining the MP ‘53 centimetres’ with the disclosed interpr tation of ‘tall’ gives us:
[
[ 53 centimetres]
[
/0ABS tall
]]
Z⇒
λR
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
; R(w1) λu
~
w
w
|u| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(u))|
u.p = u.g
= λx Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
; λu
~
w
w
|u| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(u))|
u.p = u.g
(w1)
= λx Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
;
~
w
w
|w1| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
= λx Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
|w1| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
(4.22)
We can now consider the case where the MP modifies conjoined adj ctives. We can com-
bine the existentially disclosed translations of ‘tall’ and ‘wide’, of type((v3 → τ) → (e→ τ)),
in accordance with Definition 38 of (dynamic) generalised conjunction, to obtain the following
interpretation of the phrase ‘tall and wide’, of type((v3 → τ) → (e→ τ)):
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[ [
/0ABS tall
]
and
[
/0ABS wide
]]
Z⇒
λR
λx
Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
; R(w1) ; Ew2
~
w
w
WIDTH(w2)
w2.p < w2. f
w2.g = 0
w2. f = ∂(x)(WIDTH)
; R(w2)
(4.23)
This expression takes a modifierR of type(v3 → τ) as argument and distributes it across both
conjuncts. Combining this with the measure phrase gives us:
[
[ 53 cm.]
[ [
/0ABS tall
]
and
[
/0ABS wide
]]]
Z⇒
λx Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
|w1| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
; Ew2
~
w
w
WIDTH(w2)
w2.p < w2. f
w2.g = 0
w2. f = ∂(x)(WIDTH)
|w2| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(w2))|
w2.p = w2.g
(4.24)
The result is an expression of type( → τ), which combines with an expression of typee to
yield a context change potential. For example, lettingr denote Kasimir Malevich’s painting
Red Square,15 we can describe its proportions thus:
15Kasimir Malevich (1915),Red Square: Painterly Realism of a Peasant Woman in Two Dimensions, oil on
canvas; State Russian Museum, St. Petersburg.
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[
the Red Square
[
is [ 53 cm.]
[ [
/0ABS tall
]
and
[
/0ABS wide
]]]]
Z⇒ λx Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
|w1| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
; Ew2
~
w
w
WIDTH(w2)
w2.p < w2. f
w2.g = 0
w2. f = ∂(x)(WIDTH)
|w2| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(w2))|
w2.p = w2.g
(r)
= Ew1
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(r)(HEIGHT)
|w1| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
; Ew2
~
w
w
WIDTH(w2)
w2.p < w2. f
w2.g = 0
w2. f = ∂(r)(WIDTH)
|w2| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(w2))|
w2.p = w2.g
(4.25)
As before, we unveil the truth-conditional content of this expression by applying the closure
operation⇓ to it, and reducing the expression in accordance with Definition 37. It is straight-
forward to check that this gives us the static expression in (4.26) below, which is an intuitively
plausible representation of the truth conditions of the sentencethe Red Square is 53 cm. tall
and wide.
∃w1
∃w2
HEIGHT(w1)
w1.p < w1. f
w1.g = 0
w1. f = ∂(r)(HEIGHT)
|w1| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(w1))|
w1.p = w1.g
WIDTH(w2)
w2.p < w2. f
w2.g = 0
w2. f = ∂(r)(WIDTH)
|w2| = 53· |∂(cm)(ρ(w2))|
w2.p = w2.g
(4.26)
4.6.2 Modifiers as Arguments
There are certain points worth noting in connection with theop ration of Implicit Argument
Disclosure (IAD), as set out in Definition 44 above: (i) IAD applies to expressions of any
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category: it allows forany expression with a hidden parameter,x, to take modifiers ofx as
arguments; (ii) it does not require us to spell out in advanceexactly what those modifiers will
be (say, in the lexical definition), or the order of their occurrence; (iii) the disclosure operation
is iterable, thus ensuring that there will be as many or as few modifier argument places as
required; (iv) IAD is not restricted to any particular type of hidden parameter (these can be
L-structures, vectors, degrees, events, etc.).
Thus in Fragment 2, MPs andthan-phrases are interpreted as properties of L-structures, and
assigned logical translations of type(v3 → τ), in keeping with the analysis of these expressions
as modifying expressions. Yet IAD allows us to treat these modifiers as formalargumentsof the
(existentially disclosed) modified expression. Hence the approach to modification presented in
this section blurs the line between modifiers and arguments.
Metaphorically speaking, we can describe this process as one in which an expression “grows”
additional argument places to absorb modifiers of the appropriate type.
4.7 Linking L-Structures and Sentences
We have not yet considered the way in which L-Structures linkup with sentences in cases
where the predication applies to more than one subject, suchas, for example, cases where the
subject NP contains a quantifier or a conjunction, as in (97) below.
(97) a. All footballers are rich.
b. Bob and Eve are tall.
c. All Bob’s relatives are tall.
These cases are important because there are cases where morethan one standard of evaluation
may enter into the interpretation of a sentence. In example (97a), one might argue that a single
standard for wealth applies to the entire class of footballers, but (97c) and (97b) are more
problematic; these examples both have readings where different standards of evaluation may
apply to the subject of the predication. For example, there is a reading of (97b) on which
different standards of tallness are associated with the diff rent genders of Bob and Eve, making
Bob tall for a man and Eve tall for a woman; in the case of (97c),there are potentially variations
of not only gender but also age to consider.
Clearly, although (97c) and (97b) only contain a single token of the adjective ‘tall’, there
must be more than one perspectival parameter available in order to accommodate the (poten-
tially) multiple standards of tallness that might be relevant to the interpretation of the sentence.
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We need a distinct L-Structure for each individualact of predication: in the case of the univer-
sal quantifier, there is an act of predication for each element in the quantifier’s domain, while
in the case of the conjunction there is an act of predication for each conjoined element.
All the elements we require to handle these cases are alreadyavailable in Dynamic Mon-
tague Grammar.16 First, we interpret ‘Bob’ and ‘Eve’ as higher-order functors λF.F(bob) and
λF.F(eve), of type((e→ τ) → τ).17 In accordance with the rule for generalised conjunction,
we then obtain the following translation for ‘Bob and Eve’:
[ Bob and Eve] Z⇒ λP P(bob) ; P(eve) (4.27)
Assuming the copula to be semantically transparent, we havet e following translation for ‘are
tall’ (see Section 4.5 above):
[
/0ABS tall
]
Z⇒
λx
Ew
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(4.28)
16The DRT-based formulation we employed in Section 3.6.2 of Chapter 3 would need to be enriched in order to
cope with quantification and conjunction, e.g., along the lin s of Kamp and Reyle [83, Chapter 2]; the linking of L-
Structures to sentences could then be accomplished by introducing the L-Structure using existential quantification,
with anaphoric links in the body of the formula, in line with Kamp and Reyles semantics for pronouns (Alex
Lascarides, personal communication).
17According to the canonical version of Dynamic Montague Grammar, due to Groenendijk and Stokhof [60], the
higher-order translation of ‘Bob’ should beλF.F(⇑bob); however, for consistency with the foregoing discussion,
we shall retain the simpler types we have been employing thusfar, in line with Chierchia [25].
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Applying the functor (in this case, the conjoined subject) to the translation of the predicate
gives us the result in (4.29) below:
[
[ Bob and Eve]
[
are /0ABS tall
]]
Z⇒ λP P(bob) ; P(eve)
λx
Ew
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
Z⇒
λx
Ew
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(bob) ;
λx
Ew
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(eve)
Z⇒ Ew
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(bob)(HEIGHT)
; Ew
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(eve)(HEIGHT)
(4.29)
As we can see, the predicate is distributed across the conjunction, and so there exists a distinct
L-Structure for each conjunct, each with its own perspectival parameter which can be anchored
to a (potentially) different standard of evaluation. The closure operation,⇓, then straightfor-
wardly gives us the following truth conditions:
[
[ Bob and Eve]
[
are /0ABS tall
]]
Z⇒
∃w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(bob)(HEIGHT)
∃w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(eve)(HEIGHT)
(4.30)
We now consider the case of (97c), where a gradable predicateis ttributed to a class of
individuals via universal quantification. We assign the phrase ‘all Bob’s relatives’ the following
translation (glossing over the compositional details of the possessive construction):
[ all Bob’s relatives] Z⇒
λF
Ay
~
w
w
RELATIVE-OF-BOB(y) ; F(y) (4.31)
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Applying the translation of the quantifier to that of the predicate, we obtain the following:
[
[ all Bob’s relatives]
[
are /0ABS tall
]]
Z⇒
λF
Ay
~
w
w
RELATIVE-OF-BOB(y) ; F(y)
λx
Ew
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
Z⇒ Ay
~
w
w
RELATIVE-OF-BOB(y) ;
λx
Ew
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(x)(HEIGHT)
(y)
Z⇒ Ay
~
w
w
RELATIVE-OF-BOB(y) ; Ew
~
w
w
HEIGHT(w)
w.p < w. f
w.g = 0
w. f = ∂(y)(HEIGHT)
(4.32)
This case involves both existential quantification over L-structures and universal quantification
over individuals. Note that the order of the quantifiers is crucial in determining the correct
interpretation: since the universal quantifier here takes wide scope over the existential, we get
an interpretation in which there exists an L-Structure for each element of the domain, which
may be anchored to a different standard in each case, as required.
4.8 Conclusion
One motivation for employing a dynamic semantics is to capture anaphoric dependencies in-
volving L-structures, such as those mentioned in Section 2.4 at the end of Chapter 2, where we
suggested that gradable adjectives exhibit similar types of deictic and anaphoric context depen-
dency as pronominal expressions, and again in Section 3.6.2of Chapter 3, where we showed
how this could be modelled in the context of a dynamic theory of semantic meaning.
In this chapter, we addressed two important problems faced by LSS and similar theories,
such as VSS, namely, theCoordination Problemand theDivergent Type Problem(cf. Chapter 1,
Section 1.3.5). We showed that both problems disappear oncethe L-structure parameter is ex-
istentially closed; however, this comes at the cost of making the parameter unavailable for fur-
ther modification. However, this restriction is not presentin a dynamic theory such as Dynamic
Binding (Chierchia [25]) or Dynamic Montague Grammar (Groenendijk and Stokhof [60]),
where the objects introduced into the discourse context by existentially quantified parameters
remain available for optional further specification.
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The fundamental feature of dynamic semantics is that existent ally quantified objects are not
completely closed off to further specification. As Paul Dekkr originally noted (Dekker [35],
[36]), this means that implicit arguments can be ‘hidden’ byexistentially quantifying over them
in the lexicon, while remaining accessible to further specification by modifier phrases. This has
two consequences. First, by existentially quantifying over th L-structure parameter, and thus
hiding it, a gradable adjective can be interpreted as a (dynamic) property of individuals (i.e.,
a function from individuals to context change potentials),in exactly the same way as non-
gradable adjectives and other predicates. The dynamic interpretation of the quantifiers and
connectives in DB/DMG allows existential quantifiers to bind variables outside their syntactic
scope, and, under certain circumstances, it also allows modifying expressions to make reference
to existentially quantified variables that would be inaccessible in a ‘static’ semantics. Using
Dekker’s notion ofexistential disclosure, we showed how a modifying expression could still
access an existentially quantified L-structure parameter as if it were a free variable.
In Section 4.6, we discussed the extension of generalised conjunction to a dynamic setting,
and noted that hiding the L-structure parameter, by itself,provides at best apartial resolution
to the Coordination Problem. The recalcitrant cases involved constructions in which a single
modifier applies to the conjoined adjectives, as in Example 95, where the MP ‘20 centimetres’
in the sentence ‘The painting is[ 20 centimetres[ tall and wide]]’ modifies the conjunction ‘tall
and wide’. This led us to adopt a more radical approach, basedon a mechanism we called
Implicit Argument Disclosure(IAD), on which certain modifiers are treated as arguments of
the expressions they modify (cf. Definition 44). In Section 4.6.2, we observed that the IAD
provides a systematic way of treating modifiers of hidden parameters as arguments, and noted
that this undermines the distinction between arguments andmodifiers.
In sum, we have shown that it is possible to construct a scalartheory of gradable adjectives
in which gradable share the same (dynamic) type as non-gradable adjectives and other predi-
cates. Moreover, we have shown that, using the same formal devices, it is possible to develop an
L-structure based semantics for gradable adjectives that is compatible with a dynamic form of
generalised Boolean coordination, thereby resolving the Coordination Problem inherited from
VSS.
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Chapter 5
Loose Ends and Conclusions
5.1 Introduction
We begin this chapter by addressing some foundational assumptions of the representational
framework developed over the last few chapters. First, Section 5.2 examines the topic of vague-
ness, which is a characteristic of most if not all gradable adj ctives. Section 5.3 then considers
the informational structure of the dimensions associated with gradable adjectives, and in par-
ticular the assumption that adjectival dimensions should be based on ordered linear scales.
In Section 5.4, we move on to consider an extension of our theory to the case of adverbial
modifiers. Although this still counts as work in progress, weshow how several aspects of
our theory can be straightforwardly adapted to an event-based framework, along the lines of
Section 3.2.
Finally, section 5.5 concludes with a brief recapitulationof the main points of our thesis,
and a brief statement of its contribution and possible further development.
5.2 Vagueness
5.2.1 Vagueness and Locatives
The general hypothesis that gradable adjectives are semantically akin to locatives encourages
us to treat the vagueness of adjectives as a subtype of the vagu ness of locatives. In itself, this
view is agnostic among specific theories of vagueness; it merely requires us to handle adjectives
and locatives in the same way—whatever that may be. Note thatalthough this view may be
noncommittal regarding which theory of vagueness is correct, it is still open to empirical refu-
tation: for example, if adjectives turned out to display a very different kind of vague behaviour
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from locatives, then this would count against treating the former as a species of the latter.1
Prima facie, there appear to be some telling similarities betwe n adjectives and locatives in
this regard. As we pointed out in Section 2.5, spatial expression , tenses, and gradable adjec-
tives all appear to exhibit both indexicality and vagueness. For example, the spatial locatives
‘here’ and ‘there’, and the temporal locatives ‘now’ and ‘then’, are vague, in addition to be-
ing indexical: roughly, ‘here’ and ‘there’ refer to a contrast between a region that includes
the speaker’s location, and another region that does not. Similarly for the temporal locatives
‘now’ and ‘then’. The extent of this region is highly variable, and is sensitive to context. But
in addition to being contextually variable, the region is usually vague; that is, even when the
contextual factors are fixed, the boundary of the region willstill be ‘fuzzy’.
5.2.2 Vagueness versus Gradability
Gradable adjectives are a typically vague, and vagueness isan important topic in the semantics
of adjectives; for example, Kamp develops a contextualisedversion of supervaluationism in
[84], which has been influential in later work by Klein [95][96][97] and others.
Nevertheless, even though most (if not all) gradable predicates found “in the wild” are also
vague, gradability and vagueness remainco ceptuallydistinct notions: whereas gradability is
characterised by the possession of a property to varying degrees, vagueness is (traditionally)
characterised by the possession of borderline cases (see e.g. Ke fe and Smith [89, ch. 1]), and
the lack of well-defined extensions (cf. Sainsbury [138, pp.251–253]). It is perfectly possible
to conceive of a language which is vague but not gradable, andvice versa.
In addition to being gradable, the adjective ‘tall’ is vagueb cause there are borderline
cases which are neither clearly tall nor clearly non-tall, and for which no further empirical
or analytical investigation will be able to establish whether they are tall or not. Of course,
different standards of evaluation may apply to ‘tall’, according to contextual factors such as
speaker intention and the kind of thing being described: e.g., Bob may consider a Rolex watch
expensive, while to Bill it might seem affordable or even cheap; an adult male of height 180
cm. may be tall for a Vietnamese, for example, but may not be tall for a Dutchman; and so
on. Crucially, however, this relativisation to context does nothing to eliminate the existence
of borderline cases per se: there will still be Vietnamese men, shorter than 180 cm., who are
borderline tall for a Vietnamese, and Dutchmen, taller than180 cm., who are borderline tall for
a Dutchman. No matter how detailed the specification, e.g., ‘expensive for a 18-carat vintage
1Of course, we must also consider that examples of vagueness can be found across most if not all grammatical
categories—e.g, see Keefe [87, ch. 1].
143
Swiss gold watch’, ‘tall for a fourteenth-century German adult female peasant’, etc., the use
of a vague term will still generally present borderline cases. This ineliminability of borderline
cases that is one of the hallmarks of true vagueness.
It is important to be clear about this distinction between gradability and vagueness, because
there exist both degree-based theories of gradability and degree-based theories of vagueness,
namely those which employ an infinite-valued, or ‘fuzzy’, logic—see Section 5.2.5.2 below;
however, while the model of gradable adjectives we have present d is basically a type of degree-
based theory, we do not advocate a degree-based treatment ofvagueness. Instead, we will adopt
a thoroughly epistemic view of vagueness phenomena.
5.2.3 Higher-Order Vagueness and Sharpness in Semantics
An striking feature of vagueness is that it isrecursive, a phenomenon commonly referred to as
‘higher-order’ vagueness. Borderline cases typically have borderline cases, where it is unclear
whether something counts as a borderline case (the existence of borderline borderline cases has
been recognised by commentators at least since Russell [137]; e.g., see Keefe and Smith [89,
pp. 14–17] for discussion).
Consider a hypothetical predicateF that has a sharply-delineated set of clear positive cases,
a sharply-delineated set of clear negative cases, and a sharply-delineated set of borderline cases.
AlthoughF does have borderline cases, in the sense of there being instance which are neither
clearlyF nor clearly not-F, the predicate is not vague; in the same way as ‘tall’, ‘big’,‘rich’,
etc.; English predicates do not exhibit such a sharp division between positive, negative, and
intermediate cases.
The fact that vagueness is itself vague has important consequences for our semantics, be-
cause the recursive nature of vagueness makes it awkward to speak of the ‘class’ or ‘set’ of
borderline cases, for the simple reason that classes areex ctobjects. In classical logical se-
mantics, a predicate has a meaning which determines its extension, the class of all things of
which it is true. Classes (and therefore sets) are objects with sharp boundaries: for any class
and any entity, either that entity belongs to the class, or itdoes not. A semantics based on
exact objects, such as classical set theory, thus inescapably entails sharp boundaries (cf. Sains-
bury [138, pp. 252–253]). So long as our semantics is couchedin an exact metalanguage, then
predicates will always be assigned exact extensions, and setences will always be assigned
exact truth values. This applies to all theories which attempt to model vagueness using exact
methods, including supervaluationism and many-valued logics (cf. Section 5.2.5 below).
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5.2.4 The Sorites Paradox
In addition to the existence of borderline cases and the lackof well-defined extensions, another
important characteristic of vague predicates is that they give rise to sorites paradoxes (cf. Keefe
and Smith [89, ch. 1]) such as the following:
(98) Basis premise: a collection of one billion grains of sand is a heap.
Induction hypothesis: if a collection ofn grains of sand is a heap, then a collection
of n−1 grains of sand is a heap.
Conclusion: a collection of one grain of sand is a heap.
Starting with an uncontroversial premise, we arrive at the conclusion that even a single grain is
a heap; conversely, we can take the negation of the conclusion a ur starting point, as in (99),
and show that no collection is a heap, no matter how many grains of sand it contains.
(99) Basis premise: a collection of one grain of sand is not a heap.
Induction hypothesis: if a collection ofn grains of sand is not a heap, then a collec-
tion of n+1 grains of sand is not a heap.
Conclusion: a collection of a billion grains of sand is not a heap.
Depending on our starting point, we end up with the result that either every collection of
grains of sand is a heap, or none is. Clearly, something is amis.
The classic sorites argument has the form of a mathematical induction, in which the first
premise is obviously true, and the conclusion is obviously fa se. The induction hypothesis in
both examples reflects a intuition that the addition or subtraction of a single grain of sand does
not make a difference to whether a collection is a heap. It is important to note, however, that
the intuitive reasonableness of the induction hypothesis is highly dependent on the size of the
interval employed: the interval chosen must be small enoughto be considered insignificant. The
trick to setting up the paradox is to make the steps so small that one is not able to distinguish
the lastP because it is too close to the first non-P. For example, while an interval of 1 mm.
is not enough to make a difference between being tall or not, as in example (100) below, an
interval of 1 metre is too large for the appearance of paradoxto arise, as in (101).
(100) Basis premise: a person of height 1 metre is not tall.
Induction hypothesis: if a person of heightn metres is not tall, then a person of
heightn+0.001 metres is not tall.
Conclusion: a person of height 2 metres is not tall.
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(101) Basis premise: a person of height 1 metre is not tall.
Induction hypothesis: if a person of heightn metres is not tall, then a person of
heightn+1 metres is not tall.
Conclusion: a person of height 2 metres is not tall.
However, despite the difference in assertibility between the apparently reasonable induction
hypothesis in (100) and the seemingly unreasonable induction hypothesis in (101), the former
in fact logically entails the latter. Moreover, the point atwhich an interval is small enough to
count as insignificant is itself indeterminate, and may varyaccording to the kind of entity under
consideration. Thus, while the interval of 1 metre used in the induction hypothesis in (101) is
clearly clearly false with respect to people, it appears farmo e reasonable when ‘tall’ is applied
to buildings, as in (102) below; an interval of 1 metre, though large relative to the height of a
human being, is far less significant in the case of large modern buildings.
(102) Basis premise: a tower of height 1 metre is not tall.
Induction hypothesis: if a tower of heightn metres is not tall, then a tower of height
n+1 metres is not tall.
Conclusion: a tower of height 1000 metres is not tall.
From the standpoint of classical logic, the falsity of the con lusion requires us to reject
one of the two premises. The ‘paradox’ has a clear and simple solution: we simply reject the
induction hypothesis. However, by rejecting the inductionhypothesis we are thereby compelled
to accept its negation, and therefore to acknowledge that there exist sharp boundaries for vague
concepts: for example, there is somen such thatn grains of sand form a heap, butn−1 grains
of sand do not; and there is somesuch that a human being is tall atm centimetres, but no
longer tall atm−1 centimetres.
5.2.5 Theories of Vagueness
If we accept the classical solution, then many of our concepts have boundaries that we do
not know, and perhapscannotknow. This view is known asepistemicism; representatives
of contemporary epistemicism include Cargile [23], Campbell [21], Williamson [171][172],
and Sorensen [148][149], among others (although the view itself arguably goes back as far as
the Stoic logician Chrysippus; see Williamson [172, ch. 1] for discussion). On an epistemic
view, vagueness is a matter of ignorance: for every gradablepredicateF, there exists a precise
threshold between beingF and being not-F, even if we are ignorant of where it lies.
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The reluctance to accept the classical solution to the sorites paradox has given rise to several
alternative accounts of vagueness. These typically deviate from classical logic in some way,
either in terms of their semantics or in terms of the theoremsand rules of inference of the
logic itself—and sometimes both (see Keefe and Smith [89, ch. 1] for a survey of the dominant
contemporary approaches).
We can divide theories of vagueness into two broad groups, according to the methods they
employ. The first group of theories views vagueness as in someense irreducible; since almost
all concepts lack boundaries, they regard classical logic and set theory as simply of very little
use as far as natural languages are concerned. Michael Tye [160] and Mark Sainsbury [138], for
example, have argued for an alternative semantics that eschew classical set theory completely
in favour of one based on truly vague entities. Another possibility is to the use of a semantic
metalanguage that is itself fundamentally vague, such as English or another natural language.
‘Ontic’ approaches regard vagueness primarily as a matter of he world, rather than one of logic
or language; for example, many commonplace objects, such aslouds, lakes and mountains,
appear to have fuzzy spatial boundaries.2
The second group, despite rejecting the standard logical acount, nevertheless attempts to
explain vagueness using exact methods based on logic and mathe tics. Prominent among
these are supervaluationism and many-valued logic; while both of these approaches depart
from classical semantics and logic in some way, they attemptto reserve as much of classical
logic as possible.
5.2.5.1 Supervaluationism
Consider a propositionp containing a vague predicateF. According to the supervaluationist,
borderline cases give rise to truth-value gaps, wherep is neither true nor false. However,
borderline cases are also potentially instances ofF, as well as not-F, and there are situations
under which borderline cases could become clear cases.
Supervaluationism models the potential meaning of vague expressions using the notion of
a precisification: while holding the clear cases ofF constant, the borderline cases are varied.
The set of all precisifications can be thought of as capturingthe range of potential meanings of
the vague predicateF . For each precisification ofF, we can assignp a standard (total rather
than partial) classical valuation, and doing this for everyp ecisifications produces a set of
2Parsons [125], Tye [160], and Zemach [177] argue in support of the existence of vague objects, while
Evans [43] presents an influential contrary view. One potential problem with recognising vague objects is that
they can easily give rise to sorites paradoxes of their own—cf. Unger [161][162] and Geach [56].
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classical valuations. A ‘supervaluation’ is then simply a function of the proposition’s classical
valuations.
A supervaluationist takes the truth of a proposition to be its ‘supervaluation’: the proposi-
tion is True (or ‘super-true’) if it is classically true under very valuation, and False (or ‘super-
false’) if it is classically false under every valuation. The remaining cases are those in which
the proposition lacks a defined super-truth value, because it comes out true under some pre-
cisifications but not others; these correspond to the borderline cases, and these propositions are
neither True nor False.
In virtue of the analysis of truth as super-truth, a compoundstatement may have a truth value
even in cases where its component statements do not (cf., Lewis [111], Fine [51], Kamp [84],
Keefe [87]). Thus, a disjunction of the formp∪¬p, for example, ‘Either Bill is tall or it is not
the case that Bill is tall’, is True because it is super-true;i.e., it comes out true under all ways
of making ‘tall’ precise.
In this way, supervaluationism promises to do justice to ourintuitions regarding statements
containing vague predicates, while preserving the theorems of classical logic (see Keefe [87,
p. 17]). However, while supervaluationism may converge with classical logic with regard to
theoremhood, it certainly does not preserve classical rules of inference, as it rejects contrapo-
sition, conditional proof, and proof by contradiction (e.g., see Williamson [172, pp. 151–152]
and Machina [112]).
Ruling out the empty extension for ‘tall’, then the statement “There is a person who is
tall whenn centimetres tall, but not when−1 centimetres tall” is true under all admissible
precisifications of ‘tall’, and therefore True, according to the supervaluationist.
5.2.5.2 Many-Valued Theories
Many-valued theories admit a range of truth values in addition to ‘True’ and ‘False’; the number
of values can be finite (typically three or four), or infinite,in which case it is common to use
the real numbers between 0 (False) and 1 (True). In contrast to upervaluationism, which
takes borderline statements to be truth-valueless, many-vlued approaches assign borderline
statements some intermediate truth-value between truth and falsehood.
A central duty of many-valued and ‘fuzzy’ logics, as in any logical system, is to provide a
means of calculating the truth values of complex propositions from their component parts. The
rules in such theories must cover cases where the constituents may have intermediate truth-
values. One desideratum that many-valued logicians acceptin formulating these rules is that
they should yield all the standard theorems of classical logic when the truth values have their
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limiting values of 0 and 1; in other words, they see classicallogic as a limiting case of many-
valued logic. For example, it is common to adopt rules for conjunction and disjunction which
assign to a conjunction the truth-value of the conjunct withthe lowest truth-value, and assigns
to a disjunction the truth-value of the disjunct with the highest truth-value.
However, although some theorems are preserved in the presence of intermediate values,
many of the theorems of classical logic break down; for example, supposing that the sentence
‘Bob is tall’ has a truth value of 0.5, then even a simple contradiction such as “Bob is tall and it
is not the case that Bob is tall” would be assigned a truth-value of 0.5. Similarly for the simple
tautology “Bob is tall or it is not the case that Bob is tall” (see Haack [62, ch. 11]).
The many-valued rule for disjunction also causes problems in dealing with the phenomenon
of hedging. If Alice regards Bob as a borderline case of tall man, then she cannot simply as-
sert that he is tall, nor can she simply assert that he is of average height; but she could in full
confidence make a hedged claim such as “Bob is tall or of average height”. Crucially, how-
ever, according to the standard definition of disjunction ina many-valued logic, the additional
disjuncts in a hedged claim cannot increase the degree of truth, unless one of them is more
plausible than the others. Thus, a many-valued approach is unable to explain the increased
assertibility of hedged claims in terms of an increase in their d gree of truth.
Epistemicist and supervaluationist approaches enjoy a clear advantage in this regard. For
the epistemicist, the greater assertibility of hedged statements is due to their greater probability
of truth, as opposed to a greater degree of truth; since additional disjuncts can raise proba-
bility indefinitely (up to full certainty), epistemicism correctly predicts that additional hedges
increase assertibility. On a supervaluationist account, additional disjuncts lead to truth in a
greater number of precisifications, so the supervaluationist can explain the effect of hedging on
assertibility by quantifying over precisifications.
We observed earlier (Section 5.2.2 above) that gradabilityand vagueness are conceptually
distinct notions. It is particularly important to bear thisdi tinction in mind when considering
degree-based theories of gradability, because one might betempted to think that the truth of
a predication attributing a property to an entity may vary with the degree to which the entity
possesses the property in question. That is, one might thinkat, becausea is moreF thanb,
it follows that the statement ‘A is F’ is more true than ‘B is F’; for example, given that Bob is
taller than Bill, one might could reflect this in a many-valued logic by assigning the statement
‘Bob is tall’ a higher degree of truth than to ‘Bill is tall’. However, as Klein [95] and others
have observed, we should resist making this connection between gradability and degrees of
truth: for suppose that Bob is 2 metres tall and Bill is 1.9 metres tall; then, although Bob is
taller than Bill, they are both unquestionably tall by normal st ndards. The statements ‘Bob is
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tall’ and ‘Bill is tall’ both count as fully true.
5.2.6 Epistemicism
Since the semantic framework we employ is based on the use of exact methods, our model
falls squarely in the camp of the ‘exact’ theories. We do not think that vagueness justifies the
abandonment of standard set theory and other exact methods in natural language semantics, nor
are we convinced that vagueness requires us to deviate from classical logic and semantics, pace
the proponents of many-valued logic and supervaluationism.
It is hard to find a simpler and more straightforward argumentthan the classical solution to
the sorites paradox; so much so, that it is reasonable to regard it as anexistence proofor sharp
boundaries. There is nothing fundamentally ‘paradoxical’about the so-called sorites paradox,
beyond the counterintuitive nature of its solution; the rejection of the classical solution is not
on the grounds of incorrectness, but ofincredulity.
The main source of incredulity is the claim that vague predicates have sharp boundaries,
even if we do not know where they are. This acceptance of this counterintuitive claim is not
limited to epistemicism, however: it is a characteristic ofall theories that employ an exact
semantics, and is therefore part and parcel of supervaluationism and many-valued approaches
as well. For example, the statement “A man of heightn centimetres is tall but a man of height
n− 1 centimetres is not” is true under all admissible precisifications of ‘tall’, and therefore
True for the supervaluationist. Indeed, the introduction of truth-value gaps or multiple truth-
values arguably makes the problem of sharp boundaries worse: f r xample, instead of a single
sharp boundary (between the cases that satisfy the vague predicate and those which do not),
supervaluationism introducestwosharp boundaries (one between the clearly true cases and the
borderline cases, another between the borderline cases andthe clearly false cases), while a
many-valued logic may create any number of sharp boundariesgreater than two. In the case of
a fuzzy logic, the number of sharp boundaries is infinite; anyreal number on the interval from 0
to 1, say 0.37337, creates a sharp division between those propositionswith a lower truth value
and those with an equal or higher truth-value.
The fundamental choice, therefore, is whether to retain a semantics based on the exact no-
tions of logic and set theory in the face of our metalinguistic intuitions. Among exact theories,
epistemicism has the benefit of simplicity, clarity, and preserving classical logic in its entirety
(cf. Williamson [173, p. 279]). It has the virtue of handlingthe phenomenon of higher-order
vagueness in exactly the same way as it handles first-order vagueness, as a matter of semantic
ignorance (cf. Section 5.2.3 above): the borderline instances of a predicateF arise from our ig-
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norance of the exact boundary ofF, and the borderline status of the borderline cases themselves
can be attributed to uncertainty about our own ignorance.
5.3 Scales and Vectors
5.3.1 Vector vs. Numbers
In order to be able to investigate possible parallels between spatial, temporal, and adjectival ex-
pressions, we need a common formal framework in which to represent the properties of these
different domains. There is a substantial and growing body of research into spatial models of
cognition and language, and vectors are particularly suited to modelling locations and geomet-
rical relations, especiallydistanceandrelative location, along a single or multiple dimensions.
In the case of adjectives, vectors and directed line segments (a choredvectors) can be
used to represent specific locations in a conceptual space comprised of a number of property
dimensions (HEIGHT, WEIGHT, etc.), as well as relations among these locations. The two
fundamental properties of vectors which are relevant to modelling the behaviour of gradable
adjectives are those ofmagnitudeandorientation: we use magnitude to represent the degree of
possession of a gradable property, and orientation to modelthe contrast or opposition between
antonymic pairs along the same property dimension (e.g., ‘tall’/‘short’ in the case ofHEIGHT).
Why use a vector to represent extent along a dimension, and not simply a (real) number?
One important reason is that measurement is typicallyre ational; it is expressed as the ratio
of some unit of measurement. So Bob’s height may be expressedas 6 feet, or 72 inches, or
1.8288 metres, or 1828.8 millimetres, and so on (alternative units include furlongs, fathoms,
miles, nautical miles, light years, etc.). There is no unique n mbern that corresponds to Bob’s
height; indeed, the number will vary according to the unit ofmeasurement employed, and we
could associate Bob’s height withanynumber, given a suitable choice of measure. We could,
of course, build a unit of measurement into the scale itself,in which case we would be able to
represent height by a bare numerical value, and specify somen asthe representation of Bob’s
height. However, we do not think that it is appropriate to incorporate a unit of measurement
into semantic scales, unless we want to claim that speaking English requires us to think in, say,
feet rather than metres.
5.3.1.1 Dimensions and Scale Structure
In our semantics, we have assumed that each adjective is assigned its own dimension, whose
scale structure is based on the real number line. Thus, gradable adjectives, as ‘nice’ and ‘big’,
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are associated with their own scale, just as ‘height’ is. This assumption is uncontroversial in
the case of adjectives such as, e.g., ‘tall’, ‘deep’, ‘heavy’, ‘big’, or ‘rich’, which are associated
with a clearly identifiable, measurable dimensions; however, it may appear questionable to do
so for all predicates.
There are many predicates that do not appear to be associatedwith a single, measurable
property, such as ‘nice’, ‘beautiful’, ‘clever’, ‘good’, and so on. In many of these cases, it may
be difficult to state a total ordering between elements, and it is often proposed that scales should
bepartially rather than totally ordered by the relation≤, while preserving monotonicity with
respect to this ordering: that is, if an individual is nice (or clever, or beautiful) to some extentd,
then that individual is nice (or clever, or beautiful) to anydegreed′ whered′ ≤ d. This ensures,
for example, that if Bob is tall and Bill is not tall (relativeto the same standard of tallness), then
Bill must be taller than Bob (see Klein [97, p. 684]).
In the case of adjectives such as ‘nice’ and ‘big’, there appers to be a connection with
more than one property dimension; thus ‘big’ appears to be correlated with greater height and
volume, and ‘nice’ suggests an indeterminate range of pleasing attributes; in a person, these
might include politeness, generosity, consideration for others in the case a person, and the
like. These and similar predicates are thus sometimes describ d asmultidimensionalpredicates
(e.g., Keefe and Smith [88, p. 5]). One might be tempted to pursue an analyse the meaning of
‘big’ or ‘nice’ as (weighted) functions of multiple dimensions, but this is not a precondition for
studying many of the semantic properties of ‘nice’, including the informational structure of its
associated scale.
5.3.2 The Informational Properties of Scales
It is common in the behavioural sciences to categorise scalein terms of theirinformative-
ness. The following four major types of scale are usually distinguished, in order of increasing
informativeness: the categorial, ordinal, interval, and ratio scales.3 Each scale higher in the
informational hierarchy subsumes the properties of those below it. Differences in ordinal data
allow us to infer which of two statements has greater intensiy, but nothing more—in particular,
a difference in ordinal scale values does not carry any information about the actualsizeof the
interval; thus, an ordinal scale might tell us that the phrase extremely tallhas a higher degree
thanvery tall, and that the latter in turn expresses a higher degree thanquite tall, for example,
but we would not be able to say anything about the relative sizof the difference. To capture
this kind of information, we need an interval scale, which allows us to determine which of two
3For a detailed explanation of the different measurement scale , see Stevens [152].
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differences in sentiment intensity is the larger one. If we fix an appropriate zero point on the
measurement scale, then we obtain a ratio scale, which allows us to determine theratio between
degrees; that a given degree is twice as large as another, forxample.
The reason for assigning a dimension to each predicate is to model aspects of its semantic
behaviour, such as contrasts between antonyms (e.g., ‘big’vs. ‘small’), and constructions which
express ordering, measurement, or judgements of differencs or ratios. The structure of the
scale determines the type of information that can be expressed. The issue we face is determining
what level of informativeness is appropriate for the scalesssociated with gradable adjectives.
For example, constructions which expressdifferencesandratios will require interval and ratio
scales, since these are the only ones with the appropriate structure to support such judgements.
All else being equal, the richer the phenomena, the higher the level of informativeness of the
scale associated with the adjective.
Let us consider the case of the adjective ‘nice’. There is no ready unit of measurement for
niceness, and we may often be at a loss to assign a total ordering fo niceness. However, there
are cases where an ordering can be assigned, and where it is also possible to express judgements
regarding thesizeof the interval as well, as in (104) below.
(103) a. Bob is taller than Bill.
b. Bob is a bit taller than Bill.
c. Bob is a lot taller than Bill.
d. Bob is taller than Bill by far.
(104) a. Bob is nicer than Bill.
b. Bob is a bit nicer than Bill.
c. Bob is a lot nicer than Bill.
d. Bob is nicer than Bill by far.
In informational terms, the judgements in (104), like (103), are richer than those associated
with an ordinal scale, and correspond to an interval scale.
Furthermore, it is possible to express ratio judgements in connection with gradable adjec-
tives such as ‘nice’, ‘smart’, ‘beautiful’, ‘big’, etc., asin (105) below:
(105) a. Bob isn’t even half as smart as Bill.
b. Bill is twice as smart as Bob.
c. Alice is ten times more beautiful than Eve.
d. Lucy is three times nicer than her brother.
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Given that the sentences in (105) are acceptable, then we need to assign them a semantic inter-
pretation. These statements express a ratio comparison, which in informational terms requires
not just an interval scale, but a ratio scale.
One might object that the ratio comparisons in (105) are not usually intended to be taken
literally but figuratively; that is, they are instances of hyperbole, akin to “France is hexago-
nal”, and the numerical ratio is employed pragmatically to convey a sense of the extent of the
difference between the things being compared. But even if this were the case, that would not
absolve us from giving these sentences a literal interpretation—even if what they communicate
turned out to be quite different from what they say. “France is hexagonal” has a clear literal
meaning, even if it is (strictly speaking) false. Taken at face value, these sentences express ratio
judgements, and one way to model the semantics thereof is in terms of a ratio scale.
Of course, there may still be alternatives to a real number scale; it might be possible to
use a scale based on the rational numbers rather than the reals to handle the cases in (105), for
example. Ultimately, the choice between the rationals and the reals will depend on issues such
as whether adjectival dimensions are best thought of as discrete or continuous.
We will not pursue the matter any further here. We hope to haveshown that the use of a real
number scale is not an unreasonable choice for the representation of adjectival dimensions.4
5.4 Adverbs and Gradability
5.4.1 From Adjectives to Adverbs
Our proposal has focused on gradable adjectives; however, there is scope to extend the analysis
to other types of expression. One possibility is to handle the p enomena of adverbial gradability
in the same way as adjectival gradability.
There are strong connections between adjectives and adverbs, fo example. Many adjectives
have related adverbial forms, for example, ‘quick’ / ‘quickly’, ‘slow’ / ‘slowly’, ‘former’ /
‘formerly’, etc. Also, many adjectives can apply to both indivi uals and events, especially
when they occur as adjunct predicates in the VP, as in (106) below.
(106) a. Englebert arrivedlate.
b. Bob surrenderedquick.
4Should it be necessary to adopt a more general alternative toth reals, we could always modify our model by
employingmodulesinstead of vector spaces, where a module is a generalisationof a vector space which is defined
over rings instead of fields.
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c. Alice drove awayfast.
Many adjectives have adverbial readings, including ‘former’, ‘sloppy’, and ‘beautiful’—indeed,
‘former’ only has an adverbial reading, as can be seen from (107) below.
(107) a. Englebert is aformerspy.
b. * Englebert isformer, and a spy.
c. Englebert wasformerlya spy.
(108) a. Alice is asloppywriter.
b. Alice issloppy, and a writer.
c. Alice writessloppily.
(109) a. Alice is abeautifuldancer.
b. Alice isbeautiful, and a dancer.
c. Alice dancesbeautifully.
Crucially, many adverbs appear to exhibit some of the same gradability phenomena that ad-
jectives display. We find antonymic pairs associated with the same property, e.g., ‘quickly’ /
‘slowly’, ‘carefully’ / ‘carelessly’, and so on. Adverbs can occur in a similar range of compar-
ative constructions, as shown in (110), (111) and (112).
(110) a. Englebert isquickerthan Bob.
b. Englebert ranmore quicklythan Bob.
c. Bob ranless quicklythan Englebert.
(111) a. Alice issloppierthan Eve.
b. Alice eatsmore sloppilythan Eve.
c. Eve eatsless sloppilythan Alice.
(112) a. Bob ismore fluentthan Bill.
b. Bob speaksmore fluentlythan Bill.
c. Bill speaksless fluentlythan Bob.
5.4.2 Extending LSS to Adverbs
Contemporary theories of event semantics, notably those influenced by Donald Davidson [33]
such as Castañeda [24],Parsons [126], Vlach [167] and Higginbotham [71][72], among others,
analyse adverbial modification in terms of an underlying predication on events.
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Recall that, in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, we defined a projection function,∂, which takes as
argument an individuala, and yields a function∂(a) from property dimensionsd to position
vectors ind. The subsequent application of the function∂(a) to a particular dimensiond′ then
returns a particular position vector ind′, the projection ofa ontod′.
We can extend the projection function,∂, straightforwardly to take events as arguments,
in addition to individuals. We assume a setE of events, and extend the domain of∂ to take
events as arguments as well as individuals: thus, given event e∈ E, ∂(e) denotes a function
from property dimensionsd ∈D to position vectors ind, and the expression∂(e)(d′) therefore
denotes a particular position vector in a dimensiond′, which we call theprojection of e onto d′.
We can employ the dynamic machinery of Chapter 4 to constructa thematic-role based
version of event semantics, along the lines of Parsons [126], in which the sentence “Brutus
killed Caesar” is assigned the semantic interpretation in (5.1) below (ignoring tense):
Brutus killed CaesarZ⇒ Ee1
~
w
w
KILLING (e1)
e1.agent= b
e1. theme= c
(5.1)
We will first run through a simple example of adverbial modification treating adverbs are prop-
erties of events. The example in (5.2) below shows a simple event-based interpretation for
‘quickly’:
quickly Z⇒ λe
~
w
w
QUICK(e) (5.2)
Since the event parameter in (5.1) is bound by the dynamic existential quantifier, the IAD
disclosure operation (Chapter 4, Definition 44) provides uswith the following additional trans-
lation for the sentence:
Brutus killed CaesarZ⇒ λE Ee1
~
w
w
KILLING (e1)
e1.agent= b
e1. theme= c
; E(e1) (5.3)
Combining the translation of ‘quickly’ with that for “Brutus killed Caesar” gives us the follow-
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ing interpretation forBrutus killed Caesar quickly.
Brutus killed Caesar quicklyZ⇒ λE Ee1
~
w
w
KILLING (e1)
e1.agent= b
e1. theme= c
; E(e1) λe
~
w
w
QUICK(e)
= Ee1
~
w
w
KILLING (e1)
e1.agent= b
e1. theme= c
; λe
~
w
w
QUICK(e) (e1)
= Ee1
~
w
w
KILLING (e1)
e1.agent= b
e1. theme= c
;
~
w
w
QUICK(e1)
= Ee1
~
w
w
KILLING (e1)
e1.agent= b
e1. theme= c
QUICK(e1)
(5.4)
Finally, by the application of the closure operator⇓, we obtain (5.5) as the representation of
the truth conditions of (5.4).
∃e1
KILLING (e1)
e1.agent= b
e1. theme= c
QUICK(e1)
(5.5)
In order to incorporate gradability into the analysis, we simply replace the definition of ‘quickly’
in (5.2) by the following:
Definition 45 (quickly)
quickly Z⇒
λe
Ew
~
w
w
SPEED(w)
w.p < w. f
w. f = ∂(e)(SPEED)
w.g = 0
The same derivation process as in (5.4) then gives us the following dynamic interpretation for
“Brutus killed Caesar quickly”:
Brutus killed Caesar quicklyZ⇒
Ee1
Ew
~
w
w
KILLING (e1)
e1.agent= b
e1. theme= c
SPEED(w)
w.p < w. f
w. f = ∂(e1)(SPEED)
w.g = 0
(5.6)
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Finally, we obtain the truth conditions for the sentence by means of the closure operator⇓:
∃e1
∃w
KILLING (e1)
e1.agent= b
e1. theme= c
SPEED(w)
w.p < w. f
w. f = ∂(e1)(SPEED)
w.g = 0
(5.7)
Although we are still exploring the extension of LSS to the analysis of adverbial gradability, ex-
amples such as this suggest that many aspects of our approachcan be applied straightforwardly
to gradable adverbs.
5.5 Conclusion
We regard the present dissertation as a contribution to a broade research programme concerned
with the investigation of the role that spatial concepts play in structuring multiple semantic do-
mains. Although there are well-known parallels between thesemantics of spatial and temporal
expressions, and theories such as VSS have investigated theconn ction between spatial prepo-
sitions and gradable adjectives, we do not know of other workthat has extended the parallel
to include tenses, let alone taken the ternary structure of Reichenbachian tenses as a model of
locative concepts.
The guiding hypothesis of this dissertation is that gradable djectives share a common un-
derlying semantic structure with spatial and temporal locative expressions. Accordingly, we
have developed a formal semantics for gradable adjectives within a broader semantic frame-
work for locative structures we have calledLocative Structure Semantics(LSS), which em-
ploys an abstract, cross-categorial semantic structure which we refer to as alocative structure
(L-structure).
Locative Structure Semantics (LSS) is a type of scalar, or deg ee-based, theory of gradable
adjectives (Section 1.2.5); in many respects, it can be regard d as an extension of Vector Space
Semantics (VSS) (Section 1.3), with which it shares a basic semantic ontology and the same
preoccupation with structural parallels across semantic domains. Technically, LSS departs
from VSS in the use of ternary L-structures instead of located v ctors, a feature inspired by
the Reichenbachian treatment of tense (Section 2.3). LSS also departs from VSS in according
a central role to the notion of aperspective, as found in the spatial, temporal, and conceptual
domains (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.2), and the incorporationof otions from Reichenbach’s
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theory of tense. A further difference is that LSS, in its dynamic version, attributes the same
(dynamic) type to both gradable and non-gradable adjectives (cf. Chapter 1, Section 1.2.5).
Like VSS, LSS employs vectors in its semantic ontology. The us of vectors and vector
spaces is motivated by the need for an abstract structure in which to represent the properties
of locatives from different domains. There is a substantialand still growing body of research
into spatial models of cognition and language; vectors are emin ntly suitable to the represen-
tation of configurational relations, especiallydistanceandrelative location, along a single or
multiple dimensions. This is pertinent to the semantics of gradable adjectives, where we use
vectors to represent locations in a conceptual space comprised of a number of property di-
mensions (HEIGHT, WEIGHT, etc.), as well as the relative position of locations along those
dimensions. Two fundamental vectorial properties that areespecially pertinent to the seman-
tics of all locatives aremagnitudeandorientation; in the case of gradable adjectives, magnitude
is used to model the degree of possession of a gradable property, while orientation is used to
model the contrast or opposition between antonymic pairs along the same property dimension
(e.g., ‘tall’/‘short’ in the case ofHEIGHT). In this regard, the ‘directed degrees’ proposed by
Bierwisch [14] can be seen as vectorial in nature.
The notion of an L-structure is a generalisation of a Reichenbachian tense to the level of
concepts in general: where Reichenbachian tenses are associated with aspeech point, S, an
event point, E, and areference point, R, locative structures are associated with aPerspective,
P, a Figure, F, and aGround, G. Indeed, Reichenbach’sS, E, R points may be regarded
as temporal instantiations of the more general categoriesP, F, andG; in particular, the speech
pointSis a temporal Perspective point, the event pointE is a temporal Figure, and the reference
pointR is a temporal Ground.
While the terminology of Perspective, Figure, and Ground israwn from Talmy’s work on
the semantics of spatial and locative expressions (Talmy [153]), the importance of the notion of
perspectiveor point of viewin semantic theory has been recognised in other semantic theories,
and constitutes a central tenet of the theory of Situation Semantics (see Barwise and Perry [9,
p. 39]). In Chapter 2, we presented the Perspectival parameter, P, as the primary locus of
contextual variability in the semantics of gradable predicates, a notion which we borrowed from
Barwise and Seligman [11]. We have observed several structural parallels between gradable
adjectives, pronouns and tenses, of the sort originally observed by Partee [127] between tenses
and pronouns, and argued that adjectival gradability should be treated as a form of pronominal
contextual assignment, in which theP (and sometimesG) components of an L-structure take
their value by deictic or anaphoric means. Again, the treatmnt of adjectival anaphora as akin
to tense and pronominal anaphora is original, to the best of our knowledge.
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In Chapter 3, we presented a formal semantics for gradable adjectives centred around the
notion of an L-structure which we introduced in Chapter 2. Wedefined an L-structure for-
mally as a ternary structure whose components are vectors, which in the case of adjectival
L-structures belong to dimensions in a conceptual space (cf. Section 3.2). We also defined
notions of orientation and magnitude for L-structures in terms of the relations between their
components (Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2), and presented a small formal fragment for adjectival
constructions (Section 3.3). We distinguished the semantic properties of gradable adjectives in
terms of configurations ofP, F, andG points on a dimensional scale, in a manner reminiscent
of the Reichenbach treatment of tenses in terms of configurations ofS, E, andR points on the
timeline, and proposed anadjectival measurability condition(AMC) in order to account for the
phenomena associated with MP modification (Section 3.4.2).We showed how to incorporate
the AMC into the semantic composition mechanism, as part of the lexical semantic definition
of the measure phrase. In Section 3.6 we provided a brief treatment of intersentential adjectival
dependencies using notions of dynamic semantics.
Certain aspects of theadjectival measurability condition(AMC), introduced in Chapter 3,
stand in need of further investigation. Although the AMC, asstated in Definition 22, has cer-
tain properties that make it appealing, including the fact that (i) it is extremely simple, (ii) it
applies uniformly to both comparatives and non-comparatives, and (iii) it can be incorporated
straightforwardly into the compositional semantic definition of the language. , it is equally true
that the AMC is too restrictive when considered as a cross-categorial characterisation of mea-
sure phrase behaviour. At best, the AMC might be adequate as ac tegory-specific constraint
on adjectives, but not as a global constraint on L-structures in general; while the semantic
compositional machinery can be modified to accommodate thisfact (cf. Section 3.5), a global
constraint on measurability, applicable to all L-structures, would be preferable. One candidate
for such a constraint is the modification condition (MC) of VSS discussed in Section 1.3.4 of
Chapter 1. While it would be relatively straightforward to import the MC into LSS, given that
the latter theory is basically an extension of the former, weare also currently investigating the
possibility that the AMC might be a special case of the MC, theresult of the interaction of the
MC with the particular geometric properties of the adjectival domain. We are also investigating
ways of making the AMC less restrictive, in order to allow forthe greater range of possibleP,
F, andG configurations in the spatial and temporal domains.
We have resolved certain technical issues that have proved highly problematic for VSS and
potentially other degree-based theories, notably the problems we described in Section 1.3.5
of Chapter 1, which we referred to as the ‘Divergent Type Problem’ and the ‘Coordination
Problem’: the first concerns the type incompatibility between gradable adjectives on the one
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hand, and non-gradable adjectives and all other predicateson the other, while the second is the
problem intersective constructions present to a vector-based theory. In Chapter 4, we exploited
Paul Dekker’s [35, 36] insight that in a dynamic model of meaning, existentially quantified
objects are not completely closed off to further specification, and so implicit arguments can be
‘hidden’ by existentially quantifying over them in the lexicon, while remaining accessible to
further specification by modifier phrases. Accordingly, we defined a dynamic version of LSS
using the theory of Dynamic Binding (Chierchia [25]), a variant of Groenendijk and Stokhof’s
Dynamic Montague Grammar, and made use of Dekker’s notion ofexistential disclosureto
address the existentially quantified L-structure parameter as if it were a free variable. The
result is a theory in which gradable adjectives can be interpreted as (dynamic) properties of
individuals (i.e., functions from individuals to context change potentials), and therefore share
the same (dynamic) type as gradable and non-gradable adjectives.
In Section 4.6, we discussed the extension of generalised conjunction to a dynamic setting,
and noted that hiding the L-structure parameter, by itself,provides at most apartial resolution
to the Coordination Problem. The recalcitrant cases involved constructions in which a single
modifier applies to the conjoined adjectives, as in Example 95, where the MP ‘20 centimetres’
in the sentence ‘The painting is[ 20 centimetres[ tall and wide]]’ modifies the conjunction ‘tall
and wide’. This led us to adopt a more radical approach, basedon a mechanism we called
Implicit Argument Disclosure(IAD), on which certain modifiers are treated as arguments of
the expressions they modify (cf. Definition 44). In Section 4.6.2, we observed that the IAD
provides a systematic way of treating modifiers of hidden parameters as arguments, and noted
that this undermines the distinction between arguments andmodifiers.
Finally, we should point out that several of the proposals wehave made in this dissertation
do not depend on the use of L-structures. The proposals regardin construction-specific con-
straints in Section 3.5, for example, are quite general in nature. Many of the ideas put forward
in Chapter 4 do not require the acceptance or use of L-structures, and can be quite straight-
forwardly incorporated into VSS or indeed any scalar or degre -based account. Thus, it is our
hope that even those who might disagree with some aspects of our thesis may find some of
value herein.
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[118] Richard Montague. Universal grammar.Theoria, 36, 1970.
[119] Richard Montague.Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague. Yale
University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1974.
[120] Reinhard Muskens. Combining montague semantics and discourse representation.Lin-
guistics and Philosophy, 19:143–186, 1996.
[121] Toshiyuki Ogihara.Tense, Attitudes, and Scope. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1996.
[122] Rohit Parikh. Vagueness and utility: The semantics ofcommon nouns.Linguistics and
Philosophy, 17:521–535, 1994.
[123] Terence Parsons. Some problems concerning the logic of rammatical modifiers.Syn-
these, 21(3–4):320–324, October 1970.
170
[124] Terence Parsons. Pronouns as paraphrases. Unpublished Ms., University of Mas-
sachusetts, Amherst, 1978.
[125] Terence Parsons. Entities without identity. In J. E. Tomberlin, editor,Philosophical
Perspectives, 1: Metaphysics, pages 1–19. Ridgeview, Atascadero, CA, 1987.
[126] Terence Parsons.Events in the Semantics of English: A Study in Subatomic Semantics.
Current Studies in Linguistics. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990.
[127] Barbara H. Partee. Some structural analogies betweentenses and pronouns in english.
The Journal of Philosophy, 70(18):601–609, 1973.
[128] Barbara H. Partee. Binding implicit variables in quantified contexts. Papers of the
Chicago Linguistic Society, 25:342–365, 1989.
[129] Barbara H. Partee and Mats Rooth. Generalized conjunction and type ambiguity. In
R. Bauerle, C. Schwarze, and A. von Stechow, editors,Meaning, Use and Interpretation
of Language, pages 361–383. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, 1983.
[130] H. Pilch. Comparative constructions in English.Language, 41(1):37–58, 1965.
[131] Manfred Pinkal. Towards a semantics of precization. In Thomas T. Ballmer and Man-
fred Pinkal, editors,Approaching Vagueness, pages 13–57. North-Holland, Amsterdam,
1983.
[132] Manfred Pinkal. Imprecise concepts and quantification. In R. Bartsch, J. van Benthem,
and P. van Emde Boas, editors,Semantics and Contextual Expression, pages 221–265.
Foris, Dordrecht, 1989.
[133] Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, editors.Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism:
New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
[134] Hans Reichenbach.Elements of Symbolic Logic. Macmillan, London, 1947.
[135] Mark Richard. Contextualism and relativism.Philosophical Studies, 119:215–242,
2004.
[136] J. R. Ross.Constraints on Variables in Syntax. PhD thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1967.
[137] Bertrand Russell. Vagueness.Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 1:84–
92, 1923.
171
[138] R. M. Sainsbury. Concepts without boundaries. In Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith,
editors,Vagueness: A Reader, pages 251–264. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and
London, England, 1997.
[139] Nathan Salmon. Tense and singular propositions. In J.Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein,
editors,Themes from Kaplan, pages 331–392. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
[140] G. Sampson. Good.Linguistic Inquiry, 1:257–260, 1970.
[141] Jerry Seligman. Perspectives in situation theory. InR. Cooper, K. Mukai, and J. Perry,
editors,Situation Theory and its Applications, volume 1 ofCSLI Lecture Notes, pages
147–191. CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA, 1990.
[142] Jerry Seligman.Perspectives: A Relativistic Approach to the Theory of Information.
PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, 1991.
[143] Jerry Seligman. Physical situations and informationfl w. In J. Barwise et al., editors,
Situation Theory and its Applications, volume 2 ofCSLI Lecture Notes, pages 257–292.
CSLI Publications, 1991.
[144] M. E. A. Siegel. Capturing the Adjective. PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts
(Amherst), 1976.
[145] M. E. A. Siegel. Capturing the russian adjective. In Barbara H. Partee, editor,Montague
Grammar, pages 293–309. Academic Press, New York, 1976.
[146] M. E. A. Siegel. Measure adjectives in montague grammar. In S. Davis and M. Mithun,
editors,Linguistics, Philosophy, and Montague Grammar, pages 223–262. University of
Texas Press, Austin and London, 1979.
[147] C. Smith. A class of complex modifiers in English.Language, 37:342–365, 1961.
[148] Roy Sorensen.Blindspots. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988.
[149] Roy Sorensen.Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford University Press, Oxford, England,
2001.
[150] Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson.Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Black-
well, Oxford, 2nd edition, 1995. First edition published in1986.
172
[151] Mark J. Steedman. Temporality. In Johan van Benthem and Alice ter Meulen, editors,
Handbook of Logic and Language, chapter 16, pages 895–938. Elsevier North Holland,
Amsterdam, 1997.
[152] S. S. Stevens. On the theory of scales of measurement.Science, 103:667–688, 1946.
[153] L. Talmy. Figure and ground in complex sentences. In J.Greenberg et al., editors,
Universals of Human Language, volume Four. Stanford University Press, Stanford, Cal.,
1978.
[154] L. Talmy. How language structures space. In H. L. Pick and L. P. Acredolo, editors,
Spatial Orientation. Plenum Press, New York, 1983.
[155] Leonard Talmy. Force dynamics in language and cognition. Cognitive Science, 12:49–
100, 1988.
[156] Leonard Talmy. Figure and ground in language. InToward a Cognitive Semantics,
Volume 1: Concept Structuring Systems, chapter 5. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
2000.
[157] Leonard Talmy. How language structures space. InToward a Cognitive Semantics,
Volume 1: Concept Structuring Systems, chapter 3. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
2000.
[158] Leonard Talmy. The relation of grammar to cognition. In Toward a Cognitive Semantics,
Volume 1: Concept Structuring Systems, chapter 1. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
2000.
[159] T. Trabasso and N. L. Stein. Using goal-plan knowledgeto merge the past with the
present and the future in narrating events online. In M. H. Haith, J. B. Benson, R. J.
Roberts, and B. F. Pennington, editors,The Development of Future-Oriented Processes,
pages 323–352. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1994.
[160] M. Tye. Vague objects.Mind, 99:535–557, 1990.
[161] P. Unger. There are no ordinary things.Synthese, 41:117–154, 1979.
[162] P. Unger. The problem of the many. In P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein,
editors,Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, pages 411–469. University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, MN, 1980.
173
[163] Jan van Eijck and Hans Kamp. Representing discourse incontext. In Johan van Benthem
and Alice ter Meulen, editors,Handbook of Logic and Language, pages 179–237. North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1997.
[164] Michiel van Lambalgen and Fritz Hamm.The Proper Treatment of Events. Explorations
in Semantics. Blackwell, Oxford, England, 2005.
[165] C. Vandeloise.Spatial Prepositions: A Case Study from French. The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1991. Translated by A. R.K Bosch.
[166] Zeno Vendler.Adjectives and Nominalizations. Mouton, The Hague, 1968.
[167] Frank Vlach. Temporal adverbials, tenses and the perfect. Linguistics and Philosophy,
16:231–283, 1993.
[168] A. von Stechow.ε-λ kontextfrei Sprachen: Ein Beitrag zu einer natürlichen formalen
Semantik.Linguistische Berichte, 34:1–33, 1974.
[169] A. von Stechow. Comparing semantic theories of comparison. Journal of Semantics:
Special Issue on the Comparative Construction, 3(1–2), 1984.
[170] S.-C. Wheeler. Attributives and their modifiers.Noûs, 6(4):310–334, 1972.
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